

# *American* SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

The Official Journal of the American Sociological Society

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SUPREME VALUES AND THE SOCIOLOGIST\*

HOWARD BECKER  
*University of Wisconsin*

**I** *The State of the Union.* You are all familiar with the long-standing antithesis between the so-called "meliorists" and "purists" within our • sadly *disunited* sociological "union." This antithesis, which in its social rather than its logical phases might better be called a controversy, recently has become even more definite because of an incipient parallel cleavage between "administrators" and "academicians." Those of us who have joined the staffs of the various governmental agencies sometimes feel that our friends who have remained within the ordinary university setup are slowly climbing the stairs of the well-known "ivory tower." The latter, on the other hand, perhaps feel that their detachment from programs of social amelioration gives them, or permits them to retain, advantages not possessed by their comrades.

Such unfortunate and unnecessary splits currently have been brought to the notice of the hitherto oblivious by indiscriminate name-calling which, although occasionally amusing, cannot but make the judicious grieve. Those of us who might otherwise be inclined to say, "A plague o' both your houses," have begun to realize that we cannot longer ignore the clamor.

Our concern, moreover, goes even beyond solicitude for the sociological enterprise. When, literally speaking, the destiny of the greater portion of mankind seems to be following courses of previously unimagined portent, it ill beseems the sociologist to remain on his pedestal. And if "mankind" has a hollow ring, what about these United States? The steadily intensifying world crisis has caused many of us to think through our earlier statements about the role of the sociologist.

Not in a weakly compromising spirit, however, but out of genuine intellectual conviction, I maintain that both the "meliorists" and the "purists" have customarily put their cases in ways that render them quite indefensible. Further, I think it is possible to state those cases so that previ-

\* Presented to the American Sociological Society at Chicago, Dec. 29, 1940.

our irreconcilabilities are eliminated. It seems best for me, however, to restrict my efforts to making my own position clear both to others and to myself. If a number of us succeed in doing this, it may then be possible for someone with symphonic gifts to bring harmony out of what has heretofore sounded like discord. Let us, therefore, reexamine some of the traditional issues, casting aside the pride of consistency, and with it all contentiousness.

II. "*The World Is So Full of a Number of Things.*" The slogan, "No value-judgments in sociology," has been misused by its adherents (and here I make no exception of myself), and misunderstood by its opponents. Implicit or explicit assertions of final, irreducible preferences are absolutely inescapable. Only when a distinction is made between *ultimate* and *proximate* preferences and the values built upon these preferences can misuse and misunderstanding be avoided. But more of this later.

The same slogan has been taken to imply fundamental differences between "cold, hard facts," which are presumably the same for all "objective" observers, and moral interpretations of those "facts," which vary radically from person to person. There are differences, beyond doubt, between certain aspects of the phenomena with which men interact and of which they themselves are parts, but such differences are certainly not of this simple, so-called "objective-subjective" character. On the contrary, they seem to inhere in the differing preference-systems within which various aspects of the phenomenal world are incorporated. Here again, "more of this later."

Having hinted at this relevance to preference-systems, however, let us at once be on guard against the solipsisms,<sup>1</sup> of whatever sort, that such hints might seem to impose upon us. Certainly no one but the consistent solipsist raises doubts about the existence of a world "external" to ourselves, no matter how little we may know about the "real nature" of that world. Further, few of us would be willing to grant that our world is in the strict sense an "empirical chaos";<sup>2</sup> it seems to exhibit structural traits not wholly relative to the observer. So far, then, there may be said to be a world of "fact."<sup>3</sup>

Nevertheless, this world manifests for mankind distinguishable aspects of tremendous number and diversity. We perhaps need not champion Spinozism by insisting that "an infinity of aspects" is a more suitable statement,

<sup>1</sup> Here I have in mind not only the traditional solipsisms, but also the "solipsism of the response" implicit throughout George A. Lundberg's *Foundations of Sociology* (1939).

<sup>2</sup> In an essay on "Historical Sociology," *Contemporary Social Theory*, 529, New York, 1940, Barnes, Becker, and Becker, eds., I have been guilty of using this Kantian phrase. I think, however, that I have avoided the serious consequences that ensue when it is taken literally.

<sup>3</sup> This is what the constructive typologist is driving at when he says that his constructs must be objectively possible if they are to have any scientific significance. Analogy: No judge at a dog show is at liberty to "construct" an Airedale with cast-iron stomach and swivel casters for feet.

but we must maintain that there is no known limit to the ways in which the world may be related to observers. A pine forest is a different body of preferred phenomena for a botanist, a hunter, a forester, a farmer, a geologist, an artist, a recluse, and a lost child. Beyond question, the forest *is*—but *what* is it? Not only does it have differing aspects for each kind of observer, but it has differing aspects for botanists, *A, B . . . n*, for hunters *A, B . . . n*, and so on and on. Further, the forest may be viewed by men who combine several observer-capacities within themselves; there may be botanist-hunters, forester-farmers, recluse-artists, and the like, throughout a stupendous range of permutations and combinations. Running as a constant motif through these shifting patterns, moreover, is the persisting influence of the language in terms of which the observers take note of, arrange, and communicate their variously-assorted "facts." Up to this point of our exposition, the tacit assumption has been made that they all speak the same tongue. When we introduce the additional factors of linguistic diversities—syntaxes, accidents, vocabularies, and all the paraphernalia familiar to the comparative philologist—we may begin to feel that Spinoza's "infinity of aspects" comes uncomfortably close to the truth.

Our growing uneasiness is only heightened when we take account of the multitudinous moral, ethical, and religious interpretations to which this forest may be subjected. To the recluse, the over-arching pines make manifest the goodness of God or the benevolent spirit of Nature, and in contemplative mood he holds invisible communion. To the lost child, the gloom of the deep woods and the utter stillness speak of disembodied but all-powerful Evil, and in terrified mood he cowers in near collapse. To the artist, the uprooting of underbrush and the cutting of fire-lanes not only destroys beauty but violates Nature's moral code, and in indignantly righteous mood he fervently protests against such utilitarian desecration. To the geologist, the forest is simply an indication of the probable character of the strata that underlie it, and in dutiful mood he cuts down the giants of the forest in order to make test borings at strategic points.

Manifestly, the forest is, in a sense, "all things to all men." Some of the "facts" it exhibits may be "colder" and "harder" than others, but what are "the objective facts?" At precisely what points do preferences destroy objectivity? Is it not clear that the answers to these questions cannot be couched in terms of the old "objective-subjective" dualism? These questions are rhetorical; let us nevertheless try to answer them.

III. *The Scientist "Knows What He Likes."* Science, including sociology, *prefers* certain aspects of the world to others and may even be said to delineate or carve out those aspects because of such preference. Ever since the time of the Babylonian astrologers, and perhaps long before, men have sought, in differing provinces of life, for "the systematic statement of the probability of the . . . [hypothetical] or actual recurrence of phenomena

which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical."<sup>4</sup> In other words, they have sought for prediction. In this search they have, wittingly or unwittingly, disregarded all other aspects—esthetic, ethical, religious—of the world of which they are parts.

What men have been willing to regard as successful prediction has differed tremendously in differing eras, but the end sought, it seems to me, always has been control. The magician seeks control even as does the scientist; the difference between their activities lies chiefly in the frequency with which the predicted results come about, plus the consonance of these results with verified predictions in other phases of life. Usually, although not invariably, this frequency and consonance has not been determined by careful comparison of data other than those included in the predictive act, but by sheer adaptive worth—oftentimes in terms of naked survival. The magician whose incantations against the plague have been highly prized, himself succumbs; sacrifices before battle lose their accustomed efficacy, as testified by defeat; oracles foretell enduring rule for a king only to encounter a usurper; and the like. Isolated societies, shielded from the blunt "criticism" of culture contact, may for a long time preserve an inadequate predictive system, but migrations and similar accessibility-producing events demonstrate the inadequacy of the old system and not infrequently introduce a new one that more closely fits "means" to "ends."

Similarly, a scientific system, such as the Ptolemaic astronomy, yields predictions regarded as sufficiently accurate until a Copernicus breaks down the mental isolation of its upholders. The history of science shows that the first step in this breakdown is usually taken by calling attention to failures in prediction that cannot be explained away without introducing complications into the old system which its most skilled exponents cannot handle satisfactorily. The next and decisive step is achieved when it can be shown that the new system yields superior predictive power and is sufficiently simple to be within the capacities of ordinary scientists. Needless to say, the upholders of the old system do not yield without a struggle, for many of them are too advanced in years to make the shift, and others have vested interests in it represented by subsidiary theories, "authoritative" books, and like commitments. Hence, science is a perpetual battleground in which victories are predictively determined. Scientific prediction is the ultimate test, and its momentum overcomes the inertia of the internal consistency of postulational systems. These systems are not destroyed so much as simply pushed aside; they no longer yield control, and hence, *finis*. Their symmetry, logical perfection, persuasive power, time-hallowed prestige, esthetic

<sup>4</sup> Barnes, Becker, and Becker, eds., *op. cit.*, 22. Note that "hypothetical" has been substituted for "potential." The latter is too limited in meaning, and introduces irrelevant and erroneous connotations. Much recurrence is hypothetical, but only a portion of this hypothetical recurrence can be regarded as potential. See pages 159-161 of this paper.



appeal, religious orthodoxy, and other "advantages" are dismissed as irrelevant; the scientist *prefers* control.

It will be noted that "prediction" and "control" have just been used interchangeably. This usage is warranted only if the peculiar nature of the control preferred by the scientist is kept steadfastly in mind.

To predict the recurrence of phenomena is, in a certain sense, to control that recurrence if it is possible to reinstate or reconstruct the conditions under which previous recurrences have taken place. The scientist may not have any interest whatever in bringing about an actual recurrence; he may be quite content to say that "if and when" certain factors are combined in certain ways, the results are predictable. The supreme test is experimental, but when a number of experiments sufficient to diminish chance to insignificance have been performed—and a small number of experiments, under some circumstances, may suffice—the scientist as scientist has achieved all the control he seeks: "When this is done, these—within a small range of variation—*must* be the consequences."

Further, the scientist may get the control he is after even when he is not able to reinstate the conditions of previous recurrences, i.e., when actual, manipulative experiment is impracticable or impossible. He may, in other words, attain hypothetical control through mental reconstruction and/or extension of such reconstruction. Instance: astronomers are able to say, because of the study of certain aspects of the heavens over a long period, that mass, time, and movement are in certain definite relations with each other. They can therefore say that if the mass of the moon were altered in a determinate amount, its orbit and its cycle would also be changed in determinate amounts. Obviously the mass of the moon has not yet been added to or subtracted from by astronomers; there has been no experimentation! Nevertheless, most of us are willing, because of eclipse prediction and the like, to regard astronomy as an exact science—indeed, as one of the most exact of all the sciences. Now, this "if the mass of the moon were altered" is *hypothetical* control or, if you will, *hypothetical prediction*, on the basis of previously observed recurrences of related phenomena, of phenomena never before specifically observed. Like instance: comparative philologists have records of human speech that go back as far as, or even farther than, the astronomer's records of celestial changes. Even though until recent times the philologist's records are merely written, he is frequently able, through the analysis of puns, meters, rhymes, alliterations, assonances, and the like, to determine with a high degree of accuracy how a given "dead" language was actually pronounced throughout the greater part of its career. Moreover, he can often do the same for a "living" language, and in addition can predict the changes still to occur. Many languages have been subjected to such analysis, and on the comparative basis thus afforded, the philologist can therefore say that if he could rear a number of children in entire isola-

tion from all other speech contacts and was given liberty to train them to pronounce a few key words in certain ways, all the rest of their pronunciation would follow a predictable though hitherto unexemplified pattern. Here again we have hypothetical control.

The varieties of control thus far discussed, whether hypothetical or actual, have all had an orientation toward the future, both with regard to the predictive act and with regard to the phenomena predicted. Putting it differently, I have tried to make clear the implications of actual prospective prediction and hypothetical prospective prediction. *There need be a prospective reference, however, only in the predictive act itself*; it is not necessary that the recurrence of the phenomena under examination take place in the future. Appropriate example: paleontologists frequently reconstruct animals long extinct. They often carry out their task on the basis of fragmentary evidence—a jawbone here, a thighbone there, a shoulderblade elsewhere. Filling the gaps between these odds and ends may be data gleaned from apparently similar species alive today, or from comparison with seemingly related extinct forms having a like habitat, or from specimens of the same species in earlier stages of development. Thus fortified, the paleontologist ventures an assertion like this: "If and when a complete skeleton is discovered, our reconstruction *will* be found to be substantially correct." This is retrospective prediction, for the skeleton which will provide the validation lies under strata deposited millenia ago. The only essential reference toward the future is in the "will," which is the inseparable component of the predictive act. There is no actual prospective prediction; the biology supply houses which stock our laboratories do not yet breed dinosaurs for the market, and Frank Buck doesn't "bring 'em back alive"—or dead. There is no hypothetical prospective prediction, for no living animal species known at present is evolving in the dinosaur direction; the phenomena in question have only an infinitesimal probability of future recurrence. The prediction is hypothetical in the same way as altering of the mass of the moon is hypothetical: "If we found a fresh dinosaur egg or could produce a dinosaur mutant by X-ray bombardment of an iguana egg, and if we had proper environmental conditions, we could raise a dinosaur which would provide verification of our reconstruction." Finally, to repeat, the prediction is retrospective because the recurrence which will provide the validation presumably has occurred already; it is only the validation which lies in the future, and it is only to this that the future-ward orientation implied in "before-saying," or "pre-diction," refers.

Example even more appropriate: hypothetical retrospective prediction may be achieved when data which do not have to be discovered at some future time, i.e., which are already available, are reexamined in the light of the given prediction. Let us take our comparative philologist again. He knows a great deal about vowel shifts and like changes in speech patterns

in certain Indo-European languages, but neither he nor anyone else has examined Old Prussian, let us say, with an eye to related vowel shifts. Nevertheless, he may say: "When Old Prussian texts now in the University of Dorpat library are examined, my prediction that vowel shifts demonstrably occurring in similar tongues have also occurred in Old Prussian will be verified." Old Prussian has not been spoken for centuries, and the texts are similarly ancient, hence the prediction is retrospective. It can be made explicitly hypothetical, *à la* our "mass of the moon," if there seems any point in so doing, by saying this: "If a group of children could be brought up in entire isolation from all other speech contacts, and if the earliest form of Old Prussian could be taught them, and if their descendants could be isolated from everything but the Old Prussian spoken by the original and succeeding groups, certain vowel shifts resulting from the immanent development of the language would clearly appear in the speech of a substantial proportion of the fourth generation." Manifestly only the validation of hypothetical retrospective prediction is a matter of the future; *all else is past*.

Astronomy, geology, paleontology, archeology, zoology, botany, philology, ethnology, and several other sciences make much use of retrospective prediction. When the sociologists recover from the paralyzing fright they have suffered as a result of being roundly denounced as poachers by the idiographic historians, they too may profit by study of bygone days. As matters now stand, it is possible to find so-called sociologies of religion, for instance, which leap all the way from "our primitive contemporaries" in Polynesia to "our contemporary primitives" in Fundamentalia without so much as touching toe to ground in between. At any rate, it is one man's opinion that retrospective prediction in sociology has possibilities as yet unexploited, and that if we are really in earnest about prediction and its inseparable corollary, control, we will soon remedy our present shortcomings.

One last point here: the scientist as scientist does not necessarily covet *applied* control. In other words, he is not ipso facto a utilitarian because he is a scientist. When once a scientific elite has developed, direct utilitarianism in science wanes. The standards of that elite relate to hypothetical or actual control only in so far as such control provides selective criteria for and validation of predictive inference; once these are supplied, there may be no overwhelming interest in "putting science to work for the good of mankind." To be sure, scientific activity receives continued support from the lay public, in this modern day, only because actual control is applied in socially approved ways by some sciences, or by the various technologies drawing upon these sciences. The scientific elite, however, usually presents a closed front to utilitarian probings, and in thus following the maxim of "One for all and all for one," sees to it that the lay public does not get a

chance to single out a few of the members of this elite as conspicuously "useless."

In earlier periods, of course, each individual scientist had continually to justify himself, or at least to attempt so to do, by producing evidence that his control could be made actual and would be applied—generally by the scientist himself. The next step was to assert that apparently useless activities were designed to make eventual application of control possible—an assertion that in many cases was not the issue of wholehearted belief. The final step is taken when a scientific elite develops solidarity, as was pointed out above; at present some scientific value-monotheists—of whom "more later"—proclaim the dictum of "Science for its own sake." Regardless of what we may think of such value-monotheism, there can be little doubt that it has at least temporarily banished the utilitarian criterion of the "worthwhileness" of actual, applied control. *Hence, the way in which "control" is used in these pages carries with it no suggestion of a utilitarian sanction for science.*

Now I must return to the main topic, namely, the scientist's special preference-system. One striking peculiarity of the preference for control, the hallmark of science, is that it has no necessary connection with curiosity as ordinarily defined. Veblen's "idle curiosity" as the origin of science—as commonly interpreted—seems to me a half-truth that is worse than outright error. The members of a gaping crowd in front of a sidewalk pitch-artist are idly curious; so also are those rolling stones who roll "for to admire an' for to see, for to be'old this world so wide"; so also are village postmasters who read postcards and hold up letters to the light; so also are poolroom loungers who saunter out to see a dogfight; so also are Peeping Toms. (The last-mentioned, by the way, do not seem to provide the chief sources for the recruitment of astronomers, microscopists, genito-urinary physicians, and similar "peepers"—psychoanalysis to the contrary.) No; the disciplined curiosity of the scientist has definite historical origins as a culture pattern (most widely diffused since the Renaissance), and cannot be assigned to that old standby, "human nature."

In similar case is the "instinct of workmanship" stop-gap. No one can successfully deny, of course, the importance of technology in relation to science, but technology is a far cry from workmanship. The Chinese ivory carver, executing unbelievably intricate fretwork, is a workman *par excellence*; so also is the tattooer who covers the skins of his patrons with swirls of geometric and naturalistic patterns; so also is the butcher who can split the backbone of a beef with four strokes of his meat-axe; so also is the weaver who after ten years of steady toil produces a marvelous Gobelin tapestry; so also is the old-fashioned cigarmaker whose pridefully cultivated ambidexterity dazzles the onlooker. These workmen may all be "curious" about better ways to perform their traditional tasks, they may



take keen delight in demonstrating their skill, but they are not scientists, nor does science spring from such sources. "Human nature" again—what havoc that notion has wrought!

Likewise, the "urge to classify" must be dismissed in quite as cavalier a manner. The boy with a postage-stamp collection is a classifier; so also is the dilettante librarian who arranges books according to size and color; so also is the maid who "straightens" a study by carefully placing all loose notes and papers in the drawers and pigeonholes which they fit most closely. Granted, taxonomy is part of many sciences, but scientific taxonomy is not classification as such; it is oriented toward prediction and control, not toward order merely for the sake of internal consistency, esthetic gratification, ready reference, or "tidiness." "Human nature" has failed us once again.

Moreover, it is apparently very difficult, to say the least, to explain the scientific preference for control by tracing it back to the "motivating" personality traits or proximate values of individual scientists. I should not wish to deny that there may be some such thing as a scientific temperament *per se*, or a few well-marked subtypes of such a temperament, but I can say that the historical record as I know it provides little satisfactory evidence. One biographer may say that his subject was attracted to science because of the prestige it promised to yield; another, that the appeal for his subject lay in the privilege of demonstrating the wonders of God's cosmic design; another, that feeble health in childhood made a quiet, regular, sedentary calling imperative; another, that great family forerunners sounded the call of duty; another, that rivalry with a brother gave the cue; another, that a penchant for playing with puzzles was manifest early in childhood; another, that mischief-making proclivities led to elaborate practical jokes involving much planning and manipulation of material objects; another, that training for the bar was too expensive, and hence science, with attendant fellowship opportunities, was chosen as second best. Where is the least common "psychological" denominator?

In the light of all this and much more which might be adduced if space permitted, many competent researchers are inclined to think that the scientific preference for those aspects of the phenomenal world which can be subjected to control arises or becomes dominant only in societies undergoing certain kinds of change. A convenient term, covering these changes fairly well, is found in "secularization."<sup>5</sup> The scientific preference is bound up with the "social role of the man of knowledge" (to use Znaniecki's apt designation) in secularizing or highly secularized societies.<sup>6</sup>

This means that the scientific preference is not generated from "within,"

<sup>5</sup> Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, New York, 1938, vol. I, *passim*, but esp. chap. IV.

<sup>6</sup> Florian Znaniecki, *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*, 113-199, esp. 113-135, Chicago, 1940.

as it were, but is imposed from "without."<sup>7</sup> Widely discrepant "motives" or proximate preferences may lead men to play the scientific role, but once that role is assumed, all preferences other than the ultimate scientific preference must be excluded. The scientist "knows what he likes" in the sense that he possesses hypothetical or actual control of those aspects of the phenomenal world which the scientific preference has defined as amenable to such control—that is, the "cold, hard facts," which are "cold" and "hard" because they are control-preference facts.

Plainly this is a circular statement, but we can break the circle by taking account of the historically demonstrable circumstance, mentioned earlier, that inadequate postulational systems are superseded, if at all, when their inadequacy is demonstrated by repeated or disastrous failure to predict, unmanageable complication, extinction of their adherents, or loss of influence on a dominant elite. Here, certainly, Goethe's maxim of "Die and develop!" applies. Of one thing the scientist can be sure—that the working postulational system of today will be the museum piece of tomorrow.

*IV. The Priesthood of the Scientist.* Thus far I have tried, with how much success I cannot say, to refrain from introducing the question of the moral or ethical bearing of the scientist's preference-system. At this point, however, it must be confronted. "No value-judgments in science" is usually taken to mean that not only are scientific formulations ethically neutral, which is true enough, but also that the scientist who does the formulating is ethically neutral, which is arrant nonsense. Only the surviving assumptions of a faculty psychology which drew a sharp line between Reason and Passion, or the comic-strip inference that all scientists are completely schizoid or paranoid, could ever have gained currency for the myth of the scientist's personal impartiality.

To develop further a point which, although apparently extraneous, is not altogether so: it seems clear that science is basically dependent on control-preference. This preference for those aspects of the phenomenal world which offer promise of successful subjection to hypothetical or actual control seemingly does not arise out of innate propensities or special temperamental gifts, but is absorbed from, or even imposed by, general cultural patterns which make control paramount. Such culture patterns have definite ethical orientations. For whatever reason, the control-aspects of the phenomenal world must be thought important by some group which sooner or later comes to be tolerated. This means that the multifarious other aspects of the phenomenal world hinted at above do not seem to be threatened by the control-preference group. At the very least, those noncontrol aspects are

<sup>7</sup> This is a mere figure of speech; I do not mean to subscribe without reservation to Durkheim's "exteriority" and "constraint." This much, however, may justifiably be said: the scientist is held in line by other scientists and their criticism as well as by his own "scientific conscience." Further, he must *learn* to prefer control, although a modicum of this learning is oftentimes automatically acquired in a culture where science has prestige and is widely diffused.

not held to be of such overwhelming significance for everyone that scientific activity is thereby checked. In other words, science is held to be permissible, and such permissibility is ethically determined. How indifference or hostility to control-preference as nonethical or anti-ethical may prevent scientific development is shown in the following letter, quoted by William James and prefaced by his comment:

The aspiration to be "scientific" is such an idol of the tribe to the present generation, is so sucked in with his mother's milk by every one of us, that we find it hard to conceive of a creature who should not feel it, and harder still to treat it freely as *the altogether peculiar and one-sided . . . interest* which it is . . . the way in which it even now strikes Orientals is charmingly shown in the letter of a Turkish *cadi* to an English traveler asking him for statistical information . . .

"My Illustrious Friend, and Joy of my Liver!

The thing you ask of me is both difficult and useless . . . I have neither counted the houses nor inquired into the number of the inhabitants [of this place]; and as to what one person loads on his mules and another stows away in the bottom of his ship, that is no business of mine. . . .

Listen, O my son! There is no wisdom equal unto the belief in God! He created the world, and shall we liken ourselves unto Him in seeking to penetrate into the mysteries of His creation? Shall we say, Behold this star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail goeth and cometh in so many years? Let it go! He from whose hand it came will guide and direct it.

. . . I praise God that I seek not that which I require not. Thou art learned in the things I care not for; and as for that which thou has seen, I spit upon it. Will much knowledge create thee a double belly . . . ?

O my friend! If thou wilt be happy, say, There is no God but God! . . .

IMAUM ALI ZADI"<sup>8</sup>

We smile at our good *cadi* and, as I think, rightly, but it must not be forgotten that, considered simply as a preference-system, his faith is as good (or as bad) as ours. It is only when we begin to define the ultimacy of values in terms of what we hold to be the possibility of their attainment that we can say which values "should" be regarded as "ultimate." If bitter experience had shown that preference for the control-aspects of the phenomenal world yielded no real control, hypothetical or actual, prospective or retrospective, there would be as little warrant for faith in science as there is for faith that all things happen by Allah's decree. This has been aptly put:

. . . though nature's materials lend themselves slowly and discouragingly to our translation of them into ethical forms, but more readily into aesthetic forms; to translation into scientific forms they lend themselves with relative ease and completeness. The translation, it is true, will probably never be ended. The perceptive order does not give way, nor the right conceptive substitute for it arise, at our bare word of command. It is often a deadly fight; and many a man of science can say, like Johannes Müller, after an investigation, . . . ["The work is blood-stained"]. But victory after victory makes us sure that the essential doom of our enemy is defeat.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II: 640, italics mine.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

But we are not yet done with our *cadi*. He might say that the battle for control is not yet over, and that though the scientist, like Napoleon, may conquer a whole continent, one unsubjugated island still makes faith in final victory neither more nor less than a faith—and he would be right.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the worthy *cadi* might point to the so-called “paradox of consequences”; namely, that actual, applied control in one phase of life may be the very reason why another phase gets out of control. We control the air and are faced by the bombing plane; we control chemicals and are faced by poison gas; we control conception and are faced by a “birth strike”; we control pneumonia and are faced by a steeply-mounting old-age pension load; we control the Buffalo Plains and are faced by the Dust Bowl and the Grapes of Wrath; we control lynching and are faced by Mr. Dooley’s “Sure, thot State has no trouble wit’ mobs, fer there they jist give a nayger a fa-air and impa-artial thrial and *thin* hang him.” Such circumstances lead to the scientific declaration of faith, “The remedy for the consequences of actual, applied control is more actual, applied control.” If the *cadi* then said, “I can’t see that the defeat of the enemy is *certain*”—again he would be right.

The upshot of these reflections is that mere preference for control cannot account for the persistence of the scientific enterprise. Such preference necessarily transmutes itself into ultimate value; the scientist becomes a priest of the faith in the possibility and the supreme desirability of control. The secular society in which he has grown up and which sanctions his preference-system is endowed with sacred values by his enterprise; the quest for control becomes a quest for the Holy Grail. Nonrational? Yes! What ultimate values have ever been rational? Impartial? No! What priest was ever impartial?

But now we encounter something quite odd. The ethical partisanship of the scientist is precisely the reason why his scientific formulations are ethically neutral! Not only does his initial preference-system tend to preserve him from the seductions of other aspects of the phenomenal world, but in addition his faith in the desirability of control prevents him from being troubled by the skeptic’s gibe, “Control for what?” Further, the fact that “Control for what?” can be asked at all shows how void of content control, in its scientific meaning, really is. Scientific control may or may not be actual; it may or may not be applied. Now, this emptiness of control as a value-category permits it to be related to other ultimate and proximate values of the most divergent sorts and still to retain its own character as an ultimate value. Regardless of the end to be attained by a man acting in a given social role, he can, if he is also a scientist, view the means to that end

<sup>10</sup> He might also say that the difficulty of translating nature’s materials into ethical terms is no reason why such translation should not be attempted and persisted in—and again he would be right.



in his scientific role, and can say whether or not there seems to be any possibility of attaining it.

This of course can be done only by the man who, as it were, is a "value-polytheist;" i.e., who is a successful scientist in one role and a striver toward a different end or ends in other phases of his life. Such "value-polytheism," however, is not rare in the history of science, and in sociology we need name only Max Weber, Wiese, W. I. Thomas, Park, Znaniecki, MacIver, and Goldenweiser to establish the point. But, once again, "more of this later." If "value-polytheism" within a single personality is not impossible, it should then be clear that there is a much greater possibility of treating control as an ultimate value in your own scientific role and at the same time treating it as a mere means in the role of someone else.

Epitomizing: "The systematic statement of the probability of the hypothetical or actual recurrence of phenomena which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical" is an ultimate value, an end in itself, in the scientific role. Nevertheless, it may be merely a means to the attainment of another ultimate value in another social role, or even only a means for determining whether or not it is "worth while" to put forth the effort for the attainment of that other end in that other role.

The ethical neutrality of any formulation which can be called scientific is guaranteed as over against all ethical alternatives *other than the supreme end of control*, but with regard to the faith of science itself there is not and cannot be ethical neutrality; you are either a scientist in your calling or you are not. If you work on a different preference-basis, or if you refuse to project the control-preference beyond the "paradox of consequences" and thus refuse to accept it as a faith, you may be and, I venture to say, probably are just as good a human being, but you do *not* play the scientific role.

The slogan "No value-judgments in science" must therefore be expanded to read as follows: "No value-judgments in science which derive from sources other than *the supreme value-judgment that control is ultimately desirable* are ethically permissible by the scientist in his specifically scientific capacity."

Scientists, when they are fully aware of the faith that is in them, form a Church for the preservation and propagation of the Supreme End. They may not have a Pope, but they certainly have a College of Cardinals. Further, they have a doctrine akin to "the indelibility of the priestly character." As long as a scientist adequately carries out the functions of his office, his motives for performing those functions are irrelevant as far as the efficacy of his performance is concerned. Otherwise put, the personal motives or proximate preferences of the scientist are irrelevant; if his formulations further the supreme value of control, it matters not whether he is merely seeking a promotion, lusting for political power, trying to be of service to the "underprivileged," defending his nation, upholding his class,

or demonstrating the omniscience, benevolence, and omnipotence of his God. The *argumentum ad hominem* has no place in science; the only question is, "Does this formulation yield control we have not previously possessed?"

The Church of Science, moreover, applies "sanctions." If a scientist strays off the straight and narrow path by injecting other preferences and other ultimate values into his supposedly scientific work, he will soon find that his books are no longer in the Sacred Canon, that his articles can be published only in journals which lack the *Imprimatur* and *Nihil Obstat*, and eventually he may discover that all his writings are in the *Index Ex-purgatorius* or even the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*. Worse still, the institution with which he is identified may suffer Interdict, and he himself may be visited with Excommunication.

This is as it should be, if one has initially accepted the Scientific Faith. Absolute neutrality as regards all other criteria of "good" and "bad" must be maintained if control is to go on from victory to victory, as the Faith of Science necessarily assumes. If a formulation is mere wishful thinking, not only other scientists but the lay world as well will find it out, and the scoffers and skeptics will rejoice. The "sinews of research" and other conditions which make it possible for the scientist to strive for the extension of control will then be placed in jeopardy. Hence, any "sanction," no matter how severe, that will deter heresy makes for the good of the Church and of the Scientific Faith it enshrines. *In hoc signo vinces.*

V. "Value-Polytheism" and "Value-Monotheism." Turning once more to the controversy between the "meliorists" and the "purists" which has furnished the occasion for this paper, I am now prepared to assert that when once "value-polytheism" and "value-monotheism" are clearly distinguished, many of the controversial issues disappear. Going further, I maintain that neither "meliorist" nor "purist" has any advantage if once the significance of social roles is clearly recognized.

It is possible for certain key roles to exert great influence on the way the other roles are played, particularly if the key roles are infused with an absolute and strongly emotionalized ethics. Such an ethics is one in which personal motives (or proximate values) and ultimate values are in close correspondence. Examples: The social worker who is deeply sympathetic with her clients as well as professionally conscientious; the lawyer whose zeal for justice leads him to accept only "right" cases; the scientist whose conviction of the desirability of control is so great that he willingly sacrifices funds saved for the education of his children in order to carry out a crucial experiment. Personalities like this are continually carrying on an active conversation of roles, and may achieve a considerable degree of consistency in a limited range of conduct. The differing situations they encounter elicit differing responses, but nevertheless their Hamlet sounds strangely like their Ophelia, Laertes, and Horatio. In other words, they are value-monotheists.

Such persons frequently succeed in their key roles; the concentration of effort and the drive resulting from high integration are great aids. They may, however, be so limited by their preference-system and value-loyalty that their concentration and drive are self-defeating; initial errors are persisted in because nothing can shatter the internal consistency of their postulational structure and their conviction of being ethically infallible. Value-monotheism, then, yields unity of purpose but carries with it the danger of mental isolation and rigidity.

Many of our ardent "meliorists" and our extreme "purists" are adherents of value-monotheism. Where the "meliorists" are concerned, the key role is not scientific, but patriotic, democratic, humanitarian, or religious. This role tends to dominate all the others, and when the ardent "meliorist" attempts to respond scientifically, he literally cannot perceive the essential control phenomena. His preference-system does not work that way because his ultimate value-loyalty imposes another preference-system, in which control is not paramount. Where the extreme "purists" are concerned, they sometimes think they have secured control merely because they have resisted the blandishments of other preferences and ultimate values both in the scientific role and in all other roles. Failure to predict accurately can always be "explained" by using the very postulational system to which the failure was due, by stressing good intentions and ethical integrity, and by the familiar "We need more research along this line." The Faith of Science is firmly held not only for the scientific role but for all conduct whatsoever, reminding one of Montaigne's character "who sought the quadrature of the circle even while he lay with his wife."

Even in an isolated, sacred society it is difficult to find any one role which grants full scope to the potentialities and actual capacities of the personalities out of which the network of societal relations is woven. The shaman, witchdoctor, or magician role perhaps comes as close to absorbing completely the full personality of the man who plays it as possibly can be conceived, but even the shaman may be a spouse, a father, a craftsman, a "politician," an "ingrouper," a beggar, or a spy. The number of defined and specifically assigned roles is of course less in a sacred society than in a secular one, but there is nevertheless a considerable range of "individuality"—meaning thereby that total personality and assigned role or roles coincide only roughly.

When we turn to secular societies such as those in which science has an opportunity to develop, we find that the range of possible roles is much greater. It becomes more and more difficult to find one that takes in an overwhelmingly dominant proportion of any personality which has developed in such a society. Personality and society being intertwined as they are, it follows that a complex and changing society bears and is borne by complex and changing personalities. The university professor may also be

a citizen, a Democrat, a patriot, a teetotaler, a P.T.A.-er, a Rotarian, a Mason, a Methodist, a practical joker, a commuter, a Book-of-the-Monther, a customer, a renter, a golfer, a woman-hater, a penny-pincher, and a tenor. (He also may be a scientist.) These roles are fairly easy to reconcile; our conventional professor can play all of them and still be free from advanced schizophrenia. But he cannot play all of them at once—what single situation can possibly elicit all the responses of which he is capable? When we turn to those unconventional persons of whom even a university community provides samples, the range of possible responses is much greater and the impossibility of eliciting a large proportion of them in any one situation more evident.

To be sure, the norms of success in a society marked by high differentiation make it imperative to play one role *well*. Again we give William James the word:

Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well-dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a *bon-vivant*, a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a "tone-poet" and a saint. But the thing is simply impossible.<sup>11</sup>

Some potentialities that conflict with the key role, in other words, must be permitted slowly to dwindle—if, indeed, they were ever potentialities at all. But not *all* roles are in deadly conflict—*there* is the taproot of value-polytheism.

It is entirely possible to be both humanitarian *and* scientist, patriot *and* scientist, artist *and* scientist, religionist *and* scientist. There is danger, of course, that one preference-system will block out the other, that one ultimate value-loyalty will stifle the other, or that there will be a fateful mixture of both roles which will vouchsafe no opportunity of playing either well. Yet I should hesitate to say that the dangers of value-polytheism are greater than the dangers of value-monotheism. Always remembering the personal equation, I would even say that they are less.

Here, then, may be the remedy for "the state of the union." Value-monotheism we will have, and all honor to it, but let us also grant to our fellows the privilege of being neither "meliorists" nor "purists" only, but both. There is no good reason why a man passionately convinced of the dire need for national solidarity should not devote his efforts to the pursuit of that ultimate value and still be a sociologist who subjects his work in his scientific role to the requirements of the Scientific Faith. There is no good reason why a man passionately convinced of the dire need for actual, applied scientific control, whatever the end, should not devote his efforts to the pursuit of *that* ultimate value and still be a humanitarian who subjects his work in that role to the requirements of "the men of good will." As John Buchan has so cannily said:

<sup>11</sup> William James, *ibid.*, 401.



Wherefore to God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,  
Mary the Blessed Mother, and the kindly Saints as well,  
I will give glory and praise, for them I cherish the most,  
For they have the keys of Heaven, and save the soul from Hell.  
But likewise I will spare for the lord Apollo a grace,  
And a bow for the lady Venus—as a friend but not as a thrall.  
'Tis true they are out of Heaven, but some day they may win the place;  
For gods are kittle cattle, and a wise man honours them all.

VI. "*United We Stand . . .*" What do these considerations mean in the everyday routine of the private or public research bureau, the classroom, the study, the statistics laboratory, and the field?

First, I think, they mean that we must insist on scientific freedom. If a man in his scientific role has reached conclusions which seem to him and his colleagues to yield control not previously possessed, he has the right to make them known through the channels permitted under the "sanctions" previously mentioned. If he fears that his formulations may be used for ends in radical antagonism to the supreme end of scientific control, he may justifiably take steps which will keep these formulations esoteric. Certainly he is under no compulsion to become a mere technologist who prostitutes the powers of science to political systems which kill at the source all scientific endeavor which conflicts with the ends of those systems. "We cannot remain free from the biases of lore if we do not foster a bias in favor of science."<sup>12</sup>

Second, it seems to me that we have a right to demand from the public and from our "meliorist" and "purist" fellows *freedom to practice value-polytheism*. Insofar as our work is professedly scientific, it must be judged by scientific standards, not by patriotic, humanitarian, or religious standards. Insofar as we have time, energy, and inclination to be patriots, humanitarians, or religionists, we have the right to play those roles up to the hilt. No protests about "public servants in politics" or "professors in politics," for example, should have the slightest weight with us. It is not our fault that Hatch-Act legislators and journalists perpetuate the hoary myth that we should be indifferent to all save the advancement of our particular scientific specialties. Moreover, it is not our fault that the lay public grants prestige to us in our nonspecialized roles which properly belongs to us, if at all, only in our specialized capacities. The same unwarranted prestige attaches to the business man, the minister, the artist, and the politician. Let the public learn to discriminate, and in the meantime let us mount our political platforms, our stages, our forums, or our pulpits, if we feel so inclined, and speak as free men and American citizens!

The "purist" may say, of course, that this demand for value-polytheism, this fight for freedom, is nonrational. So what? Is the fight for "pure

<sup>12</sup> Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, vol. II: 1177, New York, 1938.

science" rational? Have we forgotten our *cadi*? Even if "pure science" were a rationally demonstrable goal, can it be preserved in its purity when the scientist is chained to the chariot of political systems which deny the ultimate value to which, in his role, he is dedicated?

For myself at least, doubts are dead. The freedom to "travel any road, under the sun, under the stars, nor doubt if fame or fortune lie beyond the bourne" is for me the Heart of the Bruce and, I hope, for you as well. You will remember that the dying request of the Bruce was that his heart might be buried in the Holy Land. Accordingly, his faithful follower, the Douglas, together with many another doughty warrior, set sail for Palestine, but on the way thither they heard that Alfonso of Castile was sore bestead. The Saracens were pressing him hard, hence the Douglas, to whom the Heart of the Bruce had been entrusted, decided that the fight against the enemies of Christendom need not wait until the Holy Land was reached. He and his men rode out and did battle; the issue was in doubt. Then the Douglas took "the casket with lions thereon wrought that shrined the heart of the Bruce," flung it far into the Saracen ranks, charged after it with his warriors, and scattered the heathen hosts. When the field was cleared of the living, the body of the Douglas was found, one arm outstretched in death, but upon that arm was a shield, and under that shield lay the golden casket. Thus was the battle-shout of the Douglas fulfilled: "Heart of the Bruce, I follow thee or die!"

Friends and fellow-workers, the enemies of freedom threaten. Let "meliorists" and "purists" forget their differences; let us be men who gladly do what must be done.

## MEASUREMENT OF SOCIATION\*

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**I**dentification of the Kind and Intensity of Inter-Human Attitudes. To measure sociation, the degree of interaction in a group, the kind and intensity of attractions and repulsions among persons in a group must first be determined. This may be done with the aid of an adaptation of the sociometric techniques of Moreno in the form of the *Group Membership Record*, an instrument on which persons who have participated in social interaction with other persons long enough to react to them as values have an opportunity to indicate their interhuman attitudes by choosing those with whom they would or would not like to participate in a specified group activity.<sup>1</sup>

The *Group Membership Record*, in its most recent form adapted for use in the classroom, consists of two parts: (1) a directions sheet and (2) the *Record* proper, as follows:

### GROUP MEMBERSHIP RECORD

#### *Directions*

That class groups may be intelligently improved will you kindly indicate how you feel about working with each of the members of the class in a study and discussion group? Those whom you select may be assigned to your group later. Your selection will be treated confidentially and used only for the improvement of class groups and for scientific study. You can feel free to follow your own feelings.

1. After each name indicate how you feel about having this person in a class group of which you may be a member. If you would like to have the person in your group, encircle "yes." If you would not like to have the person in your group, encircle "no." If you are indifferent about having the person in your group, encircle "I."

2. Examine the name of each person after which "Yes" has been encircled. Place a "1" after the "Yes" following the name of the person who is your first choice for membership in a class discussion group of which you may be a member. Continue until you have made choices in order from first choice to ——— choice.

\* Presented to the Section on Psychiatry and Sociology of the American Sociological Society, Chicago, Dec. 27, 1940.

<sup>1</sup> See J. L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive? A New Approach to the Problem of Inter-human Relations*, Washington, D. C., 1934; Leslie Day Zeleny, "Sociometry of Morale," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, December 1939, 799-806; W. I. Newstetter, M. J. Feldstein and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Group Adjustment, a Study in Experimental Sociology*, Cleveland, Western Reserve University, 1938; Helen Jennings, "Structure of Leadership," *Sociometry*, July-October 1937, 99-143.

<sup>2</sup> The number of choices should bear some constant relationship to the size of the class to make comparisons possible. Also, note that it might be good practice to place no limit on the number of choices. For example, one may be simply asked to place a ✓ after the names of every person marked "yes" who would be very acceptable as a group member and another ✓ after the name of every person marked "no" who would be very unacceptable as a group member. The validity of this plan is not known, but it allows a freer expression of attitudes.

3. Examine the name of each person after which "No" has been encircled. Place a "1" after the "No" following the name of the person who is your last choice for membership in a class discussion group of which you may be a member. Continue until you have made —\* choices from last choice to — from last choice.

4. In the right hand column under "Reasons" please give your reasons in every case possible for your selections indicated above.

*Remember, your selections may determine the membership of the groups to which you may be assigned later. Also, it should be clear that your selection of persons is for class groups only and not for other groups.*

## GROUP MEMBERSHIP RECORD

Name	Group Number	Date
Names	Group Membership	Reasons
1	Yes....No....I	_____
2	Yes....No....I	_____
3	Yes....No....I	_____
4	Yes....No....I	_____
n	Yes....No....I	_____

The *Record* first provides an opportunity for each person to select those he would like to have in his class or discussion group, those he would not like, and those toward whom he is indifferent. The first two selections will represent half units of intensity of attitudes ( $\pm 0.50$ ) and the last represents a zero unit of intensity (0.00). The reliability of this part of the *Record* has been determined; for example, correlations between "acceptances" on two administrations of an early form of the *Record* were, in three trials, all over .910.<sup>2</sup> The *Record* also provides for an indication of "choices"; the selection of those for whom one has more intense attractions and repulsions. In this manner, *degrees of intensity* of attitudes may be determined. Here we enter the more precise field of measurement.

Accepting (for the present) all "choices" as having the same weight, they may be considered a second half unit of intensity of attraction or repulsion. For example, a person who receives a mere acceptance, or "yes," from another receives but one half unit of attraction; but a person who receives a "yes" and also one of the "choices," receives an additional half unit of attraction—a total of one unit.<sup>3</sup> Thus, we have a unit for sociometric or

<sup>2</sup> "Sociometry of Morale," *op. cit.* Separation of the sexes is a refinement of importance not accomplished in these studies.

<sup>3</sup> No attempt is made here to distinguish between the intensity of first, second, and third choices; further research may or may not make these distinctions possible. This means, too, that it is not known whether a second half unit of intensity (a choice) is the equivalent of twice the first half unit of intensity, the square of it, or some other multiple. For the present, a linear relationship is assumed; and because of the satisfactory results so far obtained this relationship is assumed to be suitable for practical use at least.


Note also that the unit of magnitude of intensity of an attitude is so chosen that the *sociation index*,  $S = I \pm D$ , may have unity for its maximum value and thus vary in magnitude from  $(+1.00 \pm 0.00)$  to  $-1.00 \pm 0.00$ .



sociological measurement. That the "choices" are reliable has been shown by correlations between first and second administrations of the *Record*—none were less than .938 in three trials.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, one may conclude that the *Record* is a reliable instrument for the measurement of the intensity of attraction among persons in groups in a college classroom. The reliability of the *Record* as a measure of repulsion is implied in these correlations; and subsequent calculations demonstrate the soundness of this assumption.<sup>5</sup>

The validity of the measured attitudes is not so easy to determine; but

FIGURE 1. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE INTENSITY OF ATTITUDES.



The graphic representation of (1) two half units of intensity of an attitude of attraction; (2) one half unit of intensity; (3) zero units of intensity; (4) one half unit of intensity of an attitude of repulsion; and (5) two half units of intensity of an attitude of repulsion. P represents a person. The numerals give the magnitudes of the attitudes in the units as defined.

correlations of  $r = .538 \pm .082$  between attractions and ratings on the Partridge scale and  $r = .87 \pm .027$  between "choices" and Partridge ratings as well as the logic of the *Record* imply its validity.<sup>6</sup>

For clarity one may represent the different intensities of attitudes as shown in Figure 1. Thus, in the upper diagram, P stands for the person ex-

<sup>4</sup> See "Sociometry of Morale," *op. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> Note the high reliability of social status ratios computed with positive and negative intensity of attitudes as given in the section on *Measurement of Status*.

<sup>6</sup> See "Sociometry of Morale" *op. cit.*; E. Dalton Partridge, "Leadership Among Adolescent Boys," New York, 1934; and "Group Adjustment," *op. cit.*

pressing an attitude, the solid line represents an attitude of attraction, and the dot at the end of the line represents two half units, or one unit, of an attitude of attraction. In this manner, attitudes ranging from one unit of intensity of attraction to one unit of intensity of repulsion may be shown graphically. When the kind and intensity of attitudes between persons in a group or community of groups has been determined, the degree of sociation in each group may be calculated.

*II. Measurement of Sociation.* Sociation, defined as the average of the units of intensity of all the interpersonal attitudes in a group ( $I$ ) plus or minus the average deviation of the intensities of the attitudes from  $I$  ( $D$ ), may be expressed mathematically in a *sociation index*,  $S$ , as follows:


$$S (\text{sociation index}) = I \pm D. \quad (1)$$

When  $I$  equals the intensity of an attitude (attraction or repulsion) of a person toward another person in a group,  $n$  equals the total of the possible attitudes, and  $N$  equals the number of persons in the group, then

$$S = I \pm D = \frac{\Sigma I}{n} \pm D = \frac{\Sigma I}{N(N-1)} \pm D. \quad (2)$$

The *sociation index* of the group represented in Figure 2 then is

FIGURE 2. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF A *Sociation Index* OF  $+1.00 \pm 0.00$  UNITS.




Sociation among three persons, A, B, C, in a group. Each of the six possible attitudes, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, are represented as having one unit of attraction intensity.

$$\begin{aligned} S &= \frac{\Sigma I}{N(N-1)} \pm D = \frac{1+1+1+1+1+1}{3(3-1)} \pm D \\ &= \frac{6}{6} = +1.00 \pm 0.00 \text{ units} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where the  $+1.00$  represents the average intensity of the attitudes and the  $\pm 0.00$  represents the average deviation in the group from  $I$ .

Again, the *sociation index* of the group represented in Figure 3 may be calculated in a similar fashion.

FIGURE 3. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF A Sociation Index OF  $-1.00 \pm 0.00$  UNITS.



The lowest degree of sociation between three persons, A, B, C. Each of the six possible attitudes is represented as having one unit of repulsion intensity.

In this case, where each attitude of repulsion has a maximum magnitude of  $(-1)$ , the average intensities of the attitudes is also  $(-1)$ ; applying equation (1),

$$S = I \pm D = \frac{\Sigma I}{N(N-1)} \pm D = \frac{(-1) + (-1) + (-1) + (-1) + (-1) + (-1)}{3 \times 2} \pm D$$

$$= \frac{-6}{6} = -1.00 \pm 0.00 \text{ units.} \quad (4)$$

In a case of three persons, where there are an equal number of attitudes of plus and minus unity,

$$S = I \pm D = \frac{+1 + 1 + 1 + (-1) + (-1) + (-1)}{3 \times 2} \pm D$$

$$= 0.00 \pm 1.00 \text{ units.} \quad (5)$$

In a case where all three are indifferent toward one another,

$$S = I \pm D = \frac{0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0}{3 \times 2} \pm D = 0.00 \pm 0.00 \text{ units.} \quad (6)$$

In practice, the attitudes differ in numerical magnitude, and the average deviation from the mean cannot be determined easily by inspection. In such cases, let  $d$  represent the deviation of any one attitude from the mean of all the attitudes, then the average deviation

$$D = \bar{d} = \frac{\Sigma d}{n} = \frac{\Sigma(I - \bar{I})}{N(N-1)} \text{ units} \quad (7)$$

where the sign of the intensities is considered only in relation the distance of  $I$  from  $I$ . Then, the *sociation index*

$$S = I \pm D = \frac{\Sigma I}{N(N-1)} \pm \frac{\Sigma(I \sim I)}{N(N-1)} \text{ units.} \quad (8)$$

The calculation, in general, of both  $I$  and  $D$  of the *sociation index* is illustrated by that for a group of three persons as follows:

$$I = \frac{\Sigma I}{N(N-1)} = \frac{+1 + 0.5 + 0 + (-0.5) + 0 + 0.5}{3 \times 2} = + \frac{1.5}{6} \\ = + 0.25 \text{ units,} \quad (9)$$

$$D = \frac{\Sigma(I \sim I)}{N(N-1)} = \frac{.75 + .25 + .25 + .75 + .25 + .25}{3 \times 2} = \frac{2.50}{6} \\ = 0.42 \text{ units} \quad (10)$$

from which

$$S = I \pm D = + 0.25 \pm 0.24 \text{ units.}$$

From the foregoing illustrations, it is seen that the average of the attitudes,  $I$  alone does not give a satisfying numerical representation of the sociation in a group. In the cases of equations (5) and (6), the average intensities are the same, although in one group there exists interhuman attitudes of attraction and repulsion of one unit of intensity and in the other group, all the attitudes are of indifference. The average deviation,  $D$ , shows clearly the great difference in sociation in the two groups and adds significantly to the proper representation of the group. The *sociation index*, when it is defined as including both  $I$  and  $D$ , gives a satisfying numerical representation of the sociation within a group. Although the magnitude of  $D$ , as used here, is placed immediately after the calculated value of  $I$  in the manner employed for indicating the limits of observational error in the physical sciences, it does not represent observational error. It represents *A.D.* as used in social statistics.

For the purpose of clarity in explanation, the *A.D.* is used throughout; for more precise statistical treatment of large arrays, the standard deviation,  $\sigma$ , may be used. In using  $\sigma$ , one may substitute  $\sqrt{\Sigma d^2/n}$  for  $\Sigma d/n$  in the above formulas and in those to follow.

The high reliability of this *sociation index* is indicated by reliability correlations of not less than  $r = .819 \pm 0.57$  and validity correlations of not less than  $r = .701$  for  $S$ 's similarly computed.<sup>7</sup>


<sup>7</sup> See "Sociometry of Morale," *op. cit.*, 805-806. Different symbols were used and the data in the old formula were incomplete; but the results point definitely to a high reliability and validity of the *sociation index*. Furthermore, since the *Group Membership Record* is a reliable measure of attitudes, it must follow that the *sociation index* is also reliable.



III. *Measurement of Social Status and Adjustment.* Social status of a person in a group, defined as the average intensity of the attitudes of all the members of the group (or groups) expressed toward a person, may be measured in the same manner as sociation. This average intensity of attitudes, together with  $\pm$  the average deviation of intensities, may be called the *social status index* and may be represented by *SS*. Thus,

$$SS = I \pm D = \frac{\Sigma I}{n} \pm \frac{\Sigma d}{n} = \frac{\Sigma I}{N-1} \pm \frac{\Sigma(I \sim I)}{N-1} \text{ units.} \quad (11)$$

FIGURE 4. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF A SOCIAL STATUS OF  $+0.25 \pm 0.75$  UNITS.



Representation of the number and intensity of the attitudes received by A from his associates B and C.

To illustrate, a person A, Figure 4, receives 2 half units of attraction from person B and one half unit of repulsion from person C. Then his social status in that group as measured in terms of the social units is

$$\begin{aligned} SS = I \pm D &= \frac{\Sigma I}{N-1} \pm \frac{\Sigma(I \sim I)}{N-1} = \frac{+1 + (-0.5)}{3-1} \pm \frac{0.75 + 0.75}{2} \\ &= +0.25 \pm 0.75 \text{ units.} \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

*SS*'s may range from  $+1.00 \pm 0.00$  to  $-1.00 \pm 0.00$ .<sup>8</sup>


At this point, additional evidence of the reliability of the *Record* and the *Social Status Index*, as computed with the inclusion of repulsions and "indifferents" as well as attractions may be presented. A product-moment correlation between *SS*'s computed from data procured with the assistance of the *Record* administered to a community of classroom groups on successive days (one half unit of intensity of attitudes used) was  $r = .919 \pm .018$ ;

<sup>8</sup> The status of a person in a community might be the average of his statuses in all the groups to which he belongs. This paper does not answer this problem, however. See Leslie Day Zeleny, "Measurement of Social Status," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, Jan. 1940, 576-582. It deals only with status in the classroom community.

( $N=34$ ). Again, a product-moment correlation between  $SS$ 's computed with the use of one unit of positive and negative intensities of attitudes, as provided for on the latest form of the *Record* (described herein), was  $r=.977 \pm .005$ ; ( $N=25$ ). Again, the high reliability of the *Record* as well as the  $SS$  is demonstrated.

Social adjustment, defined as the average intensity of mutual attractions and repulsions between a person and each of his associates in a group, plus or minus the average deviation, may be measured in the same manner as sociation and status.

FIGURE 5. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF A SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT INDEX OF  $0.38 \pm 0.44$  UNITS.



Representation of the number and intensity of attitudes received and given by A in a group.

The social adjustment of person A to a group is illustrated in Figure 5. Here the *social adjustment index*,  $SA$ , with its average deviation, is shown by inspection to be expressed in general by

$$SA = I \pm D = \frac{\sum I}{n} \pm \frac{\sum d}{n} = \frac{\sum I}{2(N-1)} \pm \frac{\sum(I \sim I)}{2(N-1)} \text{ units} \quad (13)$$

and in the illustrated case to be

$$SA = \frac{(-0.5) + 0.5 + 0.5 + 1}{2(3-1)} \pm \frac{0.88 + 0.12 + 0.12 + 0.62}{2(3-1)} \quad (14)$$

$$= +0.38 \pm 0.44 \text{ units.}$$

In the foregoing manner, sociation, status, and adjustment may be measured; consequently, a basis for sociological experimentation has been provided.

Once sociation can be measured, sociological experimentation may be carried on—in the home, the church, the office, the factory, the army, the community, the school, and in many kinds of communities of groups.

First, the degree of sociation may be determined, then an experimental factor can be introduced and the degree of sociation measured again. Similarly, the effects of experimental factors on status and adjustment may be measured. In this way, some sociological principles may be established empirically and experimentally under more rigorously controlled conditions than are generally possible.

To illustrate the possibilities of such sociological experimentation, some sociometric studies in classrooms organized as a community of groups were carried out.

*IV. The Classroom—A Sociological Laboratory.* Accepting the reliability and validity of the indices of sociation, status, and adjustments as established, it is possible to use the classroom, organized as a community of groups, for sociological and educational experimentation. For example, the degree of sociation in a classroom may be measured, an experimental factor introduced in all or some of the groups, and the degree of sociation measured again. Also, status and adjustment may be measured, experimental factors introduced, and the changes in status and adjustment measured. Finally, sociometric measurement itself may reveal significant conditions in the classroom. In this manner, experimentation similar to that (but not the same) which has made possible advances in the physical sciences may be carried on; for one may measure immediately the effects of an experimental factor.

Additional possibilities in educational experimentation are made available by the development of sociometric measures. For example, the effects of different degrees of sociation upon learning may be studied; factors affecting status and adjustment may be isolated and learning in sociometrically organized groups, conducted by sociometrically selected leaders, may be compared with learning in classes organized along more traditional lines.

*Experimental Control of Sociation.* In one classroom, the sociation indices of three groups were computed; then, upon the basis of a tabulation of the attitudes of each person toward everyone else in the community or classroom groups, new groups with higher sociation indices were formed. In this manner, an increase in average sociation index from .733 to .90 was accomplished—an increase of 23.2 percent. A second time, experimenting with seven groups, a change of an average of  $S$  from .754 to .914 was made—an increase of 19.5 percent.<sup>9</sup> Again, a classroom community of four groups with an average  $S$  of .285 was changed with the aid of sociometric measurement to a classroom of seven groups with an average  $S$  of .445, an increase of 60.7 percent. Furthermore, at the same time that the magnitude of  $S$  is controlled, the  $SS$ 's within each primary group (not the community) are

<sup>9</sup> See "Sociometry of Morale," *op. cit.*, 806. The  $S$  was computed as a morale quotient and repulsions were not included. Also, only one half unit of intensity was employed.

also changed. Thus, the "satisfyingness" of the learning situation may be controlled.

*Sociometric Study of Race Cleavage.* Sociometric measurement may be used to study race cleavages in the classroom. For example, Joan Criswell<sup>10</sup> used sociometric measures in school classrooms, composed of varying percentages of Whites and Negroes, to determine the currents of attraction and repulsion flowing between two races. She administered simple sociometric exercises—asking children to indicate in writing their choices of those by whom they would like to sit in the classroom. Later, she investigated the reasons for the choices made. When the data were assembled, a picture of the racial cleavages in the classroom in different school grades was available. Briefly, Criswell found that there was less racial fusion in the upper grades than the lower grades, that "skin cleavages appear in majority-colored classes" more decidedly than in minority-colored classes. In this manner racial, class, and other cleavages may be studied in the classroom.

*Sociometric Study of a Delinquent Group.* Leona M. Kerstetter,<sup>11</sup> by sociometric testing in a fifth grade, identified an isolated group of five boys; that is, they were attracted to one another but their attractions toward others outside the groups remained unreciprocated. Investigation showed that this group was rejected by the school community and the wider community because of its delinquent activities. Later, the class was divided into study groups upon the basis of subject-matter interest and ability, those with the highest sociometrically determined status being made leaders. In this way, the members of the delinquent group were placed in different groups. Here new associations were made and new interests developed. A later sociometric test revealed that the change in grouping had definitely begun to break down the isolation of the delinquent group and that the processes of socialization had begun. Thus, sociometric measurement made it possible to carry on a sociological experiment.

*Selection of Group Leaders.* An important part of every classroom group is the leader, defined as the one who receives more attractions from his associates than any other in a given group. Though a teacher may judge leaders with some accuracy by voice and appearance, selection and placement of leaders in the groups where most acceptable can be done only by sociometric measurement.

When a class is first organized into groups, the instructor may know none of the students; consequently, he will need to select leaders by appearance and voice. This plan allows for limited but immediate primary group contacts. After a time, each member of the group may rank every other mem-

<sup>10</sup> Joan H. Criswell, *A Sociometric Study of Race Cleavage in the Classroom*, New York, *Archives of Psychology*, 1939.

<sup>11</sup> Leona M. Kerstetter, and Joseph Sargent, "Reassignment Therapy in the Classroom," *Sociometry*, July 1940, 293-306.



ber in leadership. The one who receives the highest average rank, i.e., the one who receives the most attractions, is the one whom others are willing to follow. This method has been shown to be both reliable and valid.<sup>12</sup>

But still the very best combination of leaders and followers has not been made. This can take place only after groups have been reorganized a number of times to provide the opportunity for each student to participate in interaction with every other. At this time, the *Record* may be administered, the attitudes tabulated or charted, and the most satisfactory combination of leaders and followers may be made.

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL STATUS INDICES OF A CLASS OF TWENTY-TWO COLLEGE JUNIORS AND SENIORS

Student	<i>SS</i>	$\pm D$	
1	.64	.34	Superior Social Status
2	.50	.33	
3	.48	.07	
4	.40	.06	← .42 ( <i>SD</i> + .25)
5	.31	.07	
6	.29	.08	
7	.26	.17	
8	.24	.14	
9	.24	.11	
10	.21	.12	
11	.21	.37	
12	.21	.02	
13	.21	.06	
14	.19	.07	<i>M</i> = .17, <i>SD</i> = .25
15	.17	.04	
16	.12	.20	
17	.02	.45	
18	.00	.52	
19	-.07	.39	← -.08 ( <i>SD</i> - .25)
20	-.12	.65	
21	-.29	.74	Inferior Social Status
22	-.48	.46	

Arrows indicate the approximate range of  $\pm 1SD$ .

It may also be pointed out that studies have been made of the characteristics of leaders and nonleaders. It has been demonstrated that those who attain a high status possess measurably higher ratings by their associates on the following qualities:<sup>13</sup> self-confidence, ability to participate in a group, quickness of decision, finality of decision, forcefulness, intelligence, knowledge, insight, steadiness of purpose, tact, self-control, good voice and appearance. Students who possess or *develop* these qualities in a relatively high degree are those who receive the largest number of attractions from their fellows in the primary groups of the classroom.

<sup>12</sup> Leslie Day Zeleny, "Objective Selection of Group Leaders," *Sociol. and Social Research*, March-April 1940, 326-336.

<sup>13</sup> Leslie Day Zeleny, "Characteristics of Group Leaders," *Sociol. and Social Res.*, Nov.-Dec. 1939, 140-149.

A person, then, to attain a higher *SS*, must develop the foregoing mentioned qualities in higher degree. Sociometric measurement thus points the road to be followed by the educator who wishes to develop personality in students.

*Development of Personality.* The possibilities of sociometric measurement as an aid for the development of personality in the classroom may be further explored. With sociometric data, one may compute the *SS* of each person in the classroom community, arrange them in an array and compute the range, mean, and standard deviation. From a study of this distribution, students with high, average and low social status may be located. Table 1 gives an array of social status indices for a class of twenty-two students.

In this class, the average *SS* was .17, the range was from  $.64 \pm .34$  to  $-.48 \pm .46$  and the *SD*, 0.25. The deviations seem to be greatest at the extremes of the array and smallest in the central portions, probably due to the limited number of choices. From these indices, with their average deviations, the classroom instructor may identify those students who need guidance in personality development. In fact, they all need guidance, for few reach as high an index as  $+.50 \pm 0.00$  which it is possible for all to obtain under the conditions under which the *Record* is given.

At this point, additional evidence of the reliability of the *SS* may be obtained from the results of several repetitions of the *Record* with different classes organized on the community plan. The following table gives the results of four administrations.

TABLE 2. SHOWING THE RANGE, MEAN, AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF FOUR ARRAYS OF *SS*'s.

Array	N	Range	Mean	SD
1	22	.64 to (-.475)	.170	0.250
2	25	.715 to (-.415)	.225	0.265
3	25	.60 to (-.34)	.165	0.225
4	32	.62 to (-.515)	.210	0.250

In these four classes, the range, mean, and *SD* were fairly stable. There is not much question, therefore, that the *SS* is a reliable measure. Also, the table suggests norms. Apparently, an *SS* falling between .17 and .225 is about average in sociology classes in the college studied; and persons who obtain an *SS* of .25 above the average may be considered relatively superior in status and those who are 0.25 below the average may be considered relatively inferior in status in the same classroom.

The motives for the attitudes expressed on the *Record* are also important. From these, one may learn the reasons for a person's status. Then an instructor is in a position to offer to the student advice of the kind that might enable him to raise his status with his associates. For example, the following

actual *SS*'s and "reasons" given by different students were very helpful in advising students.

$$SS = .64 \pm .34 \text{ "Reasons":}$$

Enthusiastic; student seems logical; well prepared; easy to get along with and has contributions to make; speaks as one who knows, but sees opinion of others; good secretary and organizer; talks and prepares; makes suggestions; can assimilate material read and relate to problems confronted; does not say very much but what he says is important; good group leader; does much research; can make conclusions; interesting speaker; good student; has a lot to contribute; cooperative and a contributor; good information; organizes thinking of the group; conflicting impressions; thorough; uses intelligent discussion.

Persons with a high *SS* were considered (with very few exceptions) well informed, good participants, and well adjusted socially. In other words, they had the characteristics of leaders in high degree.

On the other hand, persons with an average *SS* were considered by many as fair participants.

$$SS = 0.17 \pm .04 \text{ "Reasons":}$$

Likes his way of doing things; cooperative; easy to work with; not too reliable; noncooperator; has material; a sense of humor and adjusts easily; lack of preparation; broad-mindedness; has ability to understand others; cooperative; has initiative; can explain his viewpoints clearly; good worker; fine associate; good expression of ideas; don't feel free with him; no contributions other than his own opinions.

Thus, those with average social status did not impress all their associates as being well informed and good participants. They possessed only a moderate degree of the characteristics of leaders.

$$SS = -0.48 \pm .45 \text{ "Reasons":}$$

No participation; very quiet and reserved; talks very little; has material; personality; talks too little; too quiet; unwilling to participate; doesn't enter into discussion; uninteresting personality; no discussion; too quiet and backward; not much help to group.

Those with low social status were not well informed and failed to participate. Lack of preparation, self-confidence, and insight were, no doubt, some of the reasons. On the whole, these persons possessed the qualities of leaders in low degree.

With the *SS* of a person, the list of reasons given by his associates for their expressed attitudes and the general characteristics of persons who attain high status in mind, an instructor is in a position to give a student helpful suggestions on how to develop his personality. Furthermore, an instructor may later measure the results of his advice sociometrically.

Such a plan of guidance was carried out with each individual in a class of twenty-two juniors and seniors. For example, a student with an *SS* of  $+0.26 \pm .17$ , but who was otherwise an excellent student, was told of the good quality of work done and urged that she could justifiably, be more

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self-confident and participate more in group discussion. In this manner, each student was advised. Following the interviews, about four weeks were allowed for students to try out recommendations for improving status in discussion groups and in general class discussions where all could rejudge one another. Following this, the sociometric test was given again. Table 3 presents a comparison of the *SS*'s of the twenty-two students before and four weeks after the guidance interviews.

TABLE 3. SOCIAL STATUS INDICES OF TWENTY-TWO STUDENTS BEFORE AND FOUR WEEKS AFTER SOCIOMETRIC GUIDANCE INTERVIEWS

Student	<i>SS</i> before Interview	<i>SS</i> 4 Weeks' after Interview	Change in <i>SS</i>
1	.64	.52	-.12
2	.50	.36	-.14
3	.475	.57	+.095
4	.40	.48	+.08
5	.305	.23	-.075
6	.285	.21	-.075
7	.26	.55	+.29
8	.235	.26	+.025
9	.235	.33	+.095
10	.21	.31	+.10
11	.21	.43	+.22
12	.21	.38	+.17
13	.21	.17	-.04
14	.19	.12	-.07
15	.165	.36	+.195
16	.115	.05	-.065
17	.02	-.17	-.15
18	.00	-.02	-.02
19	-.07	-.34	-.27
20	-.115	-.07	+.045
21	-.285	-.31	-.025
22	-.475	-.45	+.025

Total Change +.290

Mean Change +.013

The mean change in social status was +.013, which is, obviously, so negligible an amount that the computation of the *SD* of the differences was unnecessary. Thus, four weeks of experience provided insufficient time to make much change in the mean *SS* of a class group as a whole. Since personality develops slowly and irregularly, an experiment, similar to the foregoing, carried on over a long period of time might show different results.

But the failure of the group as a whole to make a change is not necessarily a failure of the entire experiment to achieve some positive result. Take, for example, the student previously mentioned (Number 7), who made a gain of +.29. Here was an able and studious person who had at first failed to take part because of reticence; in following advice to participate more, this



student easily became recognized by more persons as a leader in the class. On the other hand, student Number 19, a weak student and a nonparticipant, was advised to participate more; but his status was lowered by his attempt. His participation revealed lack of ability to comprehend the deeper meaning of the subject matter.

It seems that, in general, those who were told they had attained a high status, rested on their laurels and lost ground (Numbers 1, 2, 5); those who had low statuses failed in attaining higher ones (Numbers 16, 17, 18, 19, 21), because they lacked the capacity; and those who had talent but had not used it wisely, increased their statuses after being advised (Numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15).

This study of the attempt to change statuses has shown two things: first, no appreciable changes in the statuses of the group as a whole were made, because, perhaps, insufficient time was allowed and also, status is a relative matter; and second, individuals shifted from one position to another because of failure to use talents, lack of talent, or wiser use of talent. Nevertheless, in a short period of time, guidance, with the aid of sociometric measurement, raised the status of the talented who had not previously used their full powers.

*Effect of Sociometric Grouping on Learning.* An experimental study<sup>14</sup> was carried on in college sociology classes comparing the effects upon learning and personality development of (1) traditional class discussion methods of instruction and (2) a group method in which the leaders were sociometrically elected.<sup>15</sup> The results of four carefully controlled experiments showed

TABLE 4. MEAN CHANGES IN TEST SCORES OF PARTIALLY SOCIOMETRICALLY ORGANIZED CLASS DISCUSSION GROUPS AND TRADITIONAL DISCUSSION-RECITATION GROUPS

<i>N</i>	Mean Change Group Method	Mean Change Class Method	<i>D</i>	<i>SDD</i>	<i>EC</i>
54	34.5	32.5	+2.0	1.1	.65

the following mean changes in scores of fact tests. Thus, learning by the group method with the aid of sociometric measurement, was slightly more efficient than by the traditional class discussion method.

In addition, changes on scores on the Bernreuter Personality Inventory<sup>16</sup> between the initial and final test were much greater in the group-organized classroom than in the traditional recitation-discussion classroom. Finally, students themselves rated the group plan much more satisfactory. There-

<sup>14</sup> Leslie Day Zeleny, "Experimental Appraisal of a Group Learning Plan," *J. Educ. Res.*, September 1940, 37-42.

<sup>15</sup> See "Objective Selection of Group Leaders," *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> Robert G. Bernreuter, *The Personality Inventory*, Palo Alto, 1935. The limitations of this test are recognized. Only group scores were interpreted.

fore, a classroom organized into groups, with the aid of sociometric measures, may be an efficient agency for learning. And what is important, it is clear that the organization of a classroom for sociometric measurement and sociological experimentation does not interfere with the process of learning; rather, it stimulates learning and the development of personality.

*V. Summary.* Sociation, status and adjustment may be precisely measured. The kind and intensity of interpersonal attitudes (+1.00, +0.50, 0.00, -0.50, -1.00 units) in a group or community of groups may be determined with the use of the *Group Membership Record* which has been shown to be both reliable and valid. *Sociation*, defined as the average of the units of intensity of all the interpersonal attitudes in a group  $\pm$  the average deviation, may be expressed in the following formula:

$$S = I \pm D = \frac{\Sigma I}{n} \pm \frac{\Sigma d}{n} = \frac{\Sigma I}{N(N-1)} \pm \frac{\Sigma(I \sim I)}{N(N-1)} \text{ units.}$$

In a similar manner, the *social status index* and the *social adjustment index* may be determined.

$$SS = I \pm D = \frac{\Sigma I}{n} \pm \frac{\Sigma d}{n} = \frac{\Sigma I}{N-1} \pm \frac{\Sigma(I \sim I)}{N-1} \text{ units; and}$$

$$SA = I \pm D = \frac{\Sigma I}{n} \pm \frac{\Sigma d}{n} = \frac{\Sigma I}{2(N-1)} \pm \frac{\Sigma(I \sim I)}{2(N-1)} \text{ units.}$$

With these indices, it is now possible to carry on many kinds of sociological experimentation—to measure, experiment, and measure again. One illustration of the possibilities of sociological experimentation is in a classroom organized as a community of groups. It becomes a sociological laboratory. Here sociation may be measured and controlled; race, class, and other cleavages may be studied; group leaders, identified; status may be measured, personality developed, and status measured again. This work improves rather than hinders learning. With these procedures, a new aspect of the scientific study of group life is made possible.

## THE COMMUNITY AS A SOCIAL GROUP\*

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WHETHER A community may be regarded as a social group depends not on the definitions offered but on the discoverable characteristics of systems that are designated as communities and groups. However, the observation and the identification of these characteristics depend on the conceptual scheme adopted. The viewpoint here taken, hypothetically, is that a group is a social system comprising identifiable elements which also are found in the composition of an analytical community, so that the latter may be regarded as a type of social group amenable to analysis by methods suitable to the study of social groups in general. Although communities have, at least by implication, been called groups,<sup>1</sup> apparently the literature dealing with this subject has not attempted an inductive comparison of these two types of social structures. For this reason, a brief statement as to the suggested analytic characteristics of social groups is desirable. This will serve to illustrate the method employed, as well as to characterize the community as a logical class of social forms.

In briefest terms, we may say that a social group comprises persons acting with reference to given aims, in the prosecution of which an integration of roles and an ordering of social relations come into play. At least four analytical elements are identifiable in this descriptive statement: (1) a personnel (members); (2) a test of admission to membership; (3) distinctive roles or functions of the members; and (4) norms regulating the conduct of the personnel. This restriction of the characterizing elements implies that a group is distinguished from a society with its diverse complexes of folkways and that the groups comprised within such a society share in the various aspects of this culture. However, any culture trait or complex may become a differentiating element of a class of social groups. For the present, our attention is directed toward the generic elements. The sociologist constructs

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<sup>1</sup> R. M. MacIver, *Community, A Sociological Study*, 107, London, 1917. He says: "A community is a social unity whose members recognize as common a sufficiency of interest to allow of the interactivities of common life." R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 161, Chicago, 1921. They say: "Community is a term which is applied to societies and social groups where they are considered from the point of view of the geographical distribution of individuals and institutions of which they are composed." Stuart A. Queen, "What is a community," *J. Social Forces*, vol. I (1922-23), 376-377; 381. Dwight Sanderson, *The Rural Community: The Natural History of A Sociological Group*, Boston, 1932, esp. ch. I, "The Rural Community as a Sociological Group," and ch. II, "The Evolution of The Rural Locality Group." Carle C. Zimmerman, *The Changing Community*, 4, New York, 1938. While the phraseology of this literature is suggestive of the idea that a community is a group, the actual treatment does not distinguish a group from the total local societal system, comprising culture complexes and interrelations characteristic of society in the abstract.

these elements and their integration in a group theoretically, inasmuch as they are abstractions from an empirical situation which contains various general societal characteristics, such as the possession of means of communication, folkways, interdependency, and differentiation among the population comprised in the given society.

Thus, a social group is viewed as a special type or logical class of cultural-social system which forms in the general cultural setting but which, in its construction, comprises members as agents who are also values to one another, to whom tests of admittance and codes of relation are applied, and who assume a set of ranking and functional places or roles. As agents, they construct the system in which they are means and objects of valuation to one another. These aspects constitute the social (that is, the cultural-social) aspect of the group as a system, whereas systems that are merely cultural, such as aesthetic, technological, and linguistic, etc., contain only nonpersonal data in their composition. If, or to the extent that, people merely share in the traits of the general culture, such traits cannot be taken as analytic elements differentiating and identifying a logical class of groups, in contrast, to societies, as these terms are applied in this discussion.

A group is here viewed as a system comprising the named analytical elements in its construction, while a societal system comprises not only these group systems of various kinds but also the many nonpersonal culture systems. The characteristics of these group elements are reciprocally related and involved in such a relatively closed system as a group. The interests and goals condition the actions, the norms bear on the interrelated roles and statuses and define the relations between the members. Thus, it also appears that inclusion of membership as one of the analytical elements does not imply that the sociologist must consider the total personality of the constituent members. In their role as agents, members are viewed from the standpoint of their actions or functions which they perform in the given system, not from the standpoint of their total mental life.

If such analytic elements are, in fact, generalizations from data, differences in the types of groups would necessarily depend either on variations in the content of these elements, or on the presence of additional elements. If the suggested elements are generic to all groups, they must be identifiable in an analysis of communities, providing our hypothesis is correct that communities do, in fact, constitute a type of social group. While analysis indicates that the community—at least the abstract community with which sociology is concerned—does in fact include the named elements, it contains an additional a fifth element by which a community group is differentiated<sup>2</sup>—a habitat, locality or area—which, as a value, not

<sup>2</sup> Maclver (*op. cit.*, pp. 97-124) speaks of "interests" as "The Elements of Community," but the writer of this article views the discussion of the types of, and the relation between, interests as belonging logically to the general characteristic of social relations rather than to the differentiating characteristics of a community as a social group. The same observation also



only becomes involved reciprocally with the other elements, but also serves as the occasion for the integration of the other elements into a group constituting a community. While all social groups can be assigned to an area in the sense that they are constructed by people living in delimitable spaces, this does not mean that they are communities; for the fact that a given area is the place of abode of the members does not imply that this area is a datum essential to the construction of the group in question. However, if the locality is a datum in the norms, roles, and other relations between the members, it is an element in the composition of the system constructed by these agents. Thus, a community is only one system constructed by people in defined areas. The inclusion of a class of values in an integration constitutes a separate type of system and the inclusion of an area or locality as a datum in a system definable as the generic group, gives us the subtype "community-group," just as inclusion of other elements, such as the data religion or education, together with the four generic elements, constitutes other types of groups, the additional element supplying the differentiating characteristic.

From this point of view, variations in the five elements which we posit as generic to a community might account for some, although not all, variations in community types; for some other element may be added to produce other subclasses of communities. It also follows that not every locality which is populated is a community because the area or locality may not be a datum utilized in the construction of a social system integrated with the other named elements. In an analogous way, a population in a defined area does not inevitably construct, for instance, a religious organization, welfare society, or a chamber of commerce. Thus, a so-called "disorganized community" is not necessarily to be classed as a community-group as here defined. However, we recognize that any attempt to classify communities can be undertaken only after long research and extensive theoretic analyses by suitable conceptual schemes. Accordingly, the plan here presented is offered as a tentative method for the inductive study of the general aspects of communities.

As a theoretical problem, this analytical procedure involves the following implicit or explicit steps: I, identifying the system under observation; II, analyzing its contents; and III, discovering its integration. Other comparably intricate problems are the tracing of changes in the organization of communities and, ultimately, classifying types. The present discussion advances some tentative views regarding the first three items.

*I. Identifying the System.* The first task in a theoretical analysis of a com-

applies to Zimmerman (*op. cit.*, pp. 12 ff.); for he characterizes the community as an undifferentiated social fact, i.e., as "behavior or actions that are common to a number of people" (p. 17). His designated element, "limited area," like all ideas of localization, is pertinent (pp. 15, 29 ff.), but, like other writers, he does not treat this item as a datum used in the construction of a community by the members.

munity, as of any other configuration, is that of identifying and delimiting the given structure. However, this can be accomplished only as the elements comprised in the system are identified and the composition (the elements) of the system can be determined only as this circumscription is made explicit and definite. Indeed, the two aspects of the method are but different ways of stating the problem; they are not independent procedures. This statement indicates that the delimitation of a community is not necessarily given in advance of research, even though common-sense observations have made some contribution to the identification of the community structure. However, the suggested procedure has little in common with various prevalent approaches to the study of communities, such as the techniques for locating boundary lines between adjacent trade areas.

The problem of identifying a social structure by circumscription and analysis may be made clearer by contrasting it with some less critical views as to the character of communities. According to one view, a community is a concentrated population,<sup>3</sup> the implication being that occupancy of geometric space is the determinative criterion. A second view identifies a community as a locality where a concentration of physical structures and "institutions" (firms, schools, churches, or residences)<sup>4</sup> is found, the inference apparently being that such proximity in space is the essential test of a community. To be sure, a community as a sociological system may involve these "nucleated"<sup>5</sup> forms or "institutions," but the observation that they are agglomerated in geometric space is of no particular analytic importance, as has been suggested above. Neither does research on institutions necessarily involve reference to the local society in which they are situated, for each institution must be studied by means of a suitable frame of reference in which the analytical community structure has no necessary part.<sup>6</sup> However, since these "nucleated" forms occupy position, the data pertaining to them can be studied with reference to their local distribution, and valuable inductions can be made by these procedures.<sup>7</sup>

While such locality assignment of data is useful in studying these institutions and in discovering the operation of certain processes affecting them, this does not take the place of the type of studies here suggested because different frames of reference are involved. The observation that cultural data are localized does not supply a sufficiently particularizing statement

<sup>3</sup> See Sanderson *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* See also Eduard C. Lindeman, *The Community; An Introduction to the Study of Community Leadership and Organization*, 9-38, New York, 1921.

<sup>5</sup> F. Stuart Chapin, *Contemporary American Institutions: A Sociological Analysis*, 13 ff., New York, 1935.


<sup>6</sup> This may be illustrated by reference to most works dealing with social institutions, such as those by C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*; Joyce O. Hertzler, *Social Institutions*; Leroy V. Ballard, *Social Institutions*; Floyd Henry Allport, *Institutional Behavior*.

<sup>7</sup> Chapin, *loc. cit.*

about them, for position is no element in their composition even though all cultural data are assignable to a population located in delimitable areas. Communities, as a logical class, must be studied by means of a frame of reference different from that applicable to any of the local institutions; for while one may study institutions that are found in a locality, such research would not, of itself, be germane to the analytic community (or as we say, the community group), for the reasons that each of these systems must be studied with reference to their distinctive elements and structure. Thus by postulation, the character and integration of elements varies for each class of social systems, such as family, church, school, state, and so on.

*II. Analysis of Contents of the System.* Instead of regarding the conceptual community as identical with a local aggregation of people with their institutions and culture, we posit that a community is amenable to an approach which places it in the same field of sociology as the study of social groups in general and that this is accomplished by the suggested analytical procedure in identifying the named elements and their integration. These elements are not so much invented as merely utilized by a group, for they are universal or prevalent values in the culture; and a description of their content and organization supplies a sociological characterization respectively of communities, or of other logical classes of groups. The elements of whatever sort are class names for data used in the construction of the value system by the agents, the members. The order in which these elements are listed in the following discussion has no implication as to their relative importance, although the fifth item named in the introduction and reviewed below is considered to be the essential variant which differentiates the concept community from other types of groups. (See Chart 1.)

CHART 1. RELATIONS BETWEEN GENERIC AND DIFFERENTIATING GROUP ELEMENTS  
Analytical Elements of Social Groups



1. While the ecological viewpoint as to population volume and composition is in a way analogous to our analytic element, community membership, the ecological view regards the population mainly as an indication of competitive balance, while the group element approach views people as bearers of functions, duties, and claims in a social system operating under norms which are identified with locality as the occasion for their application. The membership of a community normally comprises all ages and both sexes, insofar as it is a segment of "society," but it does not differ in this from some other logical classes of groups such as a church or political party. However, variations in the composition occur as a result of the familiar selective processes.

Aside from guests, persons entering a delimited area may be tentatively classified as either transitional<sup>8</sup> (entering for temporary sojourn other than as guests), provisional (entering for test of permanence), or permanent members. The permanent members are established as constituent parts of the personnel with recognized status, in contrast to the tentative positions of the first two classes. Accordingly, the length of residence may assume qualitative differences with reference to the social position occupied. However, members (whether as agents or as values) occupy unlike social positions for various reasons other than length of residence. While any classification of the type of membership needs to be investigated at great length by means of analytic induction, these suggestions will serve to illustrate types of positions that may be identified in a community structure. The suggestion that members, apart from their roles, must be postulated as an analytic element, rests on the observation that persons are objects of appreciation, respect, and rights, independently of utilitarian, honorific, or other functions that they have performed.

2. If a community is classifiable as a type of social group it must, by hypothesis, have a test of membership. By hypothesis, also, a community differs from other groups in respect to the test of membership because of the familiar folkway giving easy admittance into social spaces and demanding as the minimal role, the maintenance of symbiotic relations. In fact, a main characteristic of the community group arises from this peculiar elasticity of the test of admittance. The less distinct and exclusive the requirements for membership and the less mandatory the norms of social relations are, the more elastic are the tests of admittance into the structure. In minimal terms, the test of membership in a community group is admissibility into an administrative or otherwise collectively meaningful space which, like admittance into other social groups, is subject to regulation; and thus, while it is usually lax, may be rigorous as in some carefully guarded areas, such as in some variant culture communities (Chart 1).

<sup>8</sup> I wish to express my indebtedness to Erich Franzen for the term, "transitional member," as a designation for one type of transient members, as well as for the identification of the idea, "level of integration," with that of value orientation.



However, admittance into an area does not imply that each resident is an active participant in the construction and maintenance of a community group any more than that every person "identified" with a political party or religious denomination is an active participant in these groups. While residence in an area permits of a high degree of isolation from social actions, there is always the implicit conformity to norms and sharing in certain minimal rights and duties. This is true even of visitors and of transitional and provisional members. In addition, they must necessarily engage in various social actions (such as buying, selling, renting, leasing, conversing, or what not), but these social actions (though involving local social contacts, sharing in local schooling, worshiping, trading, etc.) are not part of the value system which we describe as the community group, but rather of the local society. In brief, the distinction is made between the community group organization and other systems constructed by social actions, the phrase, local segment of society, comprising all systems locally produced or maintained.

3. Thus, it appears that mere admittance into a defined area gives no adequate indication concerning the participation by individuals in a given social system, for this depends also on intentions and the anticipated roles to be played by provisional or constituent members. The overt participation or social actions by members in a system constitutes their roles. These roles involve rights and duties regarding both functional and honorific relations, and they are expressions of membership, which, accordingly, can be studied empirically.

Minimal functional roles are illustrated by casual exchanges of labor, goods, and services. The more permanently established social actions take on the form of recurrent and expected reciprocities, resembling an institutional arrangement in the local structure. Whether these roles are performed by individuals as independent agents or as representatives of groups or associations, they may be comprised directly in the community structure, either (1) because they are valued by the community members apart from their connection with any of these subgroups of the locality, or (2) because they involve the community personnel in a series of reciprocations and recognized interdependencies. The personal relations so produced or required, not the accompanying technological or other nonsocial actions, are implied.

The position in the scale of honor or rating may depend on the functions performed or on a combination of these and other values which are identified with the person, such as length of residence, wealth, or "family connection." Empirical studies of rural and village areas seem to show that several of these values must coincide in order to produce high rating, and that unfavorable valuations on one score offset otherwise favorable ratings on other scores. However, variations in these valuations are presupposed as a source of differences in locality groups. The favorable as well as the

unfavorable ratings depend on the local standards, and these produce the scale of local social statuses.

¶ The conclusion that these social statuses or their personal expression as roles are locally oriented is supported by the fact that they cannot be directly transferred to another locality through migration, but must be re-established by integration into the system of functional and rating roles in the new place of settlement. Differences in the assigned roles supply the basis for the foregoing suggested classification of membership, as transitional, provisional, and constituent (or permanent). Although even the transitional and provisional roles are subject to a test of acceptance, they are nevertheless established with relative ease as compared to entrance into other logical classes of groups. Such facts supply some justification for the familiar idea that a community is the product of competition, but, as is easily seen, this is only a partial analysis of the adaptation of roles to the situation. Residence in a locality and one's place in the social structure do not depend solely on the outcome of competition in symbiotic relations. Functions of this sort are only one of various types of social actions constituting the local organization of social roles. While the symbiotic relations are highly important, they are subject to norms; acceptance into this phase of the local societal system depends on the meaningful compatibility between the local demands and the functions offered by the individual. Further, the duration of residence and the role played are, in particular ways, subject to the option of either the group or the individual.

¶ In a sense, membership is provisional either as long as an individual is uncertain about his preferences for a place of abode or as long as his role is not accepted. Indeed, the person's conception of his status is involved both in his bid for admittance and in his acceptance. This in turn necessarily varies with occupations, tastes, surplus wealth, and other local conditions. Inductive studies dealing with the experiences of people in getting established in a community would thus supply analyses not only of membership roles but also of community types. The ratio of transients and the frequency of emigration give insight into the stability, especially of the symbiotic relations, either within the given locality or between it and other localities. Intercommunity mobility indicates freedom to move no less than it indicates incentives to move. This freedom implies ease of egress from one locality and of ingress into another and the prevalence of established techniques whereby at least symbiotic relations can be severed in one locality and established in another. Accordingly, from a general point of view, the comparative rates of admittance into and egress from social spaces indicate general characteristics of the societal organization no less than qualitative differences between local systems.

¶ 4. Norms of personal relations, whether implicit or explicit, are found in every social group as a necessary phase of its collective action. Accord-

ingly, they are hypothecated for communities, but these norms may vary with the type of group and the occasion for their application. Thus, communities as a logical class of social systems may be characterized by distinctive norms or by distinctive occasions for their application. Among such occasions are the admittance of persons into a social space. By social space, we mean that location in a given area or within certain boundaries becomes a symbol of various rights and duties or is made an occasion for comparing statuses and judging the personal acceptability of people. In other words, area, locality, or space is taken as a datum in defining social relations. It is symbolic. When locality or space has such symbolic significance, admission thereto constitutes a test of access to corresponding social relations, whether these be prescribed politically or otherwise. As soon as admission into defined space is allowed, various norms, such as certain legal rights and duties, are expected to operate. On the other hand, the refusal of admittance to even a transient role implies the withholding of those minimal rights. Thus, the so-called law of settlement is seen to rest on normatively given presuppositions which are built up with reference to ingress into a recognized social space and which have varied in form and content in different times and cultures. However, such a comparative study is not our present problem. Since the applicability of some norms rests on the admittance into a given space, they tend to vary with the definiteness of the test of admission and of the status assigned. This means that only relevant rights and duties belonging specifically to the community system are involved in such admittance into the defined area and that participation in various social circles and institutional groups involves normatively regulated relations that are characteristic of these systems. Thus, various codes found in a locality do not apply equally to every one. Instead, they are specialized with reference to the membership within the community group or the various other social systems, such as the "institutions" constructed by the residents.

Commonsense references to the idea that norms are applied on the basis of inclusion in meaningful space are contained in such expressions as "local patriotism," "community spirit," "charity begins at home." More explicit expressions of these place-bound social relations are the unofficial and official ("public") philanthropy and legal protection of the person and property, together with the corresponding duties. These minimal social relations come into operation as soon as one enters the defined social space, while other norms are optional after prescribed periods of residence. That is, people are on a different footing in the locality-identified group, both as to their own sense of this place fellowship and the norms that apply to it. There are, in fact, various norms which correspond to characteristic variations in the other analytical elements, especially in the type of membership. There may also be a recognition of these norms even when they are not actually observed in conduct. They become identified with the web of relations which

develop between people involved in prolonged reciprocations incidental to contiguity of abode.

¶ In brief, the locality becomes identified as a social possession and "place" is experienced as a "social space" within which certain duties and rights and other normatively defined relations obtain. While such norms may be more or less similar in content to those found in other social structures, the occasion for their operation is distinctive. They are integrated into a system comprising meaningful space, which is regarded as the possession and symbol of a locality-group. The failure to identify this normative element in the composition of the community structure appears to have been one reason for the naturalistic view frequently disclosed by writings on the subject of community.<sup>9</sup>

¶ 5. In view of such symbolic significance, the habitat or locality as a datum in a social reference, must be hypothecated as an analytical element differentiating the community because it either is valued as a collective possession and symbol or serves as means to ends. As a symbol, the habitat is associated with norms of social relations and with values that reflect upon the reputation of the residents or in other ways becomes identified with their personalities. Cases in point are the aesthetic and other values identified with the climate, terrain, and material structures, or even the products which are considered to reflect on the self-esteem or the reputation of the residents. Such values thus become involved in the organization of efforts intended to improve the self-respect and the reputation of the group. This idea is familiar from the fact that different localities, cities, and even sections within a city, have unequal prestige. In a somewhat similar way, the aesthetic or other qualities of the habitat may be looked upon as a possession of the locality with which one is identified. This group aspect of locality is also shown by the various official and unofficial controls exercised over social relations delimited by such spaces.

¶ As means to ends, the habitat serves as a datum—a factor—in a chain of reciprocations between the local personnel and also between localities. Because time-space factors become involved in the social organization, characteristic distribution of local aggregations tend to develop. Thus, the position of communities with reference to one another, as well as the use of the site, has a bearing on the functions which they severally perform. Most of the technical functions involving people in symbiotic relations are connected with, or organized into, the lesser local structures or associations (firms, households, etc.), but at the same time, they involve the residents in series of social actions and roles which comprise the local community with its abstractly distinctive, even if not independent, life history. Since these postulated generic elements are abstractions, they cover varied empirical

<sup>9</sup> Relevant discussion and citations are presented by Milla Aissa Alihan, *Social Ecology, A Critical Analysis*; New York, 1938, esp. chs. III-V.



data which could obviously be classified under other categories if different conceptual schemes were used.

*III. Discovering the Integration of Social Systems.* 1. While the identified analytic elements vary in content, they are not independent, but rather they are functions of one another since they inhere as meaningful aspects of the empirical situation to be met by people in the business of living. The manner in which these value-aspects are organized constitutes the integration of the community, so that empirical differences may be due to the peculiar weight given a particular datum. Thus, the discussed importance of competition in a community appears to be due to such weight assigned to the symbiotic roles in determining membership and rating, but communities also differ in regard to the importance of the symbiotic role in giving admittance and permanent status. This is illustrated by the contrasts, for instance, between a rural community possessing a distinctive culture and a heterogeneous urban area. In such a distinctive culture community, this element in the group organization serves to select the type of members admissible into the group and to differentiate the logical class of community.

2. A second aspect of integration is observable in the connection between the various associations or specialized groups of a locality, such as firms, churches, schools, households, etc. These may be regarded as subsystems of the local *society* rather than of the locality *group*; and, like the community group, they are creations of the local population. We have seen that from an analytic point of view, which regards a community as a type of group, the mere aggregation of these institutionalized groups does not constitute the community. Neither are these associations in their entirety directly synthesized into the given community, as a structure or system, for there can be no synthetic analytical system, just as there can be no synthetic analytical science. Instead, the community, as a social structure, involves elements which may likewise enter into the subsystems, but the community integrates them anew into a characteristic structure.

This may be done because, in fulfilling their own value systems, they may supply roles that are incorporated into the community structure. Thus, some roles of members of a subsystem are organized into the containing community insofar as they pertain to the rating or valuation that is bestowed upon the local personnel. This is especially true of the dominant role of these subsystems, but is not confined to them. For instance, the role of the minister belongs to a church as a social group, but this function is given a rating in the containing community system, which is a set of social relations of the personnel. The other members of a church may or may not, for reasons of this membership, be assigned to characteristic places in the community structure. In a like manner, the honor aspect of the roles of a factory or a bank personnel are involved in the community integration, although the organization of these firms is separate from that of the com-

munity. In a similar way, other groups contain, within their structures, characteristic roles which are given ratings in the community framework. All such roles (and thus the associated functionaries) are subjected to general norms and are given ratings according to valuations that extend beyond the given associations.

In addition, special community-binding agencies may be formed for directing community affairs. Such is the local political structure, which is, in fact, a type of formal organization representing a group integrated on the basis of locality or area. This locality basis of integration competed with the kinship basis even in preliterate societies and is formalized in the administrative areas of the state.<sup>10</sup> In the same category, but of a different logical class, are the local improvement associations organized to develop aesthetic, recreational, or other values considered to be the possession of the locality group. Other organs of the community are concerned with the relief or health of the members or with their education preparatory to playing standardized roles in the community. The church, school, and family are also concerned with imparting skills and norms of conduct, while the family, in particular, determines the rating position of its members in the local scale of statuses.

Finally, the subsystems, especially the families, serve to lessen contradictions in the roles of their members. Thus, when members of a family are employed in different firms or occupy unlike positions of honor in the community, the family members tend to reconcile or to mitigate the contradictions in their roles and to bring them into harmony with norms which operate within the family. Somewhat similar processes may take place in other institutional groups. Obversely, the community group tends to keep the conflicts between the roles comprised in the subsystem within certain bounds insofar as these conflicts do violence to the values of the community. This is illustrated by the fact that some general norms are demanded of all the residents, even though other and more specific roles and codes are required by the subsystems found in the community.

Like every social (in contrast to a physical or biological) system, the community (if it is actually a social system) is constructed by the agents, who constitute an essential aspect of its structure and whom we identify as members. But a group, like any other social system, is not necessarily nor usually apprehended, nor constructed, in its entirety by any one, nor even by several, of the members. This applies to a community, as well as to any other complex group. The larger and more complex the group, the less is the likelihood that it can be the object of direct experience by any one person, but the unity or integration of a social (or a general cultural) system does not rest on such direct experience or apprehension of all the roles or of

<sup>10</sup> Robert H. Lowie, *The Origin of the State*, 51-75, New York, 1927.

their interconnection nor on its intentional construction by any one of its members.

Instead, the unity of a community, like that of any other group, rests on several or all of the following conditions: (1) the manifest or reconstructed experiences of several members may be publicly accepted as attributes of the community; (2) each member experiences his own role and thereby links it into the chain of the roles in the system (although no one apprehends all the roles, each class of members helps to complete the pattern of the whole structure); (3) all the roles may be subjected to a scale of valuation thereby being brought into an objective order, without implying assent on the part of the members; (4) if different norms are applied to the several roles, these variations nevertheless supply an integration of the roles (such general codes and valuations are usual, even for roles within the several subsystems of the community, but high valuations of a role may apparently be connected with either a strict or a lax application of norms); and (5) a given community is a result of the evolving adjustments that persons make to complex value systems and to the means at hand for their actualization. Thus, there exists a kind of historic unity in which the conditions produced may continue to determine action indefinitely. This may be illustrated by an analogy from language norms, which are produced by many people, none of whom are aware either of the final result or of the immediate structural changes to which they are contributing. Only after generations, may it be discovered that an evolutionary process has resulted in weaving minute changes into a new pattern.

The integration so effected may be guided in various directions by the value orientation, although various factors impose restraints upon the expression attained by these tendencies. Even so, this value orientation may give a discernibly similar direction to the plan of living, even under contrary conditions. For instance, the norms may prescribe either competitive or cooperative behavior; or prestige and honor may attach to opposite kinds of conduct, such as altruistic or egocentric achievement. In one community, norms require self-sufficiency and condemn dependence on the public treasury, and instead promote mutual aid; in another community, the reverse is tolerated and condoned. Other observed points of contrast pertain to an ascetic view of life, to the use of the discoveries of science, and to criteria of personal rating and approved points of personal differentiation. This orientation may give emphasis in the direction of a value contained in one of the generic elements, or to some additional element. The value orientation is hypothecated to affect the organization of the community, such as in the relative weight given certain goals, as shown by the use of time, resources, and choice of means to given ends. This viewpoint is, of course, closely allied to the familiar, though elusive, idea about culture integration. However, our problem involves the direction of effort and the organization

of roles, not the abstract problem of mental integration of culture data. Thus, we found clearly marked differences in the value-directed mode of living even in simpler rural communities. However, as regards the more complex communities, even of the village type, a uniform value orientation is problematical, so far as our data show. In time, such value orientation may be found to supply a basis for logical classification of communities, but at the present stage of sociological research, no such empirically derived classification should be attempted.

Nevertheless, the suggested analytic induction supplies a scheme by means of which a classification ultimately may be developed. If the hypothecated elements and their integration are adequate to characterize the generic community as a sociological, as over against a biological phenomenon, variations in types will be due either to the variations in the content of the elements and their weighting or to the presence of additional elements such as a variant culture trait (a distinctive language or religion), racial characteristic, etc. Groups with such variant traits may be identified as communities if they are settled contiguously, and contain the reviewed elements, as well as these variant characteristics. In general, we may say, hypothetically, that the presence of any additional element or any variation in the integration of the generic elements constitutes a logical class of community. However, only extensive inductive studies can determine the character and importance of such variations in these cultural-social structures.



## SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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IN THE summer of 1940, the writer spent a month at the National Archives under appointment by the Committee on Control of Social Data of the Social Science Research Council. Associated with him were Mrs. Sara Jones Tucker, anthropologist of the University of Chicago, and Lowell Mason Pumphrey, economist, fellow of the Brookings Institution. The purpose was to make an exploratory study of the Archives to ascertain what materials they contain of interest to the social sciences represented and what are the facilities and difficulties involved in working with these archival materials.

The National Archives defines "archives" substantially the same as European students. This definition is fairly descriptive of its own materials, except for films and recordings (to be discussed later): "National Archives . . . comprise the sum total of documents, papers and other records made or received in the transaction of public business by the officials and agencies of a national government and filed for preservation by or for the official or agency concerned."

A warning is in order here. The proportion of records so "filed for preservation" may range from zero to 100 percent. Enormous quantities of records of all degrees of usefulness have been lost by fire, carelessness, thoughtless destruction, or removal by officials who regarded them as their private property. Large amounts are to be found in historical societies, state and local archives, ports of entry, etc. The papers so retained may not be the most recent and active, although that is the commonest arrangement. They may be things sacred by age or things to which the department or agency which produced or inherited them is emotionally attached. Possibly the persons in charge cling jealously to them for fear of losing their positions or through the sense of status that comes from identification with valuable deposits. Sometimes they are poorly cared for and inaccessible; sometimes, on the other hand, they are serviced by officials whose familiarity with them could not be excelled and who exploit them zealously for research purposes and aid other researchers generously.

The desirable relation of the sociologist to the Archives can be stated simply if one considers the question: What kind of outgrown shells in the form of papers do governmental agencies leave behind them? No one who asks this question will be surprised to find in the Archives, even after rigorous discarding by the archivist, an enormous amount of apparently worthless detail. We must call it "apparently worthless" when we remem-

ber how much we would give for just such materials, now entirely lost, pertaining to some earlier period. Any student of archives must be prepared for miles of narrow aisles hemmed in by high shelves and cabinets full of the dullest things in the world, with only an occasional nugget of gold.

After years of agitation by historians concerned over our lack of a national depository for archives, the National Archives finally was established on June 19, 1934. Even before the magnificent building on Pennsylvania Avenue was completed, a small staff was busily engaged in surveying the materials from which its collections would be selected. Now a complete staff is installed in a building which, if it is not satisfactory in every respect, is safe, permanent, and impressively modern and expensive. Five annual reports have been made by the Archivist, R. D. W. Connor. In the third one was a preliminary guide to materials in the archives. More recently, a separate publication of over three hundred pages entitled *National Archives Guide* has been issued. This discusses the materials serviced by the various custodial divisions, corresponding to the departments and agencies in which the materials originated, and has a valuable introduction and index. The *Guide* can be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents for forty cents in paper and seventy cents in cloth. An extremely useful feature of the *Guide* is its recommendations of books to be read by those approaching the various *fonds* or bodies of archival materials.

The National Archives always has serviced requests from the government itself, from individuals seeking information about ancestors or themselves, and from a growing number of scholars. The Archives has done much to familiarize its own staff with what is there and to broadcast knowledge of such materials as is permitted to possible scholarly users.<sup>1</sup> In some instances, as in the classification of Labor Relations Board cases by industry, the staff has gone very far to meet the needs of possible clients. It must, however, be admitted that there are limits to what can be done in this way. It is inconceivable that the principle of *respect des fonds* should be violated. This principle decrees that collections must be kept in the order received or in some reconstruction of an order they formerly possessed. The student who has interests that cut across the lines that separate Navy from Interior and Labor from Justice must learn to find his own materials, with the efficient aid of the Reference Division. He will discover no heading, Race Relations, in the index to the *Guide*; he will meet many other cases in which the index obviously does not exhaust the material which must be in the Archives. The social scientist will find the whole establishment somewhat better fitted to deal with the unique than with his interest in the repetitive, the recurrent, and the commonplace.

The vast arrays of statistical data raises a serious problem of storage. The

<sup>1</sup> See, for instance, *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Dec. 1940, page 958.

mere physical bulk of governmental paper is so stupendous that it threatens to more than fill the National Archives building. The remedy may be found in ruthless but discriminating discarding, and by microfilming. This process not only saves a great deal of space but also frees us from the tyranny of the central depository. This possibility so fired the imagination of the late Robert C. Binkley that he wrote, with fine appreciation of its revolutionary implications:

Research in the social sciences and humanities is unlike research in the natural sciences in that it uses written texts as its principal material. The first duty of scholarship is to protect and preserve original writings, the loss of which would be irretrievable. . . . A given body of research material is reproduced in so many copies and distributed in so many places that it is accessible to all scholars who wish to use it. The mechanical impediment to the use of that body of material has not been wholly removed. . . . As the tonnage of material continues to increase, the ordinary college library becomes as antique as the private library. . . . To secure the maximum of research effort from . . . teaching personnel, the library should be so equipped that any scholar can pick up his work and go on with it wherever he may happen to be teaching."<sup>2</sup>

The needs of scholarship which Mr. Binkley thus so vividly portrayed he was sure would be met in our own time by the various types of microphotography: "New processes and devices which, taken in their entirety, promise to have an impact on the intellectual world comparable with that of the invention of printing."<sup>3</sup> Perhaps Mr. Binkley was a little too optimistic in prophesying that as a result of such inexpensive copies, easy to transport, store, or reproduce, there would come a whole new cultural design, including a cultural revival of the small town, but one can sympathize with his enthusiasm.

The National Archives, under the leadership of Vernon D. Tate, Chief of Division of Photographic Archives of Research and editor of the *Journal of Documentary Reproduction*, has had a most significant part in freeing the scholar from a central depository. The National Archives is equipped to make full-tone photographs of documents for facsimile illustrations, to make photostats and microfilm with amazing speed for sale at cost.

It seems probable that in the near future an additional step of great importance may be taken. We refer to a subpublication project, which will mean that whenever a considerable bulk of unified material is ordered to be microfilmed, the Archives as a routine matter, will consider whether it would like that film for its permanent collection. If so, the negative will be retained at the Archives and a positive copy made and sold to the individual. This arrangement, of course, would facilitate the filling of later

<sup>2</sup> Robert C. Binkley, *Methods of Reproducing Research Materials*, 1-2, rev. ed. 1936, lithoprinted by Edwards Bros., Ann Arbor, Michigan, for the Joint Committee on Materials for Research.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

orders at a very low cost. Mr. Tate's explanation of the plan stresses its several advantages:<sup>4</sup>

The plan under consideration involves the preparation and editing of copy for a documentary publication precisely as though it were to be printed. A microfilm copy of the typescript, or possibly in some cases of the original documents, would then be made. Notice of the availability of the microfilm would be published in the leading journals in the field that the publication is intended to serve, and as orders are received, positive copies would be made. The publication need never be out of print, as additional positives could be prepared at any time. The costs to the institution publishing the work and to the purchaser are much lower than for printed publications, and consequently much more material can be made available. If the demand for a publication as revealed by requests for microfilm copies is large enough, some other method of duplication, possibly printing, could be used. Thus, through the 'sub-publication' of material on microfilm, many of the restrictions which have heretofore hampered archivists in the dissemination of valuable archival material can be eliminated.

Before the full possibilities of these new methods can be realized, certain technical and human problems have to be solved. As usual, it is easier to solve the technical ones. Machines for reading microcopy which previously have been so expensive as to constitute an obstacle for many institutions and most individuals may shortly be available for as little as twenty-five dollars. A part of that cost even may be defrayed for a period out of certain special funds. The difficulty alluded to as human and psychological is that "older scholars have become conditioned to certain operating techniques and have adopted microphotography rather slowly except in certain outstanding exceptions."<sup>5</sup>

The types of effects which Mr. Binkley expected from these new processes will follow only if what sociologists are in the habit of calling the cultural lag is reduced by changing our habits to fit these new possibilities. The records in the National Archives and the supplies of materials in the humanities and social sciences everywhere will reach their maximum usefulness only if scholars are trained to use microcopy. Every possible means of bringing about this result should be tried, including internships at the National Archives and the Library of Congress, intensive courses in the few institutions fitted to give them, and specific instruction in graduate courses perhaps by visiting lecturers, by exhibition of a loaned motion picture film which could be made easily but would be expensive, or by the cheaper and more oldfashioned device of lantern slides and a mimeographed lecture prepared by experts. The expected *Manual* on microphotography for the individual scholar by Mr. Tate will be an invaluable aid to this whole movement. This is only a part of the general graduate training in the use of archives which should be developed intensively in certain institutions and on a more elementary level in every graduate school.

<sup>4</sup> *Staff Information Circular* No. 8, page 7.

<sup>5</sup> Vernon D. Tate at the Conference on Microphotography, page 246 of the *Transcript*.



With reference to the types of material in the Archives which will interest the sociologist, we will give a number of suggestive samples which may illuminate the foregoing discussion. In addition to these bodies of primary source material, two possibilities may be mentioned. The first is that of getting back of certain research publications into the "raw materials" which they purport to summarize and by which they are supported. One would thus be doing something that corresponds more or less to checking a laboratory experiment. It would certainly satisfy a good deal of curiosity with regard to such a thing as the so-called Wickersham Reports. The other possibility is that of viewing this whole matter of archives as a social institution. In examining the process, one is studying how a society uses its own past records, with what respect or indifference it treats them, and how instrumental it succeeds in making them in the determination of present policy. Has our society a tradition in scholarship which is capable of looking back to day before yesterday? Have we a policy in government which will lead to the continuing study of our past administrative records in order to avoid the repetition of past mistakes? One historian remarks that we have just about reached the point at which a book could be written on how not to have a Civil War, but does anyone know enough about the inner workings of war agencies of 1917-18 to advise on the present emergency? In this sense, everyone who has written about archives has been something of a sociologist, but no one has gone quite far enough.

It must be admitted at the outset that another reporter would probably find other materials, and would have different opinions, as to the feasibility of the studies suggested. While the following suggestions do not pretend to exhaust the subject, it is believed they will illustrate some of the possibilities and also some of the limitations and difficulties which must be faced in the sociological use of archival material.

Three comprehensive topics, on the borderline between sociology and political science, are the study of the commission as a form, the study of fraud and graft in government operation, and a study in democracy which might be entitled, "America Writes to Its Government," based on letters of complaint, application, suggestion, and plain crank letters bordering on the psychopathic, which can be found in many bodies of material in the Archives. Studies of this character, cutting across divisional lines in the Archives, may well be esteemed less hopeful than more circumscribed research.

*Division of State Department Archives.* In this Division, as everywhere, the question poses itself, how worth while is it to examine enormous masses of material, for the possible rare nugget? The science of custom might find some grist for its mill in the consular reports which contain everything, depending upon the interests and capacities of the observer. The classification of these consular reports is, naturally, one of place, not of subject matter. It is only by chance that one comes upon an item, "Israelites, treatment of,

in Morocco." There is no index to matters in the field of public opinion, yet interesting material undoubtedly exists here on the reception in various lands of news or legislation from America. Since State Department papers are deposited in the Archives only up to 1906, many things of the greatest interest to the social scientist are beyond his reach, for the files still kept in the Department of State are in the proximate future likely to be withheld from the curious by a harassed Department.

This Division also has the proceedings of a number of international conferences (Red Cross, Sanitary, etc.). However, the material has been pretty well exploited in the published reports. This is frequently the case throughout the Archives; it would be well if the *Guide* could point out in every instance, as it frequently does, whether or not the records in its possession have been adequately summarized in printed sources.

Statistics might conceivably be compiled from passports, once the restriction of their use was removed. No great reliance could be placed upon their accuracy as to physical characteristics, and I am not sanguine as to their usefulness in general.

*Division of Treasury Department Archives.* After exhausting the *Annual Reports* of the Secretary of the Treasury, the student might get back to the Archives deposited by the Treasury. These Archives represent less than 30 percent of the material of value, since six or seven thousand cubic feet of the Secretary's Old Records remain in an Annex subbasement, and other records are scattered about Washington and ports of entry. Other material, such as Public Health Service Records and those of the Procurement Division, ultimately will be found with Independent Agencies Archives because of recent changes in the administrative setup. Perhaps the records of counterfeiters and other offenders against the federal monetary system from 1853 to 1917 might interest the criminologist.

*Division of War Department Archives.* It is only by a stretch of the imagination that the author can conceive of the bulky and confused War Department records yielding valuable materials for social research. Those most familiar with them feel the statistics are inadequate for complete studies. The determined optimist might attack the descriptive books regionally arranged, in which three million Civil War soldiers are listed; or he might hope to describe the Army post as a distinctive social institution with the aid of scattered inspection reports; or a study of the enlistee as a personality type, or of the army's use of skilled capacities might intrigue him. Courts martial records, of interest to the criminologist, are not here as one might expect them to be. In general, the questions sociologists might like to put to the War Department Archives seem irrelevant to the records one actually finds.

*Division of Justice Department Archives.* The principal records in this Division are the correspondence files of the Attorney General's office, a

large and relatively unused mass of instructions to officials in the Department, United States marshals, District Attorneys, clerks, and sometimes judges. It is difficult to separate the purely routine from matters of policy. In any case, most of the material stops at 1910 and all records of the past fifty years are closed to investigators. Court records are an exception, being open, but this Division has only certain ones, including the court of the District of Columbia, which was a court of general jurisdiction up to 1863. There are some marshal's records, chiefly from the southern district of New York. The criminologist will also be interested in material on the development of federal penal institutions from 1871 to 1907. The administration of justice in the territories may be traced back as far as 1820 and down to the attainment of statehood or later.

Records from the Court of Claims deal in part with Indian depredations, some based on claims of settlers, others referred by the Department of the Interior, and extending in time to the movement for the conservation of natural resources. Others deal with the depredations of federal troops in the South, and the description of the properties they despoiled include such interesting exhibits as old plantation account books back to the 1840's.

For the period 1902-06, the Department shared with the War Department the administration of Insular and Territorial Affairs. Something might be done with the adaptation of our legal system to the Philippines in this period. The War Department's files on the Philippines for this period have been transferred to Interior Department Archives (Territorial and Insular Possessions).

The records of the pardon attorney's office might be studied for evidences of political pressure or for the changes in the character of federal crimes, which in the early days are mainly those committed on the high seas. The Division has records for 1853 to 1912 (restricted after 1890); earlier records are in the Division of State Department Archives.

Following administrative changes on the outside, this Division may in time receive the immigration and deportation materials, most of which the Division of Labor Department Archives now holds. Another possible accession raises problems of bulk and sampling, e.g., what can be done with the threatened addition of some 425,000 cases of civil liability and crime accumulated in the Department's attempt to enforce prohibition?

Cases of vigilantism or lynching, when they involve the federal government, occur in these files; there is material here for the student of the Ku Klux Klan, labor uprisings, peonage, and frontier gangsterism.

As in most divisions of the Archives, one may find here material on the development of the patronage system and of Civil Service. The appointment of the employees of the Department itself can be studied in a wide range of cases.

The changing attitude of the Attorney's office to the administration of

certain types of laws (antitrust, passenger laws affecting immigration, interstate commerce cases, enforcement of laws in regions unsympathetic to the law, such as federal legislation affecting Negroes in the South, and that on polygamy among the Mormons) may be studied both in actual cases and through the opinion function of the Attorney General's office.

There are early letters from marshals, District Attorneys, clerks, and sometimes judges, describing conditions affecting justice, presence of gangs of desperadoes befriended by the populace, etc., crank letters and accusations of what we should now call "fifth column" activities. Among smaller groups of materials are those of the Alien Property Custodian, including some records of private businesses found in his files; the District of Columbia Rent Commission records covering the period 1920-28; the Lever Act cases continuing and closing the work of the Food Administration; the Spanish claims cases which show something of conditions in Cuba in the insurrection period of 1895-98; slave trade and fugitive slave cases; material on the restrictions of alien activities in World War I; material on frauds perpetrated on the government, the most celebrated being the Teapot Dome and related cases, not inherited from the Department of Justice but from the special counsel appointed to prosecute because of lack of confidence in the Department itself.

The Department of Justice has, in other words, touched every other government department and its activities. The archivists of this Division are alive to the social and economic interest of their records but have not been able to make much progress with the detailed description of their archives. The administrative history and filing systems are exceedingly complicated and there is always the obstacle of the restriction covering the past fifty years, a restriction which the Department wished to make absolute and unlimited.

The Division also acts as custodian of the Senate files. The principal virgin territory here is in the files of memorials and petitions, which afford an interesting crosssection of the demands of the American people upon their government. There are, of course, some enormously voluminous petitions, like that for the release of Debs and other political prisoners.

*Division of Navy Department Archives.* This Division illustrates the retention, probably justifiably, of valuable materials by the government department in which the records originated, for Captain Dudley Knox (of Naval Records and Library) is the custodian of all records before 1842, and of the Secretary's files from 1842 to 1885; this Division of the Archives has the Secretary's files from 1885 to 1926 and some other material going back as far as 1842. The records arrived in poor condition, have been so inaccessible that they have not been much used, and much of the material is still difficult to study.

Possible sources, from which, on a basis of my sampling, I should not ex-



pect too much, are the early medical and surgical records, the records of the Military Governor of Santo Domingo, conduct books, records of deserters, parents' consent to the enlistment of boys, court martial records, ship logs, journals and officers' letters (the letters only from 1885 to 1926, the logs and journals earlier). One might expect valuable observations on natives at points touched, etc. One surgeon records that he was too unwell to go ashore and make moral and political observations, which at least shows his interest. An example of the unexpected find, but in this instance, a most unrewarding one, is material on Syrian and Armenian relief, because the Navy was asked to loan vessels for the transport of cargo and workers.

*Division of Interior Department Archives.* This Division is the chief source for information on the American Indian, his education, health, industry, arts and amusement, crimes and arrests, care of the destitute, etc., etc., for the period 1907 to 1921.

The National Park Service file is valuable to the student of recreation and the development of the national park ("a pleasuring ground for all the people"). Superintendents' reports, outgoing correspondence from 1936, with a few samples from 1935, reports on C.C.C. projects in parks including state and local parks, are the chief types of materials.

If there is ever to be a sociology of art in this country, it will base itself in part on the files of the Commission of Fine Arts and its blueprints, clippings, correspondence, etc. This file is astonishingly current, including material on the as yet unfinished Jefferson Memorial and National Gallery of Art. There is additional material on Washington buildings and monuments not in the files of the Commission.

The problem of government personnel has been studied too exclusively from newspapers and the *Congressional Record*. This Division has the actual letters of application and recommendation which would enable the student to visualize the manner in which government positions were filled in the nineteenth century.

The records of the two Coal Commissions, including some special unpublished studies and the original schedules on living conditions in mining towns, etc., have some interest for both the sociologist and the economist.

For the Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations, there are files on the social (in the narrow sense) activities of the White House.

It might be expected that the files of the Territories and Island Possessions would yield real gold in the field of culture contact in Cuba, the Philippines, Vera Cruz (1914), the Virgin Islands, etc. The Virgin Island materials, mostly in Danish, and rich in newspapers covering a hundred years, are a relatively unexploited field. The slavery situation, the "bickering" and "alimentation" cases in the courts, the involved race mixture, the "consensual" marriage and the important role assumed by sponsors in baptism, all form part of what might be called colonial sociology. Some ma-

terials of the Naval Administration of Samoa and Guam also have found their way to this Division.

A body of material of real interest, and not terrifying in bulk, is found in the recent and unworked accession of District of Columbia Penitentiary records (1826-62), and the less complete records of Freedmen's Hospital, Howard University, and the government hospitals for the insane. The penitentiary files include minutes of the meetings of the Board of Inspectors, the warden's correspondence, lists of prisoners received and discharged (with dates and remarks), punishments (e.g., the amount of cobbing for singing and laughing in one's cell, or talking through the keyhole), and most interesting of all, the longhand reports of William O'Neale to Benjamin Williams, Esquire, on the many other prisons he visited in 1829. Blueprints for various territorial penitentiaries and insane asylums are also present, as they had to be approved by the Department.

*Division of Agriculture Department Archives.* Although much of the material in this Division is hopelessly disorganized and finding media are not very satisfactory, attention should be called to the data here on rural sociology. In view of the rather full exploitation and publication of the material by the Department, it should be pointed out that the files will be most useful for local or regional studies. Field workers' plans and reports throw light on changes in rural life and especially the relation of governmental action to such changes. The development of community centers, cooperatives, etc., can be studied here. Data on particular persons and places are regarded as confidential.

The same restriction applies to the cases of the Food and Drug Administration (dating from 1882 and including material as recent as an exhibit assembled when the Tugwell bill was pending).

Anyone who knows the broad interests of the Soil Conservation Service (which began as Soil Erosion in the Department of the Interior) will expect its correspondence files 1933-36 to possess sociological interest.

The Forest Service has records of the National Conservation Commission (1908-9), the National Conservation Congress (1909), and its participation in the National Conservation Exposition (1913).

Schedules of the *Household Inventory and Consumption Survey*, which was part of the *War Emergency Food Survey*, are available and contain unpublished material.

This Division possesses schedules of a CWA study of part-time farming, and an FERA-BAE study of drouth areas, both of sociological interest.

The Division's own statement as to its sociological materials deserves quotation:

The correspondence of the Secretary of Agriculture housed in the Division of Agriculture Department Archives, contains a considerable amount of material directly or indirectly related to the subjects of social organization, social life, and

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social welfare. This results in part from the fact that the Secretary's Office, as the central agency of the Department, has had extensive contacts with all kinds of organizations both in the United States and abroad, and that it thus has accumulated a great deal of correspondence relating to the activities of such associations and to the conditions with which they have attempted to deal. Since the personnel activities of the Department have been conducted in the Secretary's office, a considerable number of records relating to the social and welfare activities of Departmental employees and their working conditions also appears in the files. Finally, the fact that the Extension Service, that agency of the Department which has been most concerned with the social aspects of rural existence, has been in the Secretary's Office since 1923 accounts for the presence of a large amount of material relating to these social aspects.

It must be realized, however, that the emphasis in this data is upon organized activity, particularly governmental action and administration, rather than upon description of conditions.

The reports of the field workers of the Extension Service of the Department of Agriculture, 1908-1936, now in the custody of The National Archives contain a wealth of information on the various aspects of rural culture. Although they emphasize the economic side of rural life they contain much data of interest to the investigators in other fields. Generally it can be said that of the many features of rural culture only the political and religious are not directly mirrored in the extension service reports.

Of all agencies of the Department of Agriculture the Extension Service is best equipped to observe the changes and trends of rural life. Through cooperation with state and local agencies the Service has an agent in practically every rural county in the nation, an agent whose full time duty it is to work with and for the farmers. In some counties in addition to the county agent the Service maintains a 4-H club leader to supervise the extension program for the young people and a home demonstration agent who is interested particularly in women's activities.

The annual reports of these agents constitute a detailed narrative and statistical record of the extension work in the county—crop and livestock improvement, marketing and rural organization, home management and home industries, recreation, etc. In addition to this record of the extension program, however, the reports are also a more general record of the prevailing conditions, trends and problems of rural life.

*Division of Commerce Department Archives.* While most of the material in this Division is economic, there are exceptions. Personnel records (some segregated as such) exist here as in so many divisions. The collection of census schedules is fragmentary and restricted as to use. It includes the agricultural census of 1925, that of 1930, and a small remnant of 1920; some tobacco census schedules of 1909; that of religious bodies, 1926 (1916 was destroyed, 1936 retained by the Department); the 1929 census of distribution—retail and wholesale schedules (1933 was destroyed, later ones retained).

Unrestricted materials are to be found in the files of the President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, and the President's Committee on Unemployment, which no student of relief in the 1930's can afford to neglect.

*Division of Labor Department Archives.* This Division is relatively advanced in its work of describing its materials, but that makes it only the surer that it possesses much chaff and little wheat. Something could be dug out on local social history; sociology may have some interest in the labor relations cases (indexed by industry in the card catalog); the immigration files (restricted) consist of individual cases of admission and deportation and (in the correspondence files) of some statements of policy as well as routine matters; vast but incomplete bodies of material from 1919-20 and later are listed as pertaining to alien radicals. These latter files include damaging pamphlets found in the possession of aliens, especially if printed in one of the less familiar languages. I suppose the Archives has here one of the largest collections of copies of the Communist Manifesto to be found outside the Soviet Union. The material in the Americanization files consists of correspondence, preparation of textbooks and pamphlets, material on specific cities and organizations.

The Children's Bureau files are mainly administrative and reveal more about the organization and functioning of the Bureau than about its research. Some material on the White House Conference on Child Health and Protection is in the Independent Agencies Archives rather than here.

*Division of Independent Agencies Archives.* The vast collections of the Food Administration and the Grain Corporation were among the earliest to be dropped in the lap of the National Archives. They were studied with a time-consuming care that must have been extremely expensive and were advertised to the scholarly world in a series of articles. Their main interest is, of course, the manner in which a nation is mobilized and its daily and cherished habits changed. Incidentally and unexpectedly, one finds such items as replies to a questionnaire asking mayors what moving picture theatres in their cities are attended by Negroes exclusively, as well as those where they attend in large numbers.

Although Mr. Hoover removed much of the American Relief Administration material to his World War Library at Leland Stanford University, the A.R.A. files (and those of the European Children's Fund) here include more or less confidential reports and bulletins on conditions in European countries and the applications (unfavorably acted upon) of Americans who thought themselves qualified for positions on the staff of the American Relief Administration.

The Division has recently received a small body of material comprising the records of the defunct Commission on Radio in Education. Included are correspondence and some radio continuities. Independent Agencies also has some samples of commercial broadcasting. For an actual recording of all programs for a sample 18-hour day, the student will turn to the Division of Motion Pictures and Sound Recordings.

*Division of Veterans' Administration Archives.* The possibilities for research which lie in the endless, monotonous 34,000 cubic feet of veterans'



records, stretching from just after the War of 1812 to just before the World War, are not inspiring. The Administration has been called the largest domestic relations court in the world. It could be exploited by a staff (after permission to use the records was obtained) to determine the age difference between husband and wife, the number of remarriages of veterans, the picture of American sex morality that emerges from some of the cases. By accident, a small collection of life histories of "members" of the Bath (N. Y.) Soldiers' and Sailors' Home, with the disciplinary actions their cases seemed frequently to require, were taken over by the Veterans' Administration and deposited here.

*Division of Maps and Charts.* It should not be forgotten that while this Division cannot possess all the maps one might desire, it may have just the unique thing that will illustrate the pattern of settlement in an early American community, the successive thrusts of urban growth, the natural and cultural landscape at any given time and place. Thus far sociologists (unless you count the city planners and mention the ecologists) have not been notably map-minded.

*Division of Motion Pictures and Sound Recordings.* There is a great difference between the situation of the National Archives and that of a historical society. The latter can write its own ticket, selecting whatever materials promise to be most useful to the future historian. The National Archives is limited to taking what is transferred to it by government agencies. There is one exception to this statement which deserves comment. The Division of Motion Pictures and Sound Recordings is permitted to accept gifts of materials pertaining to and illustrative of the history of the United States. The almost limitless possibilities thus opened up are being faced with vision by John G. Bradley, Chief of the Division. Handicapped by lack of space for storage and, of course, by lack of funds for filming and recording what he would like, Mr. Bradley is hoping, nevertheless, by cooperation with the motion picture industry and private individuals, to build up a uniquely valuable collection. There is a voluminous correspondence on the movement to create a great National Film Library. This movement antedates the creation of the National Archives, but since 1935 naturally has aimed at making the Archives the depository of such a collection.

There is a real gap between the broad theoretical question of what sights and sounds a civilization should preserve and the mere collection of a mirror of Hollywood. This gap is not bridged with entire satisfaction by insisting that if Hollywood is preserved, it is as a sample of Hollywood and not as a perfect record of what American civilization was. It is the record of a civilization and not the record of an industry that is the desideratum.

It is no doubt true that vast amounts of material produced by individuals and groups could be had for the asking or at cost. Films illustrating medical and industrial processes, archaeological work, and every facet of our American life are constantly being made. Conceivably, the giving of publicity to

the Division of Motion Picture and Sound Recordings at the National Archives might result in a deluge of such material impossible to handle. It is my opinion, however, that neither the problem of selection nor that of salving the feelings of those whose films would be rejected presents insuperable difficulties.

In addition to the broad concern with the representative character of such a film collection, mention should be made of the necessity of developing new types of suspiciousness in this field based upon some technical knowledge of the way in which films are produced. In dealing with news photos, we have learned to separate the caption from the picture. We have learned that the seeing which is believing can readily lead to false beliefs. Certainly in the future, the student of film archives will need special training and real ingenuity in the interpretation of motion pictures.

The Archives will accession motion pictures in the field of a so-called factual (pictures of an actual event at the time), the factual-expository (based on a scenario designed to popularize something regarded as scientifically true), fictional re-creations of history (if not too obviously inaccurate), pictures that because of their great appeal have been themselves historical events, propaganda films, and examples of the pure entertainment film at all levels.

Thus stated, the aims and objectives of the Division are exciting enough. They become more grandiose when one encounters the idea that collections and series may be built up on practically every human activity and that the voice of America may be printed in thousands of instances, ranging from every public utterance of the President to short examples of the speech of anonymous Americans typical of their region or occupation. Sound recordings offer perhaps a more hopeful field than motion pictures because of the smaller expense (provided cooperation from the broadcasting companies and other sources is obtained), smaller bulk and less fire hazard.

In the cases of both motion pictures and sound recordings, it is apparent that the selection of the material to go into this open Time Capsule that is the National Archives is a responsible and challenging job and it should be undertaken only with the advice of statisticians and social scientists who understand their responsibility and are expert in the study of culture.

As to the way in which such vast collections of material may be used by social scientists in the future, I am compelled to let it go with the old clichés, as "visual and auditory aids to education." Such materials offer us new kinds of truth as well as new possibilities of error and if the social scientist of the future cannot find ways to utilize them, one can only say that he will have been blind and deaf to incomparably the most complete, the most novel, and the most vivid record of itself which any civilization ever has been able to accumulate.

## THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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THE TERM "social control" was introduced into sociological literature by Small and Vincent in 1894.<sup>1</sup> The idea, however, stems from Comte<sup>2</sup> and possibly came to Small and Vincent through Ward's<sup>3</sup> philosophical writings. The first book under the title,<sup>4</sup> *Social Control*, is traceable to Ward's influence.<sup>5</sup> Although the term has been accepted into the sociological argot, sociologists have shown only sporadic interest in the concept. This observation appears valid in view of the fact that "social control" never has had such a vogue as have "disorganization," "community," "ecology," and other concepts. Specifically, this paper is a reaction to a futile search for a theoretical statement of the concept in Landis<sup>6</sup> and Bernard<sup>7</sup> in its relation to a scientific statement of societal behavior. Both writers realize the connection the concept bears to the works of Ross and Cooley, but proceed without examining their theoretical positions in terms of newer data. The writer, in view of the situation, believes two steps are necessary for future research on social control: first, the concept should be reexamined in relation to the general theory of the men who established it in the sociological organon; and second, a tentative restatement consonant with contemporary knowledge.

Ross<sup>8</sup> and Cooley<sup>9</sup> attacked a common, conjoint problem of how behavior is controlled on the one hand, and on the other, how it is related to the maintenance of social order from different viewpoints. Consequently, their conceptions of the nexus between social control and order in society are diametrically opposed. Under the spell of nineteenth century naturalism and in the footsteps of the early system makers, Ross started with definite assumptions, and from them flowed his conclusions as mechanically and freely as automobiles from a production line—"a part for every function and a function for every part." Briefly, the skeleton of the argument he uses

<sup>1</sup> A. W. Small and G. E. Vincent, *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, 328, New York, 1894.

<sup>2</sup> Auguste Comte, *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, Paris, 1830-42, tr. by Harriett Martineau, 3rd ed., London, 1893, Vol. II; and Auguste Comte, *Système de Politique Positive*, Paris, 1851-1854.

<sup>3</sup> L. F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, 69, 468-475, New York, 1883, Vol. I; 35-36, 42-43, 89-95, 248-251, Vol. II; and *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 1-2, 134-331, Boston, 1893.

<sup>4</sup> E. A. Ross, *Social Control*, New York, 1901.

<sup>5</sup> E. A. Ross, *Seventy Years of It*, 56, New York, 1936; B. J. Stern, "The Ross-Ward Correspondence," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 3: 362-401, 1932.

<sup>6</sup> Paul H. Landis, *Social Control; Social Organization and Disorganization in Process*, New York, 1939.

<sup>7</sup> L. L. Bernard, *Social Control*, New York, 1939.

<sup>8</sup> *Social Control, A Survey of the Foundations of Order*, op. cit.

<sup>9</sup> *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York, 1902.

runs along the following lines: There is a natural order in human affairs, based on the inheritance of four instincts ("moral Capital" implanted in each of us by nature, viz., "sympathy," "sociability," "the sense of justice," and "resentment" to mistreatment)<sup>10</sup> which are adequate to provide man with a harmonious order so long as social relations are on a personal intimate<sup>11</sup> level. However, as society evolved, impersonal, contractual relations developed, because man's social instincts weakened to such an extent that self-interest took their place. Society at this critical, transitional point was faced with the problem of implementing these weakened moral obligations with social mechanisms to control the selfish individual's relations with others.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, as "natural communities"<sup>13</sup> gave way to "artificial, civilized societies," social controls took the place of man's instinctive controls in regulating conduct and assuring to the individual, safety, and to the society, order and continuity.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the more civilized a society becomes, the greater the degree of control society exerts over the "moral intuitions" of its members.<sup>15</sup> The resultant is the selfish striving of the individual against society and society against the individual. This dichotomy of individual versus social ends forced society to control the individual by "artificial" devices. Thus, the emphasis is on "means" in Ross' conception of control.<sup>16</sup>

Cooley, without explicitly stating his position, unobtrusively but effectively demonstrated how the individual becomes a member of society through association, is controlled by it, and in turn becomes an agent in the process. He specifically rejected the idea that the individual is juxtaposed to society.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, he denies social activities are motivated by instincts or "Social Faculties."<sup>18</sup> This being the case, the only realities in the social process are persons in society who possess common meanings which define their activities. His conclusion was that the person's behavior is controlled for the most part by the development of conscience (the "voice" of the group) as a consequence of association, although the process is withal unconscious and unplanned. Thus, in the Cooley system, control was implicit in society, and as such, it was transmitted to the individual by association.<sup>19</sup>

Following the appearance of these pioneer works, little attention was given to the concept *per se*. Those who have written on the subject, almost without exception, have followed either Ross' or Cooley's approach without critically examining their theoretical positions. In the case of Ross, his erroneous assumptions have been dropped, and rightfully so, while the idea of "means" of control has been incorporated into the literature.<sup>20</sup> Lumley

<sup>10</sup> Ross, *op. cit.*, 6, 7, 9, 26.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 12, 41-47.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 19-20.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, see especially 89-375.

<sup>17</sup> C. H. Cooley, *op. cit.*, 4-8.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-13, 26, 27, 65-67.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 338-341, 360-361, 369-370, 392-394, 396-397, 403.

<sup>20</sup> For instance see F. E. Lumley, *Means of Social Control*, New York, 1925; J. M. Clark, *Social Control of Business*, Chicago, 1929, 2nd ed. New York, 1939; also his *The Control of*

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specifically followed the Russian conception in two ways: first, in his assumption that social control arises in a crisis situation,<sup>21</sup> and second, by confining his work to an examination of selected means used by controllers to direct behavior along lines acceptable to the controller. Bernard, likewise, follows the crisis assumption, although, like Lumley, he ignores the nature-of-man aspect of the Russian position. He specifically limits his analysis to the methods society uses to bring about an adjustment of behavior on the part of those to whom the control stimuli are directed.<sup>22</sup> The Russian influence is apparent throughout the book, in that the bulk of Bernard's quotations relate to conflict situations. The weakness of this narrow "means" approach is that it ignores the whole field of organizing ideologies, folkways, and institutions fundamental to behavior-direction which are inherent in society. Moreover, these "means" are merely instruments by which specific behavior is manipulated within some aspect of the organizational complex and with reference to it. The net result of uncritically following the Ross approach has been the growth of a body of literature without theoretical orientation. On the other hand, Cooley's followers have had their attention centered on the problem of personality development.<sup>23</sup> Although Cooley and his followers accepted culture as the all powerful matrix of control, they did not turn to an analysis of its structure and function as an organized reality, inasmuch as they were primarily interested in how the individual acquires his personality by group association.<sup>24</sup> For some strange reason, Sumner's fundamental position that an understanding of social behavior must be sought in the usages, mores, and institutions of society has more or less escaped the attention of those interested in the problem of control. The current status of the situation is that we have a widely used term almost devoid of clear conceptual content. In addition, the study of the control aspects in the sociocultural complex have been almost completely ignored.

Today the student who embarks upon research into social control, as it has been dealt with traditionally, is faced with the dilemma of either choosing between the fragmentary "means" or the all-inclusive "social influence" approaches. The one is so restricted in scope that it focuses only on a few of the instruments men use to manipulate selected aspects of behavior within the confines of the control culture,<sup>25</sup> thus ignoring what may well be the most important parts of the problem. The all-inclusive approach, by way of contrast, is so broad that it encompasses the entire sociological field. Obvi-

*Trusts: An Argument in Favor of Curbing the Power of Monopoly by a Natural Method*, New York, 1912. <sup>21</sup> F. E. Lumley, *op. cit.*, 11, 12.

<sup>22</sup> L. L. Bernard, *op. cit.*, 12-13, 15, 30-47.

<sup>23</sup> Ellsworth Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature*, New York, 1937; E. B. Reuter, "Some Observations on the Status of Social Psychology," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 46: 293-304, 1940.

<sup>24</sup> See Paul H. Landis, *op. cit.*

<sup>25</sup> For a discussion of this concept, see James W. Woodard, "A New Classification of Culture," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1: 89-102, 1936.

ously, a more realistic view of the matter is needed if the concept is to be useful in the development of theory. The writer believes an approach restricted enough in scope to delimit a definite field of inquiry but large enough to include the essentials observable in the control process may be the key to unlocking the problem of society's control over its members. Moreover, as the writer conceives the problem, the essence of social control lies not so much in the mechanisms society has developed to manipulate behavior in a crisis or in the subtle influences so important in the formation of personality, as it does in a society's organization. The description of control instruments and the diffuse factors influencing personality appear to be incidental, from a theoretical viewpoint, to a search for the functional interrelations between culture forms and the behavior of the person in a social situation. Our tentative position is that social control inheres in the more or less common obligatory usages and values which define the relations of one person to another, to things, to ideas, to groups, to classes, and to the society in general. In short, the essence of social control is to be sought in the organization of a people. Herein lies the reality of the control process.<sup>26</sup>

This position clearly posits the existence of two interdependent variables: sociocultural forms and persons. These forms are subjectively integrated in the person and objectively expressed in his behavior. Furthermore, it assumes society is composed of the interrelations among persons acting within the confines of the rules, regulations, practices, and beliefs common to their culture. Society, in contrast to the person, is an ongoing processual existence lasting from generation to generation, perpetuated by the sentiments, codes, customs, institutions, and ideologies communicated to individuals born or adopted into the organization by those previously assimilated. Thus, we proceed on the premise that folkways, ideologies, and institutions implemented by a series of administrative sanctions integrate behavior and produce conformity on the part of society's members. Controls exerted by society *enable* the person to adjust to its expectancies, rules, and regulations, as well as *compel* him to do so or be penalized. These controls are made effective through the organizational framework binding other aspects of life into a more or less coherent unity. The concatenation of these traits channelizes personal and group activity into more or less predictable behavior. From the viewpoint of social control, society is a vast, multiform, organized system of appeals, sanctions, prescriptions, usages, and structures focused upon directing the behavior of its members into culturally defined norms. This position assumes that society inherently possesses a system of behavior controls by which the person is trained, as well as constrained.

The hypothesis we may use as a frame of reference is that social behavior<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Faris, *op. cit.*, 45.

<sup>27</sup> This position assumes all learned reactions acquired by participation in society are expressions of social behavior.

occurs as a functional response to the controls learned by the person as a concomitant of his participation in a sociocultural milieu.<sup>28</sup> Social behavior is, then, the objective expression of organized, communicated experience acquired by the person in association. As such, it is an overt manifestation of social organization pertinent to the situation in which it is acquired, and in which in turn it is exhibited. Since the person's reactional configuration (activity pattern) generally conforms to the standards induced in him by association, it follows that his behavior is controlled by these socially acquired usages and values. A proposition compendent upon our hypothesis is that behavioral differences observed from group to group, class to class, person to person within a society, as well as behavior differences between societies, are a consequence of differential associations<sup>29</sup> on the part of the person participating in a sociocultural milieu. This being the case, an investigator should take as his field for research this system of organized sociocultural forms which condition the behavior configuration followed by persons in association with their fellows, objects, or ideas. This enables us to observe individual or group reactions to any social situation to determine if the behavior exhibited is in response to the usages and values which define how the persons subject to the situation should react; but our central interest is on the controls and how they work to manipulate behavior rather than on behavior as behavior. By our hypothesis, the study of social organization becomes the point of departure for future research, since behavior is controlled *ipso facto* by the organizational precepts which motivate and define it.

At this point, it may be well to state briefly what we mean by the term "social organization." Reduced to its simplest rudiments, social organization, whatever else it may be, is a system of reciprocal values and usages inherent in a culture which provide the members of society with common attitudes and behavior modes. The simplest element in social organization appears to be a usage-value unit, such as the folkway of shaking hands, observed by all or most members of a group. In their more formal and elaborate aspects, usage-value units become mores, institutions, and ideologies. They serve as a framework on which and within which persons build their common activities. From the viewpoint of society, value-usages are norms which define how a person should act with reference to a social situation. The more or less systematic coordination of these value-usage units with one another and with the culture as a whole enables the members of society to maintain working relations so that joint activities are possible although the participants may be separated in space, time, and function. The common values associated with the usage give it validity, justify it, and enable the group's members to achieve relative consensus. In short, we believe or-

<sup>28</sup> B. Malinowski, "Culture as a Determinant of Behavior," in *Factors Determining Human Behavior*, especially 133, 136, 163, Cambridge, Mass., 1937.

<sup>29</sup> E. H. Sutherland, "White-Collar Criminality," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 5: 1-12, 1940.

ganization and control are inextricable aspects of the process wherein behavior is directed toward groupwise interactional responses so uniform in nature that members of society can predict the responses of their fellows to the situation. The product is the observable order found in every organized group. The rationale of organization is, as we see it, the development of orderly, predictable, that is, socially controlled, behavior responses to defined situations. Once this relationship between organizational controls and behavior responses is understood, the student of control can focus his attention upon those aspects of culture and society which function as behavior organizers. This position perforce directs attention from "means" as the object of study to the organization which envelops the person and makes him what he is. The "means" used in a "crisis" are, in this scheme, only a component in the larger process. This frame of reference limits investigation, on the one hand, to the study of sociocultural usages, both formal and informal, which act as definers and guides to conduct, and, on the other, to the study of the person's behavior responses to them. Stated categorically, the immediate research problems in social control then become: (1) analysis of the structure and function of sociocultural forms which organize and, therefore, control behavior; and (2) determination of the relations between the forms and the behavior responses made by persons subject to them.

Within the confines of this proposal, the investigator may divide his interest and focus on the analysis of the control culture, or the response of persons to its compulsives.<sup>30</sup> The former problem should be prior in time and interest for there is no operational way to determine to what extent the behavior of the persons under observation is congruous with the ideologies and usages unless the investigator has a prior comprehension of what these are and how they are supposed to operate. This is not to belittle research focused on behavior reactions of persons in relation to social situations, let us say courtship, traffic, or on a bathing beach. However, the writer believes that before the student interested in these phenomena can give a general explanation of such collective behavior, he has to resort to the facets of social organization pertinent to the situation under discussion. If this is done first, the next step might be to determine empirically to what extent the participants in a given social situation conform to the values and usages which define how they should act. Both aspects of the problem must be solved before we are able to make valid propositions on efficacy of controls over behavior. The dual interest of the investigator, therefore, is to search for, define, and analyze the organizational systems functioning in a culture and to determine how these regulate the behavior of the person.

<sup>30</sup> For instance see John Levy, "The Impact of Cultural Forms upon Children's Behavior," *Mental Hygiene*, 16: 208-220, 1932; "Conflicts of Cultures and Children's Maladjustment," *Ibid.*, 17: 41-50, 1933; Donald Clemmer, *The Prison Community*, especially 149-205, Boston, 1940; Margaret Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, New York, 1935; John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, New York, 1930.



The solution to the problem just posited may be approached either by studying the universal<sup>31</sup> organizational usages<sup>32</sup> (folkways, mores, and institutions) and ideologies in a culture, or by limiting investigation to a detailed analysis of the organization and operation of specialized behavior systems.<sup>33</sup> Before we have the answer, continuous, detailed, and painstaking research by many students on both aspects of social organization is necessary. The general synoptic view will give us useful knowledge, but the most fruitful contributions upon which to base theoretical generalizations will probably come from minute detailed studies of specific institutions, usages, ideologies, and behavior systems. Having made this assumption, the next step toward setting up a conceptual frame is to develop a tentative classificatory scheme of the data in the control culture.

For exploratory purposes, data may be arbitrarily organized around a fourfold classification based upon the form and function of controls, when viewed from the reciprocal facets of the cultural complex, and the person's behavior in the society. The first category might contain that hierarchy of normative usages and conjoined ideologies which range from ephemeral folkways, such as fads and fashions, to those complex, more or less permanent, and continuous institutional prescriptions possessing the authority of law, backed by force. Data pertaining to the role attached to the person by virtue of his position in society could be placed in a second class.<sup>34</sup> The third class may be focused on the authority exercised by functionaries who act as administrative agents of the institutionalized usages included in the first category. The fourth could include those instruments customarily resorted to by private persons and institutional functionaries to elicit behavior conformity consonant with the hierarchy of usages and values they possess as a consequence of their role and authority in society. These include the broad gamut of symbols and mechanisms which either elicit desired behavior through the use of praise and rewards or suppress undesirable responses by resort to coercion.<sup>35</sup> This classification is focused on two of the three major

<sup>31</sup> For a discussion of Universals and Specialities, see Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* 272-274, New York, 1936.

<sup>32</sup> Willard Waller, "Social Problems and the Mores," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1: 922-933, 1936.

<sup>33</sup> For a discussion of this concept see the writer's "Behavior Systems as a Field for Research," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 4: 816-26, 1939.

<sup>34</sup> The role provides status, prestige, and a complex body of behavior norms which the person is expected and constrained to observe in his relations to associates. Also, every age group, social function, and institutional office appears to have its appropriate role.

<sup>35</sup> Categories one and two are conceived of as being principally focused on the structure of the control culture, whereas categories three and four are integrated around the dynamic functioning of the system. To be sure, normative usages and roles are constantly functioning to organize behavior; furthermore, they represent the major framework of the control culture. Nevertheless, it is within the matrix of the data included in the latter classes that the dynamic is encompassed, because it is the task of the functionaries to use their office, and control instruments to maintain a more or less standard working relationship between the normative usages and the behavior responses of the person.

divisions inherent in the control process, namely, the conditioners and agents. The other is the *modus operandi*, or "how they work," phase. Stated briefly, the three components in the process are (1) the value-usages guiding behavior, (2) the agents who implement the value-usages by (3) manipulating them in such a way that a desired behavior mode will result. The task of the investigator is to discover and reveal how usages, roles, agents, and instruments operate to bring about organized behavior.

By way of summary, it may be well to restate categorically the analyses in the preceding paragraphs.

1. Two conceptions of social control were developed in the early writings of Ross and Cooley. Ross viewed social control as a *sine qua non* of society, because the selfish nature of the individual made it necessary to restrain his actions. This approach consequently stressed the means society used to bring about ordered behavior. Cooley viewed social control as an aspect of the reciprocal relation between the individual and society.

2. The theoretical justification for Ross' approach has been nullified by the destruction of the instinct hypothesis but the interest in means of control has been retained without its users realizing its connection with Ross' original theory.

3. Cooley's position has been selectively developed by the social psychologists who have concentrated on the personal aspects of the control process but have generally neglected the cultural organization aspect.

4. A restatement of the concept is needed before research of a theoretical nature is undertaken. This is attempted by making the following assumptions: (a) social behavior is a functional response to controls learned by the person in a sociocultural milieu; (b) as such, behavior is an expression of social organization existent in the milieu and pertinent to the situation in which it is expressed.

5. Since social organization is the compulsive or control factor in behavior, the student should focus his attention upon the aspects of society and culture which function as behavior organizers.

6. These data may be approached from the viewpoint of general usages common to the society or those confined to a specialized group.

7. A fourfold classification of the control forms is given. These include: (a) prescriptive usages and ideologies; (b) social roles; (c) authority exercised by functionaries; and (d) instruments, "means," used to elicit or suppress behavior.

The object of the approach sketched here is the development of a theoretical foundation from which to derive tentative propositions of an abstract nature (hypotheses) capable of empirical test, which tested knowledge may then become the basis for valid theoretical generalizations concerning behavior control in society.

## SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE

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THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM presents some interesting applications of sociological principles.<sup>1</sup> The most obvious aspect is the quantitative one having to do with the mere numbers of men, but there are underlying principles which should not be overlooked. Selective Service, viewed sociologically, has these two aspects: (1) the application of known facts which are commonly used in the field of sociology; and (2) the application of sociological theories.

The former is the simpler but it shows the assistance which can be given by the men who for years have been grubbing in census volumes which, but for them, would be dust-covered. Simply stated, it is a problem of population; in its more complex form, it is an exercise in statistical analysis. The Selective Service System is called on to supply a certain number of men; the question is how best to secure them. Congress decided that the way to do it was to require all men in the age group 21 through 35 to register and to make themselves available for chance selection. This immediately raises the question of how many men will be involved. It is extremely important, first, because of the physical task of registration and second, because there must be some indication of how many of the original total group will be left after exemptions and deferments have been granted. It is not necessary to go into the method of arriving at the total numbers, except to indicate that it involves statistical analysis of a part of the total population, including such variables as changes in age groups, immigration and emigration, and internal migration, to mention just a few of the factors. Broadly it is a question of national population; narrowly it is, "How many registration cards shall be sent to Ward 8 in Middletown?"

Difficult as this problem is, that of determining the number of men available for military service is even greater. The law provides for the deferment of men in five broad groups: (1) those with dependents; (2) those defined as "necessary men" occupationally; (3) the mentally, physically and morally unfit; (4) certain government officials; and (5) students. Thus, having arrived at an estimated total number of registrants, it is necessary to deduct the numbers in these various classes. Here again, statistical counts and guesses come into play. Taking the first group, men with dependents, we find conflicting evidence. The entrance of women into gainful occupations, the dismissal of older persons, the changes in age at marriage, the increase

<sup>1</sup> In this connection see W. Russell Tylor, "Conscription and the College Man," *Educational Record*, Jan. 1941, 69-79.

of childless families, these and many other factors will materially change evidence from earlier censuses regarding family life. Some of these will increase the number of men with dependents, others will reduce the group. The Selective Service System wants to know the final figure so that it may be deducted from the total number.

A second quantitative problem is that concerning "necessary men" occupationally. The Act provides for the deferment from service of those men "whose employment in industry, agriculture, or other occupations or employment, or whose activity in other endeavors, is found . . . to be necessary to the maintenance of national health, safety, or interest." This provision is being interpreted liberally, with a broad definition of national interest. The economists must estimate the number of men under this indefinite heading.

The sociologist is interested in the number of people in the community who are physically, mentally, or morally unfit. The official of the Selective Service System, too, is concerned with this problem, since the Act removes such men from availability for service. The same applies to certain government officials and students who are in deferred classes.

This is briefly the problem of numbers created by the Act. All men falling into these categories, plus a certain number of others deferred by reason of alienage or previous military service, are to be subtracted from total registrants and the remainder is the pool from which trainees may be drawn.

I have dealt briefly and incompletely with the relation of Selective Service to the sociology of population. The second, that of the application of certain sociological theories, is more interesting.

The first words of the Act and much of the language thereafter demonstrates the "strain toward consistency" in the mores. This is a democratic nation and the Selective Service Act, with its accompanying *Regulations*, constantly demonstrates the effort to carry out the principles of democracy. Section 1b reads: "The Congress further declares that in a free society the obligations and privileges of military training and service should be shared generally in accordance with a fair and just system of selective compulsory military training and service." This spirit is further expressed in Section 4b which stipulates that quotas shall be set up for each state and for their subdivisions, with credits allowed for the personnel from the state already in the armed services. The quotas are based, not on total population or even on total registrants, but on the total Class I registration, that is, on the number of men *available* for service. This is but one more example of an equitable demand.

Still another attempt at democratic procedure is the refusal to grant mass exemptions. I shall have more to say about this later, but for the present, I should like to point out that in the 1917-18 draft much public criticism resulted from the mass exemptions of men on the so-called Emergency Fleet Classification List. An estimated 100,000 Class I men engaged in shipbuilding were exempted by this means. Realizing the mistake of mass exemptions,



the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee, which was charged with the task of preparing the Act, laid down the democratic principle that there should be no such general releases. Bounties to conscripts and permitting substitutes, two other scandals in former drafts, were likewise ruled out as undemocratic. A bow to the self-maintenance mores as well as to those of democracy is evident in the provision of Section 8 which requires employers to restore jobs to conscripted men and which calls on the United States Courts to enforce this restoration, if necessary.

As a final evidence of equity, I should like to point out the section of the Act (Section 9) which drafts industry. This was one of the most debated portions during the enactment of the legislation. It empowers the government to take over, on a rental basis, any company which fails to cooperate in defense contracts. Penalties may also be assessed against offending company officials. This is in the highest democratic tradition. It recognizes an equal liability to government service on the part of industry at a time when liability to service is being levied against manpower.

A second example of consistency in the mores is seen in the scrupulous maintenance of legal doctrine. Section 10a provides a complete machinery of appeals from rulings of various official groups. No man will be rushed into uniform on the decision of a single individual or board. He is provided with numerous opportunities for review. Furthermore, the Act does not throw the people into courts-martial; it provides (Sec. 11) for offenders to be tried by the regularly constituted civilian courts. No man is subject to military law until *after* his induction into service.

The strength of the family institution in our society is well recognized in the Selective Service System. Paragraph 354b, Volume Three, *Selective Service Regulations*, reads:

The local board should determine all questions of Class III deferments with sympathetic regard for the registrant and his dependents. Any reasonable doubts in connection with dependency should be resolved in favor of deferment, and in doubtful cases the local board should be mindful of injuries which may be expected to result from separating a father from his children or a husband from his wife. The maintenance of the family as a unit is of importance to the national well-being.

Additional evidence of the force of the mores is seen in the definitions of relationships (Par. 356). The term "child" is made to include "an unborn child, a child legally adopted, or a child born out of wedlock." The term "parent" subsumes "persons supported in good faith by the registrant in a relationship similar to that of parent and child."

The position of the religious institution brings out a fine example of society's tendency to establish one set of rules (ideal behavior) and to live by another (expected behavior). As pointed out earlier, the Act provides that there shall be no mass exemptions of occupational groups. Yet Section 5d says, "Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, and students who are preparing for the ministry in theological or divinity schools . . . shall be ex-

empt from training and service (but not from registration) under this Act." Thus, either ministers are not an occupational group or the Act contradicts itself. While other groups, such as students, exservice men, and so forth, are *deferred* from service, the clergy is *exempted*. Is this an example of "conventionalization" in the sense that what is not permitted to apply to other men is accepted as applying to a special group removed from normal society?

Further deference to the religious institution is paid in the recognition of conscientious objectors. Two classes are provided for: (1) those opposed only to combatant service; and (2) those opposed to both combatant and non-combatant service. The former may be placed in noncombatant branches; the latter may be assigned to "work of national importance under civilian direction under such rules and regulations as may be later prescribed."

The student of ecology will be pleased by the recognition which the Act gives to local areas. The military service, so often criticized for complexity and bureaucratic centralization, refutes the charge by presenting legislation which creates a highly decentralized organization and which provides for wide discretionary powers by local officials. Appreciation of local variations is present throughout the Act and its accompanying *Regulations*.

The key to the recognition of ecological differences is provided by Section 10a-2, which states, in part: "There shall be created one or more local boards in each county or political subdivision corresponding thereto of each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia." This sentence demonstrates two different things: first, it indicates the administrative decentralization which characterizes selective service; second, it takes into consideration the fact that whereas the county is the normal administrative unit in some states, other states have political subdivisions not following county lines.

Mention has already been made of the quota provisions of Section 4b. This Section is amplified in Paragraphs 401-404 and 409-413 of Volume Four, *Selective Service Regulations*. The sociologist has long remarked on the age-distribution, sex-distribution, and marital-condition differences of rural and urban areas and of the variations within urban areas. The fact that quotas are based on the number of *available* men rather than on the total population, or on the total registrants within an area, indicates that local disparities are being considered in Selective Service. The final net quota of a local board will be determined by the local board's number of Class I men in relation to the total number of Class I men in the United States, less those men in the community who are already in the armed services. Thus, areas which have relatively few men aged 21-35 or which have a high proportion of married men, will not have disproportionate calls levied against them.

Volume Two of the *Regulations*, having to do with registration, is replete with examples of the recognition of local variations. Paragraph 205 places upon the governors responsibility for registration within their states. Under the Act, the President is empowered to issue regulations which have the force of law, but Paragraph 205 authorizes the *Governor* to "make such

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modification of details . . . as may be necessary in order to accomplish effective and complete registration on the day fixed." It should not be imagined that this provision is merely "on the books"; in actual practice, many modifications were made and are continually being made in view of local conditions in the several states to effect a smoother functioning. Paragraph 208c states:

Should the Governor in his discretion consider that it is impracticable or unwise for any reason to use the regular election officials in any county, he is authorized to appoint other registration officials. If necessary, he may appoint registrars from outside the county.

Full recognition of local variations is evident in Paragraph 109 which defines "county," and in Paragraph 214 dealing with definitions of the terms "county clerk" and "precinct."

The word 'county' includes, where applicable, counties, independent cities, and similar subdivisions, such as the independent cities of Virginia, the parishes of Louisiana, and the towns of the New England States. [The term "county clerk" is made to include] the official, board, commission or group charged with supervision of general State and National elections in the county, city, independent city, parish, town, etc., as may be applicable in the particular State, or any other person, board, commission or group designated by the Governor to supervise registration in such areas. . . . 'Precinct' includes, where applicable, voting districts, and means the smallest subdivision used for voting purposes in any State.

A further decentralization is provided for in Paragraph 504 of Volume Five.<sup>2</sup> Here the governor is given additional power in certain financial matters. In brief, it may be said that the *Regulations* provide great latitude in internal administration within the state, particularly where local conditions necessitate deviation from the general plan. The national headquarters has been very liberal in modifying the general plan to fit local peculiarities.

Investigation of Selective Service thus discloses many things which can be explained by sociology. As it continues in operation, it should also provide much information of value to future studies in sociology. The factual information which will come from the millions of questionnaires will give us an invaluable picture of certain aspects of American society in 1940, but in addition, it is my belief that much of a theoretical nature will be revealed. It is perhaps too early to anticipate what this may be, but I should like to indicate that setting up, in a democracy, a peace time organization for registering some seventeen million men and then the selecting and training of four and a half million of these men in military organizations should certainly provide the sociologist with a valuable field for research.

<sup>2</sup> At this point, it seems desirable for the author to anticipate the smiles of those who level charges of bureaucracy and who may be saying, "Here he quotes Volume *Five* of the *Regulations*, after having said earlier that it's all so simple." Let me point out that the six volumes, comprising *all* of the regulations, and covering Organization and Administration, Registration, Classification and Selection, Delivery and Induction, Finance, and Physical Standards—the entire system is covered in these volumes in a total of 159 pages.

## FORTY YEARS OF THE JUVENILE COURT\*

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THE FORTIETH anniversary of the establishment of the juvenile court should have been celebrated in Cook County, Illinois—two years ago. Such a celebration did not take place. Rather, the year 1939 saw the formation of a Citizens Committee on the Juvenile Court, a defense step made necessary by the fact that in Chicago, the cradle of the juvenile court idea, certain forces in the community were attempting to abolish the Court. Led by the *Chicago Tribune*, there are groups in that city aiming to remove the juvenile court from the roster of agencies which deal in fundamental and effective manner with serious social problems.

An attempt was made in Illinois in 1935 to amend the juvenile court act so that all children above ten years of age who were charged with felonies would be tried in the adult criminal court. This amendment was defeated, but its proponents found an opportunity to present an appeal in the case of Susie Lattimore, a fifteen year old girl convicted of murder by the Criminal Court of Cook County. The Supreme Court of Illinois in deciding the case not only overruled three earlier decisions upholding the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but also completely reversed itself on the basic philosophy of the juvenile court act which the Supreme Court had theretofore announced in 1912 and 1913, declaring in part:

It was not intended by the legislature that the juvenile court should be made a haven of refuge where a delinquent child of the age recognized by law as capable of committing a crime should be immune from punishment for violation of the criminal laws of the state, committed by such child subsequent to his or her being declared a delinquent child.

At the present moment, the Cook County Juvenile Court, the first of its kind to be established anywhere in the world, stands divested of all jurisdictions in relation to juvenile delinquents. It exists by the sufferance, so to speak, of the criminal court of that county. At any time they may care to do so, the judges of that court can remove from the juvenile court all children over ten years of age who are charged with any infraction of the law, even including petty misdemeanors. The remedy now proposed is that of constitutional amendment, or more realistically, by raising the age of criminal responsibility from its present limit of ten years—a limit which has stood for over a century—to sixteen years.

Cook County is not the only place where the juvenile court is under attack. The situation in New Jersey, to cite but one other, is not unlike that

\* Read before the Criminology Section of the American Sociological Society, Chicago, Illinois, Dec. 28, 1940.



in Illinois. The critical point at which the juvenile court finds itself in this country is well described by Jerome Hall:

The proponents of the Court must demonstrate its effectiveness by carefully worked out studies. Otherwise, the indications are that there will be movements here to curb the Court, either because it is believed that the wide discretion is abused or because it is believed that definite punitive sanctions should be administered in cases of delinquency. There is no question about prevailing American sentiment that the juvenile court is generally regarded as a great advance upon prior methods of dealing with one of our most vital problems, but the challenge has definitely arrived and the future of the juvenile court depends upon how it is met.<sup>1</sup>

Sociologists and social workers are greatly interested in this social instrumentality. If it is under attack, they are anxious to do their part in its defense. The spread of the juvenile court from Cook County to forty-six of our states and to every large country of the world has perhaps caused many persons to accept it uncritically, to sit back in the fond hope that its growth was proving its worth. Recent events are revealing the contrary, however. Those groups which desire to abolish the Court evidently will stop at little to accomplish their ends. Those who believe in the juvenile court are called upon now to defend its gains and to demand their extension.

To go back a little, it will be recalled that the juvenile court was an outgrowth of the tremendous surge of liberal and humanitarian thought of the latter nineteenth century which reached its full growth and development in the twentieth. The new instrumentality was not without precedent, however. Courts of chancery had in the earliest days fully established that, "The care of all infants is lodged in the King as *parens patriae* and by the King is delegated to the court of chancery."<sup>2</sup> "Once the sovereign state, through legislative action, removed children from under the operation of the criminal law, it made avail of its parental, its chancery, or in common parlance, its equity, power."<sup>3</sup> There was also the precedent of no criminal responsibility in children under seven and a limited responsibility in those between the ages of seven and fourteen.

It remained only to translate these precedents, through statute and administrative order, into an instrument for the hearing of children's cases—usually from ages seven to seventeen—and to set it, unfortunately in many instances, into the already existent machinery of the criminal court, to give the new juvenile court existence. Once established, the Court was made responsible in many places for the determination of conditions other than behavior—dependency, neglect, adoption and guardianship, and even the dispensation of certain relief funds. Some courts assumed control of thousands of dependent children as wards of the court, because of the lack of adequate facilities in the community.

<sup>1</sup> *Proceedings of the First Southern Regional Conference on Family Relations*, 12, 13, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1939.

<sup>2</sup> *Eyre vs. Shaftsbury*.

<sup>3</sup> *Juvenile Delinquency in Massachusetts as a Public Responsibility*, 19, Mass. Child Council, Boston, 1939.

The great contribution of the juvenile court nevertheless remained in the field of behavior. Early juvenile court codes stressed the parental nature of their jurisdiction and laid down the policy that was to mark the operation of the best courts: that children were not to be treated as criminals, but as young persons "in need of aid, encouragement and guidance." In view of the attacks now being made against the Court, this basic tenet cannot be too frequently repeated. Reflecting the newer concepts of behavior, court agencies for dealing with childhood disorder were emphasizing that children were to be treated not because of what they had done, but on the basis of the need revealed by their antisocial acts. Punishment and retribution were to be completely set aside. In its place was to enter a new attitude, viz., that offenses committed by children, called crimes when committed by adults, were to be considered merely as symptoms of a deeper, more underlying disturbance, a sign that here was a condition which, if uncorrected, might lead to serious criminal activity in adult life.

Early in the experience of juvenile courts, the need was seen for an outside aid, for a scientific agency which would be expert and specialized in seeking out the causes of maladjustment and in suggesting treatment. Thus arose the first child guidance clinic; "Juvenile Psychopathic Institute" was the original name of the clinic established in Chicago by William Healy. The development of the child guidance movement from its early attachment to the juvenile court to a worthy and independent existence, has not altered the original conception of the clinic: to study misconduct as "a branch of conduct in general"<sup>4</sup> which regards the child as "the product of conditions and forces which have been actively forming (him) from the earliest moment of unicellular life."<sup>5</sup> In passing, it may be of interest to point out that the immediate effect of the Chicago experiment was most speedily felt in the neighboring states of Ohio and Michigan.

The basic philosophy and procedure of the juvenile court have been best summarized in the Juvenile Court Standards and embodied in the Standard Juvenile Court Act<sup>6</sup> which were formulated almost twenty years ago:

That the juvenile court be vested with exclusive jurisdiction over all manner of cases of children under the age of eighteen who are in need of special care or protection;

That a judge chosen because of his special qualifications—legal training, acquaintance with special problems and understanding of child psychology—with tenure of office long enough to develop special interest in his work, should devote such time to juvenile work as is necessary to keep detention at a minimum, to hear each case carefully and thoroughly, and to give general direction to the work of the court.<sup>7</sup>

These are the chief provisions. The others—petitions instead of warrants, the forbiddance of jail detention, social investigations, informal court pro-

<sup>4</sup> William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, 28, Boston, 1915.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>6</sup> Children's Bureau, Washington, 1923; reissued 1934.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1, 2.

cedure, the attendance of parents at, and the barring of the press from, the hearings, the choice of probation officers and defining their duties—these were subordinate considerations. Four fundamental principles were to guide the procedure:

That the court should be clothed with broad jurisdiction, embracing all classes of cases in which a child is in need of the protection of the state;

That the court should have a scientific understanding of each child;

That treatment should be adapted to individual needs;

That there should be a presumption in favor of keeping the child in his own home and his own community.<sup>8</sup>

Briefly, these are the *desiderata* for juvenile court administration. Yet what do we find in practice? What has been the extent of the application of these splendid ideals to the actual day by day operation of our courts for children? It is interesting to note that in those communities where they have been vigorously applied, where the juvenile court has taken the leadership in defense of its way of doing business, and at the same time in the protection of the children under its care, the kind of attacks which have been experienced in Chicago and other places have gained no headway.

The cities where such courts are located and the judges who head them are too well known to be listed. They have made their courts a rallying center for the defense of children, and have taken the lead in the establishment of additional services as the need for them was demonstrated in the course of their work, but there are still too many communities which adopt an apathetic attitude toward the Court and thereby neglect the welfare of their children, and, incidentally, their own peace and security. It is not necessary to single out these courts by name. We all know of these places which disregard all generally accepted juvenile court standards.

In 1934, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the child guidance clinic in Chicago, professional workers were told:

There is very little plain speaking about the inefficiencies and failures of the present system with the result that scientific attitudes are not taken and very little cooperation is engendered between courts and scientific people whose particular business it is to study, understand, and prescribe proper treatment for human problems . . . Since the welfare of society is so largely contingent upon solving the problems of childhood and youth, the only conclusion can be that if the legal profession is to continue to have its great power over human lives, it should grow in knowledge and application of fundamental facts concerning human nature."<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, there are too many children's court judges who look upon their job as one of cajoling or threatening children who come to their courts, who make no attempt to discover the reasons for maladjustment, hoping that by bringing the child face to face with the majesty of the law, he will go

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, vi.

<sup>9</sup> William Healy, *Twenty-five Years of Child Guidance*, 9, 10, Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research, Chicago, 1934.

and sin no more. To such judges, the institution is a place of last resort, not a specialized facility for the training and treatment of children requiring long-term therapy under controlled conditions. It is no wonder that in the communities where such judges hold sway, the institution becomes what it is held up to be—a prison in miniature. Men in the position of judges and probation officers who come to their work without the background and training necessary for the proper performance of their duties, are perhaps not to be blamed for their failure to conduct their courts in accordance with the standards which have been long proclaimed as minimum for the protection of erring children. It is not surprising, therefore, to find in too many communities that features of criminal procedure and terminology still cling to the administration of the juvenile process. The list of abuses practiced daily in many of our so-called juvenile courts is extensive and varied. In too many courts children are required to plead their guilt or innocence, because *guilt* rather than *condition* is still regarded as the prerequisite to court interest or action. Appeals to a higher court are still allowed in many juvenile court codes, a provision which brings in its train all the evils of a criminal procedure which the juvenile court was set up to avoid: jail detention, long periods between appeal and final adjudication, representation by counsel, prosecution by district attorney, and excessively high bail.<sup>10</sup>

A detailed account of such abuses easily could fill a volume. Any sociologist who has had the briefest experience with our juvenile courts could from his own knowledge confirm the fact that the basic philosophy of the Court—the emphasis on *need* and *condition* rather than *offense* the complete renunciation of everything that savors of the criminal process, the scientific method of seeking causes before determining treatment—is more frequently honored in the breach than the observance. Too many courts are indeed criminal courts, entitled to the name juvenile court only because of the youth of the persons with whom they deal.

Punitive and retributive notions of treating social nonconformists die slowly; each new "crime wave" that is discovered—or created, usually by, or through, the press—causes some to doubt the wisdom of treating any offender, no matter what his age, with understanding, with the aim of protecting society against his further attacks, and with no desire for revenge.

The time has come to reassert vigorously the excellent principles of the juvenile court, not only to proclaim them in conventions of professionals, but to go out into the arena and fight for the incorporation of these long held ideals into the actual administrative machinery of our juvenile courts. In Pittsburgh, a professor of government enlisted with his community in a drive to clear up a notoriously poor juvenile court condition. The fact that he was later elected to the judgeship of the newly formed court—with the

<sup>10</sup> Cf. the author's "Juvenile Justice," *J. Crim. Law and Criminol.*, September 1937, 340-367.



help of his former students—is not beside the point, perhaps. The important consideration is that the children in that community are now receiving wise, humane and scientific handling, their lives are being safeguarded at the same time that the community is being adequately protected.

In Toledo, not many years ago, the judge of the court of common pleas did not choose to accept the major recommendations of a survey of his court. The findings were so typical as to merit quotation:

The staff of 21 members had been appointed for frankly political reasons;

Only one third had a high school education, and only one staff person held a college degree;

Clerks and stenographers were paid on the same basis as probation officers;

In the detention home, dependent and delinquent children were intermingled;

A large number of delinquents, and dependent children as well, were detained in the county jail.

When election time came around, the civic-minded forces in the community formed a citizens' committee representing some forty organizations and put up as their candidate an assistant prosecuting attorney, active in social work, who had never before stood for election. With the support of the groups who were interested in seeing that the children of their county got a fuller measure of decent treatment, this candidate was successful. He has since placed the personnel of his court entirely upon a civil service basis, and has immeasurably improved the operation of a court process aimed at the highest level of child care.<sup>11</sup>

The experience of these two cities demonstrates that we can no longer rest content simply with drafting and securing the passage of standard juvenile court laws. We are learning that we must be constantly on the alert, right in our own communities, to select or secure the appointment of the best possible trained people to lead our juvenile tribunals, and we must keep everlastingly at these courts to see that they do not succumb either to administrative laxity or to pressure from those forces which seem to be constitutionally opposed to progressive social measures.

Critics of the juvenile court movement like to point to the book which they have taken as their justification for curtailing the powers of the Court, or even of abolishing it, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* by the Gluecks.<sup>12</sup> There is no wish here to arouse a repetition of the hornet's nest which was stirred up by its publication.<sup>13</sup> It will be recalled how the opponents of the Court hailed the book because, they said, it had proved the futility of juvenile court methods, while the defenders of the Court busied themselves establishing that the cases studied were not typical, that they represented the most difficult cases with which court and clinic had dealt during the period

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Probation*, April 1939, 51-54.

<sup>12</sup> Cambridge, Mass., 1934.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the *Yearbook of the National Probation Association*, 1934, esp. 63-103; Healy, Bronner, and Shimberg, "The Close of Another Chapter in Criminology," *Mental Hygiene*, April 1935, 208-222.

covered. Now that the controversy has abated, it will be well to emphasize some facts of importance which have been largely overlooked. Granting that the cases represented were drawn from the most difficult of those which passed through court and clinic, and granting at the same time that the figure of 88 percent recidivism is valid, a conclusion of even greater moment stands out: that (1) the earlier the young offender came to court-clinic attention, and (2) the more nearly the clinic recommendations were carried out, the lower was the rate of recidivism than in those cases where the boy was reached late, or where the clinic recommendations were not followed.<sup>14</sup> It should likewise be understood that the time to which this study refers, the Judge Baker Center was solely a diagnostic clinic and had not yet embarked upon experiments in treatment method. Finally, it should be recalled that in only 21 percent of the cases were all the recommendations made by the clinic for the treatment of individual boys carried out.<sup>15</sup>

The very limited efforts of the court and clinic described in *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* saved only 12 percent of the cases which passed through their hands from further criminal acts. With only 21 percent of the cases receiving the full measure of treatment recommended for them, some small residuum of socially valuable young citizens remained. It is the responsibility of those who are defending the Court and its way of work to challenge its opponents to prove that a thoroughly punitive process would produce a higher measure of success. If we have such meager results with our attempts to handle each offender individually, to discover his peculiar problems and to prescribe treatment to meet these problems, what guarantee is there that a complete setting aside of these procedures will achieve a higher rate of success? What would be the percentage of failures from courts which do not employ clinics for any part of their proceedings, which aim to rehabilitate young lives through older, more mechanical methods—"the appeal to fear through the threat of punishment?"<sup>16</sup>

Hospitals and clinics for the mentally diseased have not lapsed into medieval modes of incarceration and torture when the most modern methods brought only scant results. The fact that tens of thousands of patients still languish in mental hospitals has only redoubled our efforts to approximate basic causes and test out new therapeutic measures.

There has recently come to light a copy of the first annual report of the very first probation officer appointed in this country.<sup>17</sup> He describes his duties: "... to investigate and report to the several criminal courts of the County such cases as seem to be embraced within the meaning of the ... to visit the offenders placed on probation by the court and render such assistance and encouragement as will tend to prevent them from again offend-

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, Chap. X.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 239.

<sup>17</sup> Edward H. Savage, *First Annual Report*, Boston, City Document No. 13 of 1880.

<sup>18</sup> *Ib.*  
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ing. . . ."<sup>18</sup> At the end of his first year's experience he writes, "the last year has brought to my notice, even in the better walks, trials, temptations, and struggles for life new to me, and *causes* [italics not mine—B. S. A.] that lead to vice and crime lie hidden beneath the surface, that are but little known or understood."<sup>19</sup> We have not yet approached the stage of fully applying to an understanding of the cases which come before the juvenile court that measure of knowledge as to etiology which this pioneer pointed to sixty years ago!

Proponents of the scientific way of dealing with conduct disorders in children should be heartened by the appearance of an important follow up study of four hundred cases—behavior and personality problems, noncourt delinquents and court delinquents—who were treated by the Judge Baker Guidance Center. The general nature of the adjustments, during five to eight years after the cases were accepted for treatment, were, for the entire group, favorable careers in 81 percent of the cases. Personality and behavior problems made favorable adjustments in 91 percent of the cases, while the non-court delinquent group and the court delinquent group each had the same ratio of favorable adjustments, 70 per cent.<sup>20</sup> Treatment measures included psychiatric interviews with the child, interviews with the parent, medical attention, school contacts for therapeutic purposes, tutoring, foster home placement—the whole gamut of devices which are employed by good juvenile courts concerned with the correction of delinquent conduct.

Some of these children had appeared in court, others had committed delinquent acts for which, for one reason or another, they were not brought to court. Still others represented the type of abnormal personality which confronts the court and institution. Treatment aimed directly at their difficulties brought to these fortunate children a large measure of successful adjustment in their after lives. Can any of those agencies which seek to terrorize, imprison, and otherwise disregard the condition of the children brought before them for violation of the law show a better record? If we have not been too successful in our handling of the children in our juvenile courts, it is because we have been too hesitant and too lax in applying what we feel is the proper and scientific method for their understanding and treatment. The salvation of our courts and of our children lies in the extension of these measures which have been all too scantily enforced.

We require, too, as Jerome Hall points out, to engage in constant evaluation of the work of our courts. Followup studies should be as much the responsibility of our juvenile courts as of our medical units which combine research with treatment. We can no more allow our entire system of juvenile courts to be damned by a showing of a high rate of recidivism than we can afford to rest content with the very opposite results. We must continue to

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, I.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>20</sup> William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, *Treatment and What Happened Afterward*, 25, Boston, 1939.

perfect our methods of procedure and treatment, to pool our experience, and to strive for the extension of the best juvenile court practices to the rural areas<sup>21</sup> and the backward cities. We cannot slacken our efforts to extend the benefits of a humane and scientific approach to all children who need such protection, wherever their delinquencies are committed, wherever they are brought for study and care into the courts of the nation. To fail in our duty to accomplish this result means to surrender completely into the hands of those forces which, as in Chicago and in other places, are trying to abolish this enlightened instrument for dealing with misconduct.

The juvenile court has passed the two-score mark, it has won a place in the social machinery of the world, but we still have all too few courts which offer the optimum combination of adequate and trained personnel, complete facilities, cooperative workings with community agencies, and a constant concern to accomplish what they know to be best for the children who come before them, without hurry, and with a deep regard for the importance of the material entrusted to them.

This is not asking too much. Other public and private agencies, medical institutions, for example, have attained a high level of achievement. To be sure, they will confess to inadequacies of many kinds, but at least they have not forfeited their allegiance to the strictest standards of their professional practice. They will not surrender themselves every few years to an entire change of personnel, and thus sacrifice the welfare of their clients. They will not refuse to incorporate the newest as soon as it has proved itself the best. Our courts must take such excellence for their model. They must continually strive to accomplish in the realm of behavior what our medical centers are accomplishing in the field of physical care.

Juvenile courts in some places are charged with too great a variety of responsibilities. It is not too far-fetched to say that perhaps one reason why they have not done more is because they are expected to do too much. In the days before social security in state and nation, the juvenile court was frequently the only children's agency which could handle the cases of dependency and neglect. With the extension of aid to dependent children in the homes of their parents or near relatives, there is little reason now for the Court to assume the responsibility for large numbers of placed-out children. This is an administrative function with which our juvenile courts should not be burdened.

Public schools and other agencies which deal with children should be further encouraged to deal as adequately as they know how with the behavior problems that come to their attention. The juvenile courts need no one to drum up business for them, nor do they seek to monopolize the field. Group agencies in all parts of the country are beginning to introduce indi-

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Alper and Lodgen, "The Delinquent Child in Pennsylvania Courts," *Mental Hygiene*, October 1936, 598-604.

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vidual case work methods for those children who do not conform. Many communities are trying to solve some of their children's problems on an informal basis,—many of them in the family setting, as in the Children's Court of Conciliation just created in California.<sup>22</sup> Recent years have seen many laudable attempts on the part of established agencies and agencies set up for that precise purpose, to go out into the community to bring the non-joiner and the gang-kid into a constructive relationship with the other children in the community who respond more easily to the passive invitation of the settlement house open door.

Nevertheless, after all these steps have been taken, there still will be children who will slip through the nets, who will disappoint those who try to catch them early and treat them well. There still will be children who will not reveal antisocial tendencies until the teen-ages have been reached. For these children, the offenders, society will have to rely on an agency which has the authority to enforce its decisions, no matter how scientifically it goes about the business of determining condition, need, and treatment. In our present setup, that agency will have to be a court,—a court limited to children's cases. We may yet see the day when even serious conduct disorders will be treated, as they are in Scandinavian countries, by committees or councils of trained neighborhood people, in a most informal and noncourt fashion. Rooted as we are in the common law tradition, we may be sure that day will not arrive soon. When we consider how the present juvenile court, with all its trappings of criminal court procedure, is still frowned upon as too soft and lenient, it is necessary that we first rally to what we have and improve that before we can start to think of completely noncourt agencies.

Undeniably, however, the juvenile court has had a leavening effect upon the entire process of criminal justice. The establishment of Adolescents' or Boys' Courts in a few of our large cities stems directly from the court for children. Its procedure has encouraged a critical appraisal of our adult courts to discover whether they are properly serving the protection of society. At their last annual meeting, members of the American Sociological Society were told of the American Law Institute's proposed plan for the more effective handling of the older adolescent offender.<sup>23</sup> Since then, the Youth-Correction Authority Act has been accepted by the council and by the annual meeting of members of the Law Institute.<sup>24</sup> Steps are now being taken to secure the adoption of the plan in many states. This enlightened scheme contains many proposals which derive directly from the juvenile court. The juvenile court, likewise, has much to learn from this model act.

The only way to meet current attacks upon the juvenile court is to extend

<sup>22</sup> California State Senate Bill No. 77 of 1939.

<sup>23</sup> William Healy, "A New Program for the Treatment of Youthful Offenders," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, August 1940, 610-617.

<sup>24</sup> Copies may be had from the office of the Institute, 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia.

its influence, to raise the upper age limit of jurisdiction and to increase its powers for good. This is true because those social institutions which do not progress, which do not take the offensive against the conditions which they were designed to correct, soon find themselves on the defensive and protecting whatever gains they have made from elements in the community which seek their extinction. The juvenile court is no exception: if it does not advance, it will not endure. The proponents of the Court have not fought as zealously as they might have for the thorough exercise of its underlying function, or for the application of all that psychology and psychiatry have taught us regarding the dynamics of behavior.

Nor should we be deluded into thinking that the juvenile court is the sole object of such attacks. There are those who under the guise of a national emergency wish to see curtailed other social instrumentalities, closely related to the juvenile court, which seek to ameliorate the condition of our people. Unless we are vigilant, we shall see these same forces attempting to curtail relief, to deprive the unemployed of the franchise, to limit education, to curb the gains of labor, to reduce assistance to the special classes of persons who are the beneficiaries of our social security laws.

The democratic process seeks constantly to raise the level of the living standard of the whole people. This is done through special machinery devised to correct the imbalance which operates to the detriment of certain submerged groups. The opposite of the democratic process seeks to single out these same groups for the very opposite purpose—in order to isolate them, deprive them of the sympathetic concern of their fellow citizens, and thus to impose its reactionary control over an ever widening circle of minorities. As workers and teachers in the social sciences, we are wedded to the democratic process and opposed to all that is opposed to it. In this respect, our professional aims are at one with our duties as free citizens. In this joint capacity, we must use our efforts to the end that democracy shall continue to grow by the extension of democratic purposes and procedures. An eminent English Justice has stated eloquently the point of view here expressed:

This country, at any rate, is rich in means, if they are faithfully employed, for helping those who have made a lapse, and for forming or retrieving a character able to resist temptation and to avoid crime. Let us beware of any voices of indolence or of cynicism that might belittle these efforts or hamper their further development. Above all, let us put aside the heresy that in some cases it may be right to consult the interests of the offender, while in other cases it is necessary to consult the interests of the public. Upon any fair analysis, these interests are found to coincide. The State may sometimes be compelled to be stern. It must not be cruel. It cannot afford to be indifferent."<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> The Rt. Hon. Lord Hewart of Bury, Lord Chief Justice of England, *The Treatment of the Young Offender*, 47-48, The Clarke Hall Fellowship, London, 1935.

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## RELIGION IN A RURAL COMMUNITY OF THE SOUTH

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THE ANALYSIS of religion presented here is only one aspect of a broad cultural study of Ruralville,<sup>1</sup> an open-country community in southwestern Tennessee. A modified anthropological approach was followed in securing and analyzing the data. There were approximately 252 families in the community area. Cotton farming is the dominant type of agriculture. Small farms predominate. Though not excessive, tenants are more numerous than owners. With the exception of one Negro family, the population is entirely white. Throughout the study, emphasis was placed on comparison of owners and tenants to present the tenancy problem in its cultural setting. Although no claim is made for the universality of the religious pattern described, some years of residence in the South, combined with a personal interest in religion, leads the author to believe that the complex described is fairly common to many rural communities of the area.

*I. Magic: Good and Bad Luck Signs.* No person in Ruralville would ever dream of associating his belief in good and bad luck signs with religion, yet the belief in signs is closely akin to religious faith. A vague, amorphous conception of a Power which manipulates events for or against the individual is frequently embodied in both. Just how extensively belief in good and bad luck signs controls conduct in the community is not known, but in view of the rather long list of such signs which school children secured from their parents and neighbors, one would suspect that belief in them frequently controls conduct in a subtle and unconscious fashion.

"Put 'wish bone' over door," "Set your shoes side by side when you go to bed," and "Good luck for a hen to crow" are illustrative of the good luck signs that are current. Characteristic bad luck signs are: "Bad luck to put your left shoe on first"; "It is bad luck to let any child under the age of one year look in a mirror"; and "If you see a star shoot, it is the sign that some one is dead."<sup>2</sup>

*II. Religious Beliefs: Meaning of Religion.* The vague, generalized nature of the people's religious faith was brought out by the question: "Will you make a statement of what religion means to you?"<sup>3</sup> The answers given and the effort involved in giving them were revealing. To most of those who were asked the question, it came as a surprise. They had no ready answers. Some

<sup>1</sup> A fictitious name, *Ruralville*, is used throughout this article. The study referred to is the author's *Owners and Tenants of Small Farms in the Life of a Selected Community: A Cultural Analysis*, unpublished doctoral dissertation in the Vanderbilt University Library, 1938.

<sup>2</sup> These examples are quoted exactly as stated in the papers of the children.

<sup>3</sup> The question was asked of husbands and wives.

asked that they be allowed to think it over; others were frankly puzzled. Often the answers given were merely theological stereotypes which long years of listening to preachers had contributed to their vocabularies. The fact that a fairly large proportion (29 percent) of husbands from both owner and tenant groups gave such brief answers as, "A whole lot" or "Lots," is indicative of the small degree to which religion has been rationalized, and this was more pronounced among the wives (44 percent). The owner husbands gave this response in only 19 percent of the cases, while their wives gave it in 37 percent of the cases. The tenant husbands and wives were much more similar (36 and 49). Thus, the men seem to be more vocal on religion than the women, and owners more vocal than tenants. It is interesting that the husband owners had the largest percentage of "Can't answer—don't know" answers. About 8 percent of the men and 4 percent of the women claimed to have no religion.

Typical of the longer statements by the men were: "A true Christian has the love of God in his heart and all power" (Tenant); "It means a whole lot. A man who lives here and works hard and misses heaven, misses all" (Owner). Illustrative of statements made by wives were: "Religion means happiness and pleasure if one has a true religion" (Owner); "Worth the world and all in it. I wouldn't give all the world for religion. People who pass me up in the road, I am as good as they are" (Tenant). An emphasis found in most of the statements was that whatever else religion may be, it is a value much to be desired.

*Faith in Time of Trouble.* To reveal how religious faith functions, the subjects were asked, "What are the thoughts and plans that give you courage to go on when thoroughly discouraged?" Over half of the tenant husbands (53 percent) think about God and pray to Him when they are in trouble (Owner husbands, 44 percent). However, a fourth of the tenants and slightly more than a fourth of the owners "didn't know" just what they did. Some of the answers given by the husbands were: "Well, I just go from one person to the other telling my troubles" (Owner); "Nothing. It is a cowardly act to go to God when discouraged when they don't live a Christian life. I would not do it and there isn't anybody to go to unless I did go to God" (Tenant); "Devil gets me when I get mad. After I consider, religious thoughts come back and keep me from doing anything wrong" (Owner).

Of the 87 tenant wives who answered the question, 67 percent think of God and pray; of the 37 owner wives, 80 percent think of God and pray. The women more often than the men seem to depend on God in time of trouble. Some characteristic answers of the women were: "Read Bible and there is where I get relief. If He had not stood by me, I would not have lived through the trouble I have had" (Tenant); "Put my trust in the Lord. I think of the song, 'Take your burdens to the Lord and leave them there.' He ain't going to put more on you than you are able to bear" (Tenant).



*Belief in God.* Since the heart of all religion is belief in a Supreme Being, the question was asked: "What difference would it make in your daily life if you became convinced there is no loving God to care for you?" This question puzzled many—as if it were something they never had contemplated. A large percentage of both men (41) and women (54) was sure it would make "a great difference" and both owner husbands (43) and wives (60) were more certain of it than tenant husbands (38) and wives (50). About 67 percent of the men and 78 percent of the women indicated that loss of belief would affect their daily lives somewhat (tenant husbands, 62; owner husbands, 74; wives, 74 and 84) while 17 percent of the husbands and 8 of the wives thought it would not. Here also the owner husbands and wives exceeded the tenants: owner husbands, 22, wives, 13; tenant husbands, 14, wives, 6. A much larger percentage of the tenants than the owners were non-committal: tenant husbands, 24, wives, 20; owner husbands, 4, wives, 3.

A few of both husbands and wives thought it would cause them to make less effort to live righteously. For a few, the question only aroused their deep conviction of the existence of God. Some characteristic answers of the men were: "Be a perfect wreck" (Owner); "Would. Don't know what I might do. Might slip around and shoot some fellow in the dark" (Tenant). Some answers given by the wives were: "I'd feel like I was lost" (Tenant); "Wouldn't have any encouragement then sure enough. Would just end it up sometime" (Tenant); "I'd be like Paul. I would be of all people most miserable" (Owner).

*Other Religious Beliefs and Opinions.* In addition to the foregoing questions, 13 true-false statements dealing with religious beliefs or opinions were presented to husbands and wives for their reaction. These statements were: (1) The Sabbath should be strictly observed; (2) The Church is made up mostly of hypocrites; (3) The Bible is absolutely true; (4) There is a heaven; (5) There is a hell; (6) Jesus is divine; (7) God is all-powerful; (8) God punishes the wicked by means of storms, droughts, etc.; (9) Ministers must be called of God or they are false teachers; (10) Ministers never say anything but the truth when they are preaching; (11) It is sinful not to attend church unless one has a reasonable excuse; (12) The Christian religion is the only true religion; and (13) To be religious one must be born again. The more strictly theological statements, i.e., numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, and 13, were reacted to by practically all husbands and wives in a truly fundamentalist fashion. However, in the case of statements in which the human element or more practical matters were involved, there were some interesting differences of opinion. More than half of the husbands and wives in both owner and tenant families think the church is composed mostly of hypocrites. Rather surprising was the admission of the human fallibility of preachers. While women more frequently than men believe their preachers never speak anything but the truth, no large proportion of either sex accepts every word

the preacher utters. Although more than half of the husbands and almost three fourths of the wives believe that God punishes the wicked by means of storms and droughts, there are noticeable proportions of both who do not hold such a belief. There were two statements dealing with behavior which were rather consistently affirmed as true: failure to attend church without a reasonable excuse is considered sinful by large proportions of both men and women; strict observance of the Sabbath is upheld by all.

*III. Religion in the Family: Religious Ritual in the Home.* The rural family has often been considered a stronghold of religion. The facts of this study do not always support this conclusion. Investigation was made of several simple religious practices which appeared to be within the sphere of family religion. Table 1 summarizes the results of this investigation.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR TENANT, OWNER, AND ALL FAMILIES ON OBSERVANCE OF CERTAIN RELIGIOUS RITUALS

Ritual	Tenant Families			Owner Families			All Families		
	Num- ber	Percent		Num- ber	Percent		Num- ber	Percent	
		Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No
Say Grace at Table	103	20	80	53	28	72	156	23	77
Recite Verse from Bible at Table	91	1	99	49	2	98	140	4	96
Have Family Prayers	97	8	92	42	5	95	139	7	93
Read Bible as Group	95	28	72	50	34	66	145	30	70

While local ministers might be discouraged if they knew the extent of their ineffectiveness in maintaining the virtues of religious observance in the family, they could find compensation in the fact that for some there is the chastening voice of conscience for neglecting family religious rites. One tenant farmer remarked in answering the question whether or not he said grace at the table: "No, used to do that. Feel bad and cramped for not doing it." The wife of an owner commented: "We ought to be ashamed not to, but I can't get my husband to." A wife of a tenant commenting on the same question said: "I'll bet you don't find many that does. I think everybody ought to be ashamed that he don't."

*Religious Instruction in the Home.* The Ruralville parents make some effort to teach their children to pray. They also help their children with their Sunday school lessons. The extent to which families participate in these two types of religious instruction is shown in Table 2.

*IV. The Churches.* The only voluntarily organized social institutions in the community are the churches. While the more obvious purpose of these churches is to provide opportunity for people to listen to preachers and Sunday school teachers, the interacting group life which they provide is more

truly the cause of their continuation if not their existence in the first place. The churches offer the best opportunity for the stranger to enter into the confidence of the majority of the people, especially if he is willing to conform to the common patterns of practice and belief. Four churches, representing as many denominations, are located within the community. These include the Southern Methodist and Church of Christ located at the community center, the Baptist Church in the Zion neighborhood, and the Northern Methodist in the Mt. Tabor neighborhood.

*Membership.* The community is entirely Protestant. In the sample of husbands and wives studied, the Methodist denomination claims the largest

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR TENANT, OWNER, AND ALL FAMILIES ON RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN THE HOME

Type of Religious Instruction	Tenant Families			Owner Families			All Families		
	Num-ber	Percent		Num-ber	Percent		Num-ber	Percent	
		Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No
Teach Children to Pray	81	41	59	45	53	47	126	45	55
Study Sunday School Lesson with Children	55	44	56	32	78	22	87	56	44

proportion of both, with the Baptist second, and the Church of Christ third. Other denominations represented are the Pentacostal Church, Church of God, Presbyterian, and Cumberland Presbyterian. About 91 percent of the women and 57 percent of the men are church members and wives (97) and husbands (71) in owner families more frequently than wives (89) and husbands (50) in tenant families. Approximately one fourth of the husbands and wives who are church members have their membership in a church outside of the community area. The larger percentage of both husbands (30) and wives (34) among tenants who have their memberships in churches outside the community as compared with owners (husbands, 12; wives, 14) is probably related to the greater mobility of tenant families.

*Church Attendance.* More important than church membership in indicating the significance of institutional religion in the life of a people is the extent of their attendance at religious services. To determine this, two methods were used which permitted comparison between tenants and owners. For each person in a small sample of husbands and wives, the percentage of services attended of a total possible number during a month was calculated. The average attendance of tenant husbands and wives was 10 percent of all the services they possibly could attend while that of the owner husbands and wives was 20 percent. Thus, owner families are not only more often church members, but they also attend church more frequently.

The second method of estimating attendance at religious services per-

tained to school children. They were given a schedule concerning the regularity of their attendance at preaching, Sunday school, and young people's society. Table 3 summarizes these data. It shows that tenant children attend religious services more regularly than do owner children.

TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TENANT, OWNER, AND ALL CHILDREN ACCORDING TO REGULARITY OF ATTENDANCE AT VARIOUS RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Type of Service	Tenants			Owners			Total		
	Number	Percent		Number	Percent		Number	Percent	
		Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No
Preaching Service Every Sunday	33	51	49	45	36	64	78	42	58
Young People's Society Regularly	34	62	38	45	60	40	79	61	39
Sunday School Regularly	34	74	26	47	66	34	81	69	31

*Contributions.* An easily measured and common form of participation in the church is one's monetary contribution. The median annual amount for 46 owners was \$3, while the median for 88 tenants was \$1.75. In view of the low net cash income of both owners and tenants, these sums are not unusually small. It would be most unfair to claim that the size of these contributions represents the esteem which the people have for their churches.

*How the Church Spends Its Money.* The small contributions of the members are reflected in the salaries paid preachers and the poor church equipment. Annual salaries paid the ministers are: Ruralville Methodist, \$180; Church of Christ, \$260; Zion Baptist, \$220; and Mt. Tabor Methodist, \$400. Each preacher supplements his salary from some other source. The one at the Ruralville Methodist Church has several other churches and receives from all of them including the Ruralville Church \$950 a year. He devotes his entire time to his ministerial duties. The preacher at the Church of Christ is also superintendent of schools in a nearby county. The Zion Baptist Church is served by a man who preaches at a church in the county seat and teaches in the high school at that place. The Mt. Tabor preacher serves three other churches and also does some farming.

Now and then the congregations give their preachers a "pounding," i.e., members invite the minister to a home or the church and present him farm produce, canned fruits and vegetables, and clothing. In this manner, the effective income of the preachers is somewhat augmented.

Except for the Zion Baptist Church, all of the buildings are one-room structures, which indicates that they were built when preaching was the main emphasis of the church. The Mt. Tabor Church is kept in good condition. The Ruralville Methodist Church is very dilapidated within and



without. All of the buildings are largely the contribution of a past generation. Thus, the past is distinctly symbolized in the community's present houses of worship. These symbols not only serve to keep alive memories but also provide the physical structure whereby the faith and practice of the present generation is channelled into traditional patterns.

In addition to the preacher's salary, the only important item of expenditure which each church must meet is the payment of an evangelist who holds the church's annual revival. This cost ranges from \$30 to \$50 in the different churches for a revival of a week to ten days' duration.

*Church Leaders.* A study of the lay leaders in the four churches of the community indicates that organized church life revolves around a few personalities. Eight persons, three women and five men, constitute the basic leadership in the churches. Examination of the minutes of the various intra-church organizations or observation of the services quickly reveals the degree to which these individuals direct the ritualistic performances of their fellow members, guide in maintaining organization, and lead in passing on the ideology of their respective churches.

The leadership of these individuals may be associated with certain personality traits, the most obvious of which is the ability to use words. Leadership involves praying and speaking in public. Such activities probably do not adequately describe the more fundamental traits which have made leaders of these persons. Perhaps a more detailed analysis would reveal aggressive dispositions prompted by strong desires for recognition. Life histories of such leaders are needed to account for the development of the traits which have placed them in positions of dominance. Of course, the present leaders naturally tend to restrict the leadership opportunities of others in a culture characterized by few demands for social organization.

*The Church Calendar.* Preaching may be heard at some church in the community each Sunday. The following is the monthly calendar for preaching in the several churches: Ruralville Methodist, First Sunday evening, Third Sunday morning; Church of Christ, Fourth Sunday morning; Zion Baptist, Second Sunday morning and evening; Mt. Tabor Methodist, Second Sunday morning. This calendar has become a fixed part of the community's religious pattern. It is well known by all faithful church attendants, a number of whom go from church to church that they may hear a preacher each Sunday. This practice of going from church to church on successive Sundays tends to mitigate denominational differences. Even the preachers feel that they must be constrained in their sectarian utterances lest they offend a regular attendant from another church.

*Worship Patterns and Religious Instruction.* The pattern followed in worship and the content of religious instruction provide the best material for understanding the institutional religion of a community. Worship in the several churches is marked by informality and simplicity but along with

these characteristics there are certain fixed procedures such as the familiar songs, the stereotyped prayers, the reading of the Scriptures, the customary order of the service, and finally, the sermon with its emphasis on salvation. Worship and its major feature, the sermon, seek to "make men right with God," to save their souls. "Men must become religious and give up the things of the world; it was to this end that Jesus suffered and died on Calvary's cross." Words similar to these are reiterated Sunday after Sunday in all of the churches. With one exception, the preachers have no interest in a religion which emphasizes social ethics. Their congregations are likeminded. Religion is one's personal relation to a Supreme Being; one's goodness is only incidental to this relationship. All occasions, a Thanksgiving Day service, a Christmas tree program, regular preaching days, and funerals, are the preacher's opportunities to call sinners to salvation.

Change in the content and method of religious worship and instruction, whether in the preaching services, Sunday school, or young people's society, is taking place slowly. Sporadic attempts are being made to train lay leaders for church work. These attempts are probably setting in motion influences which ultimately will produce changes in the existing patterns of worship and religious instruction.

*Revivals.* Revivals constitute the accepted method of recruiting church members. They are an integral part of the church tradition. The revival season occupies at least a month of the late summer. Even though the revivals may not always be successful in terms of number of converts or additions to the church, they are never without their social value. Preceding the revival season, people have been busy with their farm activities. There has been little time for visiting. During the revival season, crops have been "laid by" and people are released from hard and confining labor. The revival provides the social situation which the long period of hard work with its accompanying isolation from satisfying social contacts makes highly desirable. Moreover, the excitement of "getting religion" or "renewing one's faith" provides the emotional catharsis for which several months of unending work and social isolation have created a need.

From descriptions of revivals given to the investigator, it is evident that the theology of salvation from sin prevails. The Methodist preacher at Ruralville who was convinced of the value of a more definitely educational program in the church said that he had tried an evangelist who emphasized religious education. This evangelist was a complete failure in the estimation of the local people. Religion is stereotyped not only in objective and physical practices but also in phraseology and ideation. No religious leader can hope to satisfy who fails to conform to the stereotypes.

*Conflicts within the Churches.* The spirit of good will and peace does not pervade the churches on all occasions. Petty, childish, bickerings frequently find their way into the fellowship. A few years ago, a preacher was brought

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to the Mt. Tabor Church for a revival. When it was learned that he was a Democrat, several members refused to have anything to do with the meeting. Not long ago the Ruralville Methodist Church was seriously disturbed by a quarrel among its members. A Children's Day service had been planned. One of the more influential women of the church wanted her daughter to play the piano for the service; the regular pianist was offended. One night at the church the two women had to be parted to keep them from fighting. The regular pianist and her husband, together with a close friend and her husband, left the church. Another woman, trying to make peace, talked too much and the quarrel became even more bitter. The church is still feeling the loss of some of its best musicians.

*Denominational Competition and Segregation.* There is no indication of any open rivalry among the churches. The Church of Christ group is less tolerant and consequently more distinctly a sect than are the other groups. However, members of the Church of Christ attend the Methodist Church on preaching Sunday. Anyone interested in efficiency, better church equipment, and a resident minister<sup>4</sup> who might devote all of his time to the moral and religious welfare of the community would have difficulty in justifying the existence of as many churches as are found in this community. In view of latent theological loyalties as well as sentimental attachments to church house and church group, many years will pass before the situation is changed.

*Social Control through the Church.* The preacher and his religion are respected by most of the people. However, the limited contact which he has with the community prevents his influence from becoming significant. Whether the church is less influential than formerly is problematic; at least, it exercises less direct control. The following is an excerpt from the minutes of the Board of Elders of the Church of Christ:

The Church met on Wednesday the 15th of August proceeded to business the case of Brother Allen Hendrick was taken up. He was charged by the church 1st of indulging too freely in the use of Ardent Spirits or to speak plainer for Intoxication at Farmington and various other places. 2nd for ungentlemanly and unchristian conduct at your own house on a day or days last year before or in the presence of your own family and other persons both male and femail. 3rd for Absenting your self from The Church He denies the Church Affirms

After a full investigation of this case the Church believes that the charges preferred were sustained by incontrovertible evidence.

In addition to the charges above mentioned he was charged with going into Groceries Treating and drinking with the drunken which charge he admitted to be true and attempted to Justify himself in the act.

Therefore the church withdrew their fellowship from him.

Done by order of the Church

Aug. 15th 1856

T. R. Reck  
Church Clerk

<sup>4</sup> No church had a resident minister.

This, and similar records found in the minutes of the official body of this church, indicate a control over members which no church in Ruralville ever attempts at present. In fact, up to 1911 the records of the Church of Christ show frequent cases (10 from 1842-1851; 10 from 1872-1881; never less than one in other ten year periods) in which misconduct of members was the subject of discussion by the officials, with warnings or dismissals being made. Since 1911 (6 cases 1902-1911), there has been no case of misconduct brought before the official body.

*A Funeral.* When death comes, the church is the gathering place of friends and neighbors as they pause in memory of the departed. The preacher uses the occasion to point the way to salvation. During the period of the study, a father in a tenant family died of pneumonia. His funeral was held at the Zion Baptist Church. In an infrequently used graveyard near the church, his grave was dug by neighbors. It was learned from one of the men watching the grave digging that Mr. T. Y. had contracted pneumonia as the result of lying out in the dampness while drunk. According to this man's account, the deceased had drunk liquor since he was a mere lad. Except for pews reserved for the family and close friends, the church was filled before the procession arrived. As the procession entered the church, the wife could be heard screaming, "How can I do this? Oh God! Help me to bear it." There were no pallbearers; the undertaker and his assistant performed this service. After reaching her pew, the wife continued her heartrending cries. The service began with the doleful singing of "Nearer my God to Thee" followed by "Sweet Bye and Bye." The preacher read the familiar funeral passage: "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord from henceforth; Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours; and their works do follow them." (Revelation, 14:13). A prayer for the bereaved was offered, and the choir sang, "Near the Cross."

The preacher read a brief biography of the deceased. Mr. T. Y. had joined the church at 17 years of age but like many others had wandered away. A year ago, he renewed his vows and had since lived uprightly. He was a little mean and a little good. He said of himself that he never did any man any harm and that he was ready to die. The preacher announced his text, "Blessed is the just man who dies in the Lord." Said he,

Men fear death because it breaks their hearts and parts loved ones. Men fear death because it can not be understood. The only hope in death is faith in God. The one who believes is safe, not because of his righteousness but because of the righteousness of Jesus which is imputed to the believer. Man's righteousness is as rags in the sight of God.

The preacher told how a year ago the dead brother, at one of the revival services, had come to the altar and promised to live differently. He was baptized and had since continued to live a good life. Then the speaker ex-



horted the unbelievers to let the occasion cause them to accept Jesus as their Savior.

After the closing prayer, the undertaker directed the people to come forward and view the remains. Everyone went, young and old alike. Lastly came the family. The cries of the grief-stricken wife reached a new crescendo. Soon almost everyone in the building was weeping. Such emotional outbursts are doubtlessly a part of the culture. No attempt is made to conceal or inhibit one's grief. It may be that the intimate relationship of neighbors and relatives removes the inhibitions of grief which characterize the more secondary relationships of urban communities. At the grave the preacher read a brief ritual and offered a prayer. The crowd began to disperse. Friends and church had paid a neighbor their last tribute of respect and the preacher had used the occasion to call sinners to salvation.

*V. Conclusions.* Analysis of the religious beliefs, family religious practices, and patterns of institutional religion which are found in the Ruralville community leads to these conclusions:

1. That the religious aspect of the culture is characterized by simplicity and even primitiveness as is shown by (a) the vestiges of magic, evidence for which is disclosed by the presence of good and bad luck signs, (b) a non-conceptualized faith in the intrinsic value of religion, (c) general acceptance of traditionally fundamental religious beliefs and opinions, (d) the relatively infrequent observance of religious rituals and practices in the home and the simplicity of the practices that do appear, (e) a focus of attention upon the initiatory experience of salvation by which one is admitted into the ranks of the "saved," (f) informal and unembellished patterns of worship and religious instruction which have as yet been little affected by influences of a more complex culture;

2. That church organization and procedures tend to be preserved in their present simplicity (a) because of denominational divisions which prohibit the employment of a professional religious leader who might devote his entire time to elaborating church organization and procedures, (b) because of petty quarrels which frequently occur within individual churches;

3. That the more significant differences between owners and tenants are found not in their religious beliefs but in religious observances in the home and relationship to the church. Thus, with the exception of having family prayers, owner families more frequently say grace at meals, read the Bible as a group, teach their children to pray and study the Sunday school lesson with them. Furthermore, owners are more frequently members of the church than tenants, contribute more to its finances, furnish leadership more often, and, except for children, are better attendants.

## Official Reports *and* Proceedings

**American Sociological Society.** The Thirty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Society will be held in New York City, December 27, 28, 29, 1941. The hotel in which the meetings will be held has not yet been selected, but it will probably be the Roosevelt.

### REPRESENTATIVES AND COMMITTEES OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

**Social Science Research Council.** William F. Ogburn, University of Chicago, 1941; Warren S. Thompson, Scripps Foundation, 1942; Ernest W. Burgess, University of Chicago, 1943.

**American Council of Learned Societies.** F. Stuart Chapin, University of Minnesota, 1942; James H. S. Bossard, University of Pennsylvania, 1944.

**A.A.A.S.** George A. Lundberg, Bennington College.

**Delegates to the Summer Meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.** University of New Hampshire, June 23 to 27, 1941. Anders Myhrman, Bates College; Talcott Parsons, Harvard University.

**American Library Association.** Jennette Gruener, Boston University. Meetings are to be held, June 19 to 25, 1941, at Boston.

**Int. Fed. of Sociological Societies and Institutes.** No appointment in 1941.

**Research Planning Committee.** Stuart A. Queen, Washington University, Chairman, *ex-officio*; Harold A. Phelps, University of Pittsburgh, Secretary, *ex-officio*; Thorsten Sellin, University of Pennsylvania, 1941; George A. Lundberg, Bennington College, 1942; Shelby M. Harrison, Russell Sage Foundation.

**Representative to the American Documentation Institute.** Mildred Parten, Washington, D. C., 1941.

**Committee on Budget, Investment, and Finance.** James H. S. Bossard, University of Pennsylvania, Chairman; Herbert Blumer, University of Chicago; Henry P. Fairchild, New York University.

**Representatives to the Council of Human Relations of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.** O. D. Duncan, Oklahoma A. and M. College; J. L. Hypes, Univ. of Conn.; C. E. Lively, Univ. of Missouri.

**Editorial Representatives to the Dictionary on Education.** P. H. Landis, Washington State College; Robert Merton, Tulane University.

**Committee on Nominations.** Members are requested to communicate their suggestions to the Committee. T. Lynn Smith, Louisiana State University, Chairman; Nels Anderson, Works Progress Administration; H. S. Bucklin, Brown University; Carroll D. Clark, University of Kansas; M. C. Elmer, University of Pittsburgh; Helen Garvey, Stephens College; E. W. Gregory, University of Alabama; Norman Hayner, University of Washington; Helen Jennings, New York City; Clifford Kirkpatrick, University of Minnesota; A. R. Mangus, Ohio State University; Donald Marsh, Wayne University; Francis E. Merrill, Dartmouth College; M. H. Neumeyer, University of Southern California; Irwin Sanders, University of Kentucky; C. C. Van Vechten, Bureau of the Census; Ray E. Wakeley, Iowa State College.

**Committee on Social Research.** Raymond Bowers, University of Rochester, Chairman; Henry D. Sheldon, Jr., University of Rochester, Secretary; L. S.

Cottrell, Jr., Cornell University; Kingsley Davis, Pennsylvania State College; Sigurd Johansen, New Mexico State College; Florence Kluckhohn, Wellesley College; Robert K. Merton, Tulane University; Harriet R. Mowrer, Evanston, Ill.; William H. Sewell, Oklahoma A. and M. College; Raymond F. Sletto, University of Minnesota; John Useem, University of South Dakota.

**Committee on Honorary Members.** Newell Sims, Oberlin College, Chairman; Floyd N. House, University of Virginia; Ernest Manheim, University of Kansas City; William C. Smith, Linfield College.

**Committee on Resolutions.** (To be appointed.)

**Committee on Program.** Stuart A. Queen, Washington University, Chairman; Read Bain, Miami University; Harold A. Phelps, University of Pittsburgh.

**Committee on Local Arrangements.** W. C. Waterman, Brooklyn College, Chairman; H. P. Fairchild, New York University; Francis Kilcoyne, St. Joseph's College; Charles Page, City College of the City of New York; N. S. Timasheff, Fordham University; Willard Waller, Columbia University.

**Committee of Secretaries of Regional Sociological Societies.** Harold A. Phelps, University of Pittsburgh, Chairman, *ex-officio*.

**Committee on Public Relations.** Alfred M. Lee, New York University, Chairman; Read Bain, Miami University, *ex-officio*; Stanley H. Chapman, Yale University; Carroll D. Clark, University of Kansas; W. W. Ehrmann, University of Florida; Steuart Henderson Britt, George Washington University; A. B. Hollingshead, Indiana University; Elizabeth Briant Lee, South Norwalk, Conn.; Robert E. Park, University of Chicago; Harold A. Phelps, University of Pittsburgh; *ex-officio*; Stuart A. Queen, Washington University, *ex-officio*; George E. Simpson, Queens College; Malcolm M. Willey, Univ. of Minn.

**Membership Committee.** Julian Woodward, Cornell University, Chairman; Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington, District: Oregon, Washington, Idaho; Egbert B. Clark, Jr., Santa Rosa Junior College, District: Northern California; Constantine Panunzio, University of California, District: Southern California, Arizona; William H. Sewell, Oklahoma A. and M. College, District: Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado; Clyde W. Hart, University of Iowa, District: Iowa; William H. Metzler, University of Arkansas, District: Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana; Edward Saylor, Ohio State University, District: Negro Colleges and Junior Colleges; S. Clayton Newman, University of Louisville, District: Tennessee and Kentucky; Alfred R. Lindesmith, Indiana University, District: Indiana; D. E. Lindstrom, University of Illinois, District: Illinois, south of Chicago; Charles J. Bushnell, University of Toledo, District: Ohio; Joseph N. Symons, Utah State Agricultural College, District: Utah, Nevada; Albert Morris, Boston University, District: Massachusetts; T. Earl Sullenger, University of Omaha, District: Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska; Harry Moore, University of Texas, District: Arizona, Texas; Coyle E. Moore, Florida State College for Women, District: Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, Florida; Leland DeVinney, University of Chicago, District: City of Chicago; Duane L. Gibson, Michigan State College, District: Michigan; Katharine Jocher, University of North Carolina, District: South Carolina and North Carolina; Belle B. Beard, Sweet Briar College, District: Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, District of Columbia; Ray H. Abrams, University of Pennsylvania, District: Pennsylvania and New Jersey; James H. Barnett, University of Connecticut, District: Connecticut, Rhode Island; Michael Choukas, Dartmouth College, District: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont; W. C. Lehman, Syracuse University, District: New York outside of New York City; John Innes, Columbia University, District: New York City; William A. Cornell, Macalester Col-

lege, District: Minnesota; Lloyd V. Ballard, Beloit College, District: Wisconsin.

**Committee on Incorporation.** W. B. Bodenhafer, Washington University, Chairman; Ruth E. Arrington, Arlington, Va.; Walter Watson, Southern Methodist University; Malcolm Willey, University of Minnesota.

**Sub-Committee of the Executive Committee on Editorial Board.** E. H. Sutherland, Indiana University, Chairman; R. M. MacIver, Columbia University; Lowry Nelson, University of Minnesota.

**Committee on Revision of the Constitution.** J. O. Hertzler, University of Nebraska, Chairman; Ray E. Baber, Pomona College; E. T. Krueger, Vanderbilt Univ.; Dwight Sanderson, Cornell Univ.; C. C. Zimmerman, Harvard Univ.

**Committee on Co-operation with the United States Civil Service Commission.** T. J. Woofter, Jr., U. S. Department of Agriculture, Chairman; F. Stuart Chapin, University of Minnesota; Mildred Fairchild, Bryn Mawr College; Conrad Taeuber, U. S. Department of Agriculture; Willard Waller, Columbia Univ.; consultant, D. C. Riley, Bur. of Budget, Washington, D. C.

**Committee on the Role of Sociologists in National Affairs.** Carl C. Taylor, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Chairman; Eric Estorick, New York University; Joseph K. Folsom, Vassar College; Charles S. Johnson, Fisk University; John H. Kolb, University of Wisconsin; Robert Lynd, Columbia University; Joseph S. Roucek, Hofstra College; Raymond Sletto, University of Minnesota; J. F. Steiner, University of Washington; Samuel A. Stouffer, University of Chicago; Warren S. Thompson, Scripps Foundation; Rupert B. Vance, University of North Carolina; Ellen Winston, Meredith College; Donald Young, University of Pennsylvania; Erle F. Young, University of Southern California.

**Committee on the Social Aspects of Housing.** R. Clyde White, University of Chicago, Chairman; Maurice R. Davie, Yale University; Ralph C. Fletcher, Pittsburgh Federation of Social Agencies; Richard Fuller, University of Michigan; Howard W. Green, Cleveland Health Council; Julius B. Maller, U. S. Housing Authority; Calvin Schmid, University of Washington; Bessie B. Wessell, Connecticut College; Gladys Walker, Pittsburgh Housing Authority, secretary; Louis Wirth, Univ. of Chicago; Coleman Woodbury, Natl. Assn. of Housing Officials.

**Section on Social Psychology.** R. T. LaPiere, Stanford Univ., Chairman.

**Section on Social Theory.** Talcott Parsons, Harvard University, Chairman.

**Section on Social Research.** R. Bowers, Univ. of Rochester, Chairman.

**Section on Human Ecology.** J. A. Quinn, Univ. of Cincinnati, Chairman.

**Section on Social Biology and Population.** Clyde V. Kiser, Milbank Foundation, Chairman.

**Section on the Family.** Bernhard J. Stern, Columbia University, Chairman.

**Section on Sociology and Social Work.** Grace L. Coyle, Western Reserve University, Chairman.

**Section on Sociology and Psychiatry.** Hornell Hart, Duke Univ., Chairman.

**Section on Social Statistics.** Philip M. Hauser, Bur. of Census, Chairman.

**Section on Educational Sociology.** M. Wesley Roper, Kansas State Teachers College, Chairman.

**Section on Political Sociology.** C. J. Bushnell, University of Toledo, Chairman; Maurice Price, University of Illinois; J. S. Roucek, Hofstra College.

**Section on Criminology.** Walter C. Reckless, Ohio State Univ. Chairman.

**Section on Community.** Everett C. Hughes, Univ. of Chicago, Chairman.

**Section on Sociological Theory and Social Problems.** Ernest R. Mowrer, Northwestern University, Chairman.

**Section on Sociometry.** W. H. Sewell, Okla. A. & M. College, Chairman.



## SOCIOLOGISTS AND THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY

This committee, consisting of H. P. Fairchild, J. K. Folsom, M. T. Price, E. H. Sutherland, and Donald Young, was appointed by President MacIver in October, 1940.<sup>1</sup> It held two meetings in New York and interviewed about thirty persons, including government officials, sociologists in government service, other sociologists, and officers of other organizations. The chairman spent four days in Washington in this work, and found it possible to give some welcomed information as well as to receive it.

*Action.* The following three resolutions were adopted by the Executive Committee on December 29, 1940, and later by the Society.

(1) That a communication be sent to the United States Civil Service Commission to the following effect:

Whereas there is a national professional organization called the American Sociological Society; whereas sociology is a recognized discipline in the colleges and universities of the country; and whereas it is recognized as a major category by the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, we suggest that "sociologist," with appropriate subheadings or options be made a general examination category among the examinations given by the Civil Service Commission; this would be particularly serviceable at the present time in enabling officers to secure men needed in investigation, research activities, and also open a simpler channel for sociologists to enter the regular agencies of the federal government;

(2) That the American Sociological Society should establish a regular standing committee of the Society to work in liaison with the United States Civil Service Commission, in order to facilitate the solution of problems arising out of classification and the needs for sociological work in the government service; and

(3) That a Committee on the Emergency be appointed to deal continuously with the matters now being considered by this subcommittee of the Executive Committee.

*Information and Suggestions.* Resolutions urging policies or programs upon the government, the Social Science Research Council, and the members of the Society as to their research activities, were considered but not recommended in the final action of the Committee. The principal work of the Committee was to gather and organize information for the guidance of sociologists as individuals. Some of the information received was confidential; all of it is subject to rapid change. An interpretive summary of information was given by the chairman orally at the smoker on December 28 and at the business meeting on December 29, and is here again given in amended form.

1. The *National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel* is sending its uniform questionnaire to sociologists, together with a technical check-list of fields of specialization under sociology. Despite the unfamiliarity of the classification used in this list, we are assured that if any sociologist fully uses his opportunity to indicate *five* special fields of competence, he will undoubtedly be found if and when wanted by an agency using this list. The questionnaire data will be put on Hollerith cards and a desired pattern of personal qualifications can be found by mechanical sorting. The chairman has written to the social science member of the Advisory Committee on the Roster, urging the inclusion of competent graduate students. The Committee strongly urges all members of the Society to register promptly and fully on this Roster.

2. Sociologists are advised to watch all announcements of relevant *civil service* examinations, federal, state, and local, for themselves and their students.

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Subcommittee of the Executive Committee on Participation of Sociologists in the National Emergency Program, December 29, 1940.

The term "sociologist" has been used as a title of U. S. Civil Service examinations only with the qualification "rural." There are, however, many examinations in which sociological training is called for or may be offered optionally for credit. Some of these are for positions of specifically defined type; some, for more general rosters such as that of "social science analyst" (which is likely not to be replenished further since it was found too broad a category for satisfactory competitive ratings). Some sociologists in government service now favor the explicit recognition of "sociologist" as a profession and the setting up of a general roster of eligibles under that heading, upon which several operating agencies could call for various specialists as needed. Others prefer to look upon sociology, like statistics, as a tool serviceable in many governmental occupations, and which could be increasingly called for and tested by a great variety of civil service examinations under other names, sometimes as an alternative option to economics and related subjects.

At the meeting of the Society on December 29, a question was raised as to whether the use of "sociologist" as a professional designation might tend to block the popular acceptance of the broader concept of "sociology" as the general science of society. Some sociologists, doubtless aware of the scorn felt by some groups toward the professional "economist" and "social worker," seem to feel that we might enjoy more prestige by emphasizing the broader, pure science, nonprofessional meaning of our subject.

Others appear to feel that the more professional use of the concept and name would encourage students, facilitate their placement in other than academic fields, and increase the respect for sociology as a "practical" discipline. As two government officials, one of them a member of our Society explicitly stated, our resolution (1) above represents a good recruiting policy from the standpoint of the government. As another member, who also is a government official, pointed out, a much larger percentage of young sociologists in the future will need to find places outside of academic life and our preparation for this change lags far behind. For the sake of students and prospective students, there is need for a concept of sociology as something they can do as well as of something they can teach.

The action of the Society on resolution (1) seems to indicate a willingness to move a little further away from the "ivory tower" concept and to accept a greater exposure to "practical" criticism for the sake of greater participation in the world of affairs.

3. Several of our informants have stressed the need and opportunity for sociologists in various *administrative positions* in the government service and private agencies, in which sociology would function as a tool and a point of view, but not as the basic qualification. Sociology could increase its contribution to our national life in this way at the same time that it might be securing more recognition as a specialized profession. The two processes are not mutually exclusive, but might even reinforce each other. The more persons there are with sociological training in administrative posts, the greater the chance of the sociologists' being called upon to give specialized services.

4. Not all federal positions are under civil service, and even in the case of those which are, an informal approach is often desirable through an officer of the *operating agency* which is requesting the new personnel. Those interested in government work would do well to scan our membership list, making note of sociologists located in Washington, and the list of occupations of members published recently by the Society. Among the federal agencies which have employed sociologists or might do so are the following. Those of special relevance are marked with an asterisk.

## Department of State

Division of Cultural Relations  
Division of the American Republics

## War Department

Personnel Division (G-1)  
Military Intelligence Division (G-2)

## Department of Justice

Section on Nationalities  
Immigration and Naturalization Service

## Department of Agriculture

\*Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare  
Farm Security Administration

## Department of Commerce

Bureau of the Census

## Department of Labor

Bureau of Labor Statistics  
\*Children's Bureau  
Women's Bureau

## Federal Works Agency

Works Progress Administration  
\*U. S. Housing Authority

## Federal Security Agency

\*Social Security Board  
U. S. Employment Service  
U. S. Office of Education  
Public Health Service  
National Youth Administration

## Executive Office of the President

Bureau of the Budget and its Division of Statistical Standards  
National Resources Planning Board

## Veterans' Administration

## Tennessee Valley Authority

## Federal Reserve Board

## Selective Service System

## National Defense Advisory Commission; especially Consumer Protection

Labor

Agriculture

Research and Statistics

Also several "coordinators" and committees, whose roles and identity are subject to change: housing, welfare, relations with the Americas, health, etc.

5. There are several organizations and agencies which are concerned with *morale*, *ideology*, and *education*, or which have set up, or are believed to be setting up, committees for action or research in this field. These include:

Committee for National Morale, affiliated with the Council for Democracy (A. U. Pope, Chairman, 277 Park Avenue, New York City)

Council for Democracy, 420 Lexington Avenue, New York City (Evans Clark, Secretary)

Committee on Morale, of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (G. Murphy, Chairman, College of the City of New York)

- Conference Group on Morale (E. L. Bernays, Chairman, Public Relations Counsel, 420 Lexington Avenue, New York City)
- Conference on Educational Reconstruction (Frank Aydelotte, Princeton, N. J.)
- National Solidarity Group, Social Science Research Council (Robert T. Crane, Executive Secretary, 230 Park Avenue, New York City)
- William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation (Ernest E. Hadley, Secretary, 1835 I Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.; Harry Stack Sullivan, Director)
- American Psychiatric Association (A. H. Ruggles, Secretary, Butler Hospital, Providence, R. I.; R. M. Chapman, Council; H. A. Steckel, Chairman, Committee on Military Mobilization)
- Council for American Unity (Read Lewis, 224 Fourth Avenue, New York City)
- National Coordinating Committee on Education and Defense (George Zook and Dr. Willard Givens, Co-chairmen, 744 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.)
- Committee on Rural Education and National Defense (Chester E. Davis, Chairman, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.)
- Morale Division, Adjutant General's Office, United States Army (Colonel H. H. Pfeil, Room 845, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.)
- Training Division, Bureau of Navigation, United States Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

A conference on Psychological Factors in Morale was held in Washington November, 1940, under the leadership of Gordon Allport. This conference recommended the setting up of an interdisciplinary committee on morale within the Division of Anthropology and Psychology of the National Research Council. This might become a clearing house for the field, but the situation is still unclear and shifting.

6. Several individuals and groups have proposed *research projects*, some of them of surprising magnitude, and are seeking funds from foundations and/or invitations from government agencies. Since the status of these is in part confidential and likely to change at any moment, nothing specific can be said here. In general, it may be said that avenues of approach lie through the National Research Council, the Social Science Research Council, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the American Council on Education or the appropriate officers and committees of these councils.

7. The greatest impact of the emergency upon sociologists now in academic life will probably be to *change somewhat the emphasis in their teaching and the selection of their research and other activities*. It is urged by several leading sociologists and educators, and is the sense of the Committee, that those engaged upon important, long-range research should not sacrifice this for the sake of some more immediate usefulness related to the emergency; and that no invidious distinctions as to kudos be made between those serving emergency purposes and those serving long-run objectives. At the same time, many sociologists may feel they could make themselves more useful by changing the direction of their efforts, or may be in the process of deciding among various possibilities. To these, it is suggested that they might turn their efforts temporarily away from intensive studies of narrow scope to the better organization and wider dissemination of practical knowledge about our present social organization: national, state, regional and local, public and private. Few groups are as well equipped as sociologists to view social organization concretely and at the same time comprehensively. Many adult volunteer workers, including women, will need to be trained, as well as younger students. These often flounder about in confusion among the numerous agency names and alphabetical symbols used by men of affairs; and no one has taken much responsibility for orienting the beginner or the volunteer.

In many cases, colleges themselves may orient their curricular or extracurricular activities toward defense needs.



Sociologists might participate in state and local councils of defense and their various committees, upon draft boards and other committees under the Selective Service, in forums and adult education, and in committees concerned with welfare, recreation, case work with families of drafted men, social hygiene and morale, especially in communities expanded by defense industries or military camps. A United Welfare Committee has been established under the National Defense Advisory Commission in Washington to coordinate the work of various welfare agencies.

As communities become more socially conscious under the influence of local councils of defense or otherwise, various surveys, training programs, and other projects may need the help of local sociologists. The community delineation work of Carl C. Taylor's Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare offers an example of useful community work which sociologists could do and also train others to do. Communities rapidly expanding because of defense industries or military camps will especially need expert help in community organization.

It is strongly urged that sociology departments give more attention to training students in practical administration. Courses in civic and social administration or general administration analogous to those given in schools of business and social work and departments of political science, might be developed. Many sociologists could give to the science and art of administration a more general interest and universal applicability than is done by other social scientists with more limited points of view. There should also be more instruction and guidance in the matter of finding positions.

One government informant suggests that sociologists may find opportunities, in a volunteer capacity, to counteract hostile propaganda, especially in minority and less educated groups, by tracing out sources and exposing them, and disseminating material within the specific groups which answers the specific arguments. Such action might demonstrate its superiority over repressive measures and help to preserve civil liberties and democracy at home.

Several sociologists suggest that the emergency offers a valuable opportunity for general research on the social process. Particularly useful would be the collection and filing of data not recorded explicitly in print—family life, folkways, gossip, whispering campaigns, race relations, etc. Some think that social planning for the period of demobilization and economic depression which may follow the emergency has the most urgent claim on our attention.

8. Suggestions for *sources of information* are as follows. The American Association for Adult Education publishes *Defense Papers*, monthly, \$1.00 for eight issues, 60 East 42nd Street, New York City. The press releases of the National Defense Advisory Commission issued by their publicity department can be secured by writing to said office. An excellent general description of the overhead organization is contained in "The Emergency National Defense Organization," by Joseph P. Harris, reprinted from *Public Administration Review*, Vol. I, No. 1, Autumn, 1940; and also in a "Memorandum," by the National Defense Advisory Commission, *State and Local Cooperation in National Defense*. The weekly magazine *Defense*, formerly issued only to state and local councils of defense, is now generally available from the Government Printing Office at 75 cents a year.

9. Several different *attitudes* toward this emergency are possible, and several different attitudes have been expressed by various sociologists. The following evaluations have crystallized in the mind of your Committee Chairman in the process of making this survey, and may help to integrate rather diverse attitudes into a constructive policy.

A. Much if not most of the social program developing to meet the emergency

consists of measures which would be desirable if there were no emergency; the emergency has given added stimulus to many desirable changes.

B. While there will be great dislocations of people, disorganization of some institutions, and training of excess persons for temporary occupations, the result may be to develop in our society a larger number of adaptable persons who are possessed of more than one skill and capable of filling more than one role, and to reduce the number of unskilled and experience-restricted persons.

C. As E. A. Ross indicated at the December 29 meeting, sociologists need take no blame for the present unhappy state of society since they "have not had their hands on the tiller." Yet when we survey the persons having some sociological training or insight who now hold government and other positions of leadership in America, we are led to believe that the hand of the sociologist was never as near to grasping the tiller as it is now under this National Administration and in this emergency. It is still possible, despite many dire predictions, that we may fail to fail.

JOSEPH K. FOLSOM, *Chairman*

#### SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Pitirim A. Sorokin of Harvard University delivered a controversial address on "The Nature of the Challenge" before the general meeting of the Society on Sunday morning, December 29. Newspaper reports of this speech resulted in several comments to the Chairman of the Committee about the propriety of such "destructive" publicity.

Judging from editorials, Sorokin's Chicago speech was looked upon generally as a rare example of self-criticism by a leader of a dignified scientific society. As the Bridgeport, Connecticut, *Post* put it, Sorokin "might have been expected to say something pleasant about his own speciality. But he didn't." The editorial writer perhaps was reacting from the stodgy pattern set by such organizations as his own American Society of Newspaper Editors, a humorless group—so far as its *Proceedings* indicate—upon which the weight of personal significance is very heavy.

These are the facts and general policy which governed the Committee in handling Sorokin's Chicago speech. His views and scientific contributions are well known to our membership. He was invited to deliver one of the two scheduled addresses at a plenary session of the Society. From this, the Committee assumed that his theories were regarded as significant by leaders of opinion in the Society. At any rate, the Committee received no instructions to the contrary and Sorokin did not appear averse to having his ideas widely disseminated. The Committee therefore released a press digest of the speech which the Associated Press, the United Press Associations, and the International News Service carried to practically every newspaper in the United States.

In adopting this course, the Committee was acting consistently with the position that the Society should and does determine its own policies. The Society has within it, fortunately, many disparate and frequently irreconcilable views on important aspects of sociology. The Public Relations Committee recognizes this fact and takes the position that it has no right to attempt to define sociology or to decide what papers presented in open meetings should be emphasized or minimized. Other committees of the Society work out the Society's annual programs and select the articles for the *American Sociological Review*. All the Public Relations Committee attempts to do is to interpret to the various publics, in an understanding and understandable manner, the interpretable theories and research findings of the Society's members. In other words, the Committee eliminates only what cannot be interpreted

satisfactorily and, of course, what the authors of papers prefer not to have publicized, and what the newspapers are not interested in printing.

In the present instance, the Committee believes that the Society enjoyed a net gain from the reports of Sorokin's paper. As the *Chicago Daily News* summed it up, referring to Sorokin's talk, "No casualty list appeared in the news of the convention, so sociologists must be able to take it as well as dish it out."

As one must expect from the nature of the Chicago newspaper situation (dominated by Col. Robert Rutherford McCormick, William Randolph Hearst, and Col. Frank Knox), the Society's local press did not equal that accorded it in Philadelphia or in Detroit the two previous years. The Chicago bureaus of the Associated Press and United Press Associations, however, carried well-written reports on the many papers which fulfilled *both their requirement of popular interest and your Committee's requirement of interpretability*. The special correspondents for the *Detroit News*, the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*, and Science Service, Inc., were also highly cooperative.

Because a number of papers were such that they could be held by newspapers for later publication, science features based on them continue to appear throughout the country, many of them distributed by syndicates. For example, even though the wire newsgathering services carried a "spot" story on Mark A. May's paper, the United Press Association released a more extensive science feature on it by mail which appeared in a great number of subscribing newspapers between January 19 and 28.

On the whole, the national response to sociological news is improving. E. W. Scripps greatly stimulated the popular interpretation of *physical* science developments when he established and endowed Science Service, Inc. (His original idea was for a social science news service.) Even though *social* science lacks an adequately trained corps of interpreters in reportorial positions and also lacks an endowed interpretive institution, the situation is gradually improving each year. Fortunately, many individual newspaper reporters—trained by members of our Society—are kept from losing their interest in sociological theories and problems after graduation by their firsthand contact with the "facts of life," but they seldom have opportunities to "cover" sociological events. With encouragement, these young men and women are willing and able to interpret to their employers and the various publics, the body of knowledge they have found valuable.

Respectfully submitted,

ALFRED McCLUNG LEE, *Chairman*

*New York University*  
*February 14, 1941.*

**Notice: National Roster of Scientific Personnel.** Some members and all recently joined members failed to receive the schedule for this census. Such individuals may send their names and addresses to the Secretary of the Society, H. A. Phelps, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., and he will forward them to the proper authorities in Washington. I suppose one could write direct to Washington.—R.B.

## CURRENT ITEMS

**Errata.** Stuart C. Dodd, of the American University of Beirut, Syria, calls attention to errors in G. A. Lundberg's article, "Some Problems of Group Classification and Measurement," *American Sociological Review*, June 1940, 351-360. It takes lots of time for Dodd to communicate these days. He received the June *Review* on November 6 and I received his letter of that date sometime in January.

In Equation 3, page 357, the + sign was omitted in the term,  $i^2+i$ . This is an obvious case of poor proofreading but on page 358, Equation 20, there is an error which might confuse all except the mathematically literate who would probably note from Equation 20a that  $p^2$  is an exponent, not a coefficient. Equation 20, then, should read,  $q^2 = ip^2$ .—R.B.

### ANNOUNCEMENTS AND MEETINGS

**Alpha Kappa Delta** held its annual breakfast meeting in the Congress Hotel on December 28, 1940. About 60 persons ate and 15 or 20 more came in for the business meeting. The amount of business was so great that President L. L. Bernard had to call another business meeting for the next day.

President Bernard was unanimously reelected for the ensuing biennium. W. E. Gettys, University of Texas, is the new vice president; A. B. Hollingshead, Indiana University, secretary-treasurer; James A. Quinn, University of Cincinnati, editor of *The Quarterly*; P. V. Young, University of Southern California, was elected to the executive committee.

Two new chapters were installed during 1940.

**The American Association of Schools of Social Work** met in Chicago, January 30-February 1, 1941. The Schools of Social Work of the University of Chicago, Loyola University, and Northwestern University acted as hosts. Over 200 representatives of the more than forty schools of social work which comprise the association were in attendance. Arlien Johnson, dean of the School of Social Work at the University of Southern California, is president of the A.A.S.S.W.

Dean Johnson, E. C. Lindemann, of the New York School of Social Work, Helen R. Wright, assistant dean of the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, Wayne McMillen, University of Chicago and president of the A.A.S.W., and W. I. Newstetter, dean of the School of Applied Social Sciences, of the University of Pittsburgh, were the principal speakers.

The Committee on Pre-Social Work Education appointed in 1938 has just made its report and it is a most important document. I do not where it can be obtained or for how much, but I imagine the Chairman of the Committee, R. Clyde White, University of Chicago, or the above mentioned Arlien Johnson or W. I. Newstetter could furnish it, or the proper information for its procurement. The case-workers who were asked (800 in Minnesota) stated that sociology did them the most good (closely followed by psychology) and 89 percent of the women and 70 percent of the men regarded it as essential. Here again psychology was the closest competitor. Every sociologist in the country should read this report.—R.B.

**American Catholic Sociological Society** held its third annual meeting at Chicago, Illinois, December 28, 29, 30, 1940. Francis J. Friedel, University of Dayton, was elected president; Eva J. Ross, of Trinity College, Washington, D. C., vice-president; Ralph A. Gallagher, Loyola University (Chicago), secretary; Joseph Walsh, Cook County Juvenile Court and Loyola University (Chicago), treasurer.

While the A.C.S.S. has been in existence only since 1938, it has grown rapidly and now has about 200 members. There are about 80 Catholic schools where sociology is taught, though there are many members who are in social work and some who are interested laymen.



At some of the meetings, there were four or five hundred persons in the audience. About 25 papers and panel discussions were on the program. The highlights of the meeting were P. A. Sorokin's address on "The Challenge of the Times to Social Scientists" and the address of Archbishop Stritch who spoke on the need for a Catholic sociology and the functions which it may perform. The other sessions which aroused the most spirited discussion were those devoted to the teaching of sociology (high school and college), race relations, and the problems of education in labor schools.

*American Statistical Association* has decided to enlarge its *Bulletin* and issue it six times a year, beginning January, 1941. It will total about 150 pages a year and will cover matters of current and more or less informal interest to members, thus making more space available in the *Journal* for scholarly materials. It is hoped that members will use it as a medium for the expression of opinion and discussion on matters of interest to statisticians and members of the Association.

Frank A. Ross will become editor of the *Journal*, January 1, 1941, succeeding Frederick F. Stephan who has served since 1935. Stephan will return to Cornell and Ross will be on leave from Syracuse where he is chairman of the sociology department. Ross was editor 1925-1934.

The *Index to the Journal, 1888-1939*, has been completed and can be purchased by members for 50¢ (one dollar to nonmembers).

The Association now has 2644 (1940) members and is seriously considering a plan for the classification of its membership.

*American Youth Commission* on January 15, 1941, issued a pamphlet, *Next Steps in National Policy for Youth*, drafted by Paul T. David, available on request from the office at 744 Jackson Place, Washington D. C. Six other recommendation pamphlets are also free "A Program of Action for American Youth"; "Community Responsibility for Youth"; "The Occupational Adjustment of Youth"; "Should Youth Organize?"; "Youth Defense and the National Welfare"; and "The Civilian Conservation Corps." The low-priced reports of the Commission's more extensive studies should be in the hands of all teachers, publicists, and public officials, especially the studies pertaining to Negro youth, undoubtedly the most depressed, discriminated against, and potentially dangerous class of youth in the country. The strongest line of defense is the youth sector: if we save the youth, we save all; if we do not save youth we lose all. All youths, confused, discouraged, and finally embittered, are potentially dangerous. The commission has just published (January 1941) *Work Camps for High School Youth*, by Kenneth Holland and George L. Bickel. It is a well illustrated pamphlet selling for 25 cents. Also *Youth-Serving Organizations*, by M. M. Chambers, has been reissued, enlarged and completely revised, 250 pages, \$2.50 clothbound. This is an indispensable guide for all who are interested in youth projects.

The points emphasized in *Next Steps* are obvious to all who have thought about the problem. Something is being done on all the points mentioned—but not enough. What should be done cannot be done too quickly. Sound and equal opportunities for recreation, health, education, employment, vocational guidance and adjustment for all classes of youth are in a sense more important than military *matériel* and just as urgent. "Billions for Boys and Girls" are the most productive Defense Dollars we can spend. Youth in America today, and for the last ten years, has been getting a better break than ever heretofore in the history of the country. (Even the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the disgraceful *Hammer vs. Degenhart* decision the other day). We now have CCC, NYA, American Youth Commission, more milk for slum babies, better housing, more public health, juvenile courts, vocational guidance, camps, playgrounds, etc., etc., but millions of young people still lack even a minimum of these advantages.

However, even if they had a maximum of these services and aids, it still would not be enough. Democracy will not be safe in America until every child born has a Maximum Chance, until every young person feels that he has a *personal stake* in the country, that he is his *own man*, that he is wanted, that he can look forward to a continually broadening life of balanced security, adventure, and effective living. Youth is America and America is Youth. If the morale of youth is destroyed, America and the hope of democracy will die.

Youth wants to "go places"—that was the vitality of the Westward Movement. In those days, a young man could "go West" and "get somewhere." Youth still wants to go places and

do things; it will not long be satisfied with dead-end jobs, honky tonks, tippling, joy rides, economic insecurity and inequality, military camps, confusion, exploitation, and corruption. Youth wants a job to do—a big job. Youth will be served; and if it be served wisely and well, it will serve its servants well in return.—R.B.

**China Emergency Relief Committee, Inc.**, 401 Graybar Building, New York, N. Y. This is one place where those who feel a need to help those in need can send their money with the knowledge that it will not help dictators indirectly, but will help democrats directly (why doesn't Hoover help the Chinese: he was in China once). Dollars are better than bullets in China. This Committee is furnishing medical supplies. Its money will all be spent in America. Its goal is only one million dollars (Why not ten million?). This is what you (and the Chinese) will get for your money: \$25.00 will immunize 1250 people against cholera, typhoid, or bubonic plague; \$20.00 will feed 20 convalescent children for a month; \$10.00 will provide anesthetics for 150 surgical operations (major operations are still being performed without anesthetics, Madame Chiang Kai-shek broadcast to America last November); \$1.00 will cure one person of malaria. This organization is affiliated with the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China.

Another way Americans can help China is by aiding the development of cooperative industry. This movement, under the leadership of Rewi Alley, is furnishing China with the sinews of war, but also is laying the foundation for a permanent productive and democratic industrial society when peace finally shall come. It may be that the first real economic democracy in the world will be achieved in China—or Mexico—a development forced upon them by the exigency of events. Certainly, one of the prime reasons why Western civilization is in its present plight is our failure to achieve a degree of economic democracy consistent with our religious, political, and educational democracy. It seems as if the cooperative principle is more in harmony with the general ideal of democracy than the corporative state or proletarian state-socialism, at least when they are based upon force and coercion under the leadership of ruthless men on horseback—or rather, men with tanks and bombers. The Chinese have a long tradition of local group cooperation, both familial and otherwise. Modern Chinese industrial cooperation is rooted in congenial social soil. For seven dollars, the cooperatives can place a man in a permanent job capable of supporting a family of five. This defeats famine, Japs, disease, and disaster. Send your money to Indusco, Inc., 8 West 40 Street, New York. Read "China's Guerrilla Industry," *Survey-Graphic*, February 1940, 83 ff., and learn what *Gung-ho* means. Also, see *Saturday Evening Post*, February 8, 1941, "China's Blitz-Builder-Rewi-Alley" by Edgar Snow. (This is probably the first time the *S.E.P.* ever made the *A.S.R.*)—R.B.

**Chinese and Japanese Language Institute** will be held at Cornell University June 23 to August 15, 1941. These courses, elementary and advanced in both languages, are under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Cornell summer session. G. A. Kennedy, of Yale, and E. O. Reischauer, of Harvard, will teach Chinese and Japanese respectively.

The total cost for the eight weeks is about \$160.00. Some scholarships are available. For further information, write Knight Biggerstaff, M-211 Boardman Hall, Cornell University, or Mortimer Graves, 907 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.

**Cincinnati Social Hygiene Society** has issued its 23d annual report for 1939-1940. Dr. Carl A. Wilzbach is president and Dr. Richard W. Weiser executive-secretary. In the year ending June 1940, the society sponsored 377 lectures to a total of 17,625 people, published 188 articles in the papers, distributed 9753 pieces of literature, and loaned 348 books, besides engaging in several other types of educational activities.

**Committee on Conceptual Integration** held two sessions in connection with the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society. The first was devoted to the definition of definition. Papers by Maurice Parmelee and L. L. Bernard were discussed by E. E. Eubank, Hornell Hart, Dwight Sanderson, Robert Bierstedt, and Lewis Dexter. There was standing room only in the small room assigned and many people were turned away. The second meeting was devoted to papers by G. A. Lundberg and Herbert Blumer on conceptual ambiguity and the applicability of measurement to social science data. This meeting was held in a large room but again attendance was so great that many had to stand during the entire session.

The last part of the second session consisted of a business meeting conducted by Read Bain in which the following decisions were made: (1) Albert Blumenthal was retained as coordinator and secretary for another year; (2) the C.C.I. will meet as heretofore at the time and place of the annual meetings of the American Sociological Society; (3) monthly circular letters will be sent out as in 1940; (4) dues were increased from 25 cents to 50 cents a year; (5) the work of the C.C.I. henceforth will be conducted through subcommittees.

Bowers, Blumenthal (ex officio), Eubank, and Hornell Hart were chosen to constitute the committee on subcommittees which will welcome suggestions. These should be sent to Mr. Blumenthal.

The 1940 deficit of \$19.00 was wiped out by a contribution of \$25.00 from C. I. Barnard, president of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company. Mr. Barnard is much interested in the work of C.C.I. and has written a very interesting paper dealing with the general subject of conceptual integration.

On the evening of December 28th, 1940, in Chicago, Alfred Korzybski presented a special lecture for members of the C.C.I. on the subject, "Non-Aristotelian Methodology as a Foundation for Scientific Unity."

The Chicago meetings showed that interest in the C.C.I. has increased enormously during the last year, both inside and outside the group. One of the best ways to keep this interest alive and to help it function productively is to send your dues to the secretary at once: Albert Blumenthal, Maryville Teachers College, Maryville, Mo. Anyone may become a member simply by paying his dues. There are no "tests" for membership except interest in the work of the committee.—R.B.

*The Connecticut State Department of Education* issued an *Information Bulletin on Guidance*, November 15, 1940, which describes in detail "How the Lay-Off Affected 182 White-Collar WPA Workers in Connecticut, 1939-1940." This cannot be published without permission, but I imagine copies can be obtained from Stephen Habbe, Supervisor of Guidance Services, Hartford, Conn. It is an interesting document.—R.B.

*The Eastern Sociological Society* held its annual meeting at the Biltmore Hotel in Providence, Rhode Island, April 19 and 20, 1941. This is the first time in several years that the Society has met in New England.

The Saturday morning session, as in recent years, was devoted to reports on research. All papers presented to the chairman of the committee, J. H. S. Bossard, of the University of Pennsylvania, received mention on the program, though some were read only by title. This part of the program has become one of the distinctive features of the conference. Some of the papers thus presented were selected for general presentation to the Society.

Saturday afternoon was devoted to two separate sections, one discussing "Sociology and National Defense" with Willard Waller as chairman and the other dealing with "Personality and Culture" under the chairmanship of Kimball Young. The annual banquet Saturday evening was followed by a smoker, with plenty of time for sociability and informal discussion.

There were two section meetings on Sunday morning. One, under the direction of Mildred Fairchild, continued last year's discussion of "Professional Practices Affecting Teachers of Sociology," while the second discussed "Motivation of Sociological Research," under the direction of Charles H. Page.

Publicity for the conference was again handled by Alfred M. Lee. A new membership list of the Society is being prepared and the secretary would appreciate notification of any changes in address. The annual dues of \$1.00 are now payable for the year 1941. Paul F. Cressey, Wheaton College, Norton, Massachusetts, is secretary.

*The John Anisfield Award* of \$1,000 for the outstanding book of the year on racial relations goes to Louis Adamic, editor of *Common Ground*, for his *From Many Lands*, an account of the racial contacts of our recent immigrants in America. The volume consists of intimate narratives of the lives and careers of a number of representative immigrant individuals, families, and groups. Naturally, the cases cannot be considered typical of their respective groups; however, they high-light the essential problems of the stranger in a foreign land.

This award was established in 1934 by Mrs. Edith Anisfield Wolf of Cleveland, Ohio, in memory of her father, John Anisfield, for the purpose of encouraging and rewarding the pro-



duction of good books, either here or abroad, in the field of racial relationships. The judges are Henry Seidel Canby, Contributing Editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature*, Henry Pratt Fairchild, professor of sociology, New York University, and Donald Young, of the Social Science Research Council.

**Laguna Conference.** The fourth annual conference on cooperative activities in Mexico will be held in Torreon, Coahuila, June 27-30, 1941. Field trips will be taken to ejidos, schools, hospitals, cotton gins, irrigation works and offices of the various cooperative organizations in the area. First class hotels in Torreon are inexpensive. This is a fine opportunity for students of Mexican culture. For further information, address Clarence Senior, Centro de Estudios, Tapachula 87, Mexico, D. F.

Mr. Senior has recently published a study of cooperation in Mexico, which all sociologists should read. It is called *Democracy Comes to a Cotton Kingdom: The Story of Mexico's La Laguna*, 56 pages. This can be obtained from the above address in English or Spanish—and it is a thrilling story.—R.B.

**Medical Care** appeared January, 1941, as Volume 1, Number 1. It is devoted to the economic and social aspects of health service and is published by the Committee on Research in Medical Economics. It has an imposing list of editorial advisors to its editor, Michael M. Davis. It is \$3.00 per year, quarterly, about 100 pages per issue. It will be largely devoted to original articles but will also contain a department devoted to the *Course of Events*, one on *Current Literature*, and a *Forum* section. The brochure states: "Medical Care considers equally the interests of the people who receive medical care and of the professions that furnish it. It seeks to promote cooperative research, planning, and action by the professions and the public in their common interest."

It seems as if this new journal will meet a very definite need and that sociologists should be interested in it. There are now millions of people in the country who need medical care, thousands of doctors who are idle a good part of the time, other thousands who are worked to death—and all doctors collect little or nothing from many patients and too much from those who can afford to pay. Perhaps *Medical Care* can find out what to do about this—and sell the idea to the professions concerned. The medical profession has attained a high degree of technical proficiency but exhibits a low order of social intelligence and also a remarkable shortsightedness regarding its own economic well being. Many a doctor is on a meager income because of the profession's fear and horror of socialized medicine—and many a needy patient does not receive proper care. The economic organization of medicine seems little short of scandalous to many able people who have given the subject considerable study. Perhaps *Medical Care* will be able to educate the public and professions along this line.

Subscriptions should be sent to *Medical Care*, Business Office, Care of Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, Md.—R.B.

**The Milbank Memorial Fund News Digest** of December, 1940, contains a 47-item bibliography of recent publications in the field of population and public health which should be of interest to sociologists.

**National Archives.** The sixth annual report of the Archivist of the United States (101 pages), published in January, 1941, describes the activities of the National Archives during the fiscal year 1939-40, including assistance rendered to the national defense program. The report is illustrated by a series of eleven reproductions of documents in the National Archives and includes among the appendixes a newly issued set of regulations for the use of the records and a list of publications based on material in The National Archives. The first annual report of the Archivist as to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library has been issued as a separate publication (7 pages).

Dr. Edgar B. Nixon, formerly an editorial assistant on the *Territorial Papers* project of the Department of State, and James L. Whitehead, formerly state supervisor of the WPA Survey of Federal Archives in Pennsylvania, have been appointed associate archivist and assistant archivist, respectively, at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

The records of the Washington office of the National Recovery Administration, with the exception of a few files in the custody of the Departments of Agriculture and Labor, are all now in the National Archives. Recent transfers include files relating to the organization and ad-



ministration of the NRA; files concerned with the formation, amendment, and administration of codes; and reference and research files.

Recent additions that may interest sociologists include: correspondence files of the Extension Service and of its predecessor agencies, 1907-33; correspondence of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics dealing with agricultural finance, land economics, farm population and rural welfare, cotton, wool, hay, feed, and seed, 1926-31; original maps of Nicholas King's wharfing plans, 1797, and of his plats of the city of Washington, 1803; Reclamation Bureau plats showing farm units in irrigation projects in the Far West, 1907-40; and Tennessee Valley Authority maps showing drainage, cultural features, and place names in the Tennessee River drainage basin, 1934-40; photographic materials including about 3000 negatives of photographs showing construction activities of the Corps of Engineers, 1875-1902, and a collection of 49 of the earliest motion-picture "nickelodeon" shows, 1894-1917.

*The Pacific Sociological Society* held its twelfth annual meeting at Stanford University, December 27-28, 1940. Sessions dealt with "The Sociology of Housing," "The Rural Community," "Human Ecology," and "The Problems of Teaching Social Statistics." The presidential address by Martin H. Neumeyer, of the University of Southern California, given before a joint session with the Pacific Coast Economic Association, dealt with "Leisure, A Field for Social Research." Svend H. Reimer discussed "The Adjustment of Family Life to Its Physical Setting," based on a study of housing in Sweden. Erle F. Young discussed housing projects in the United States under the topic "Housing the Masses." Lawrence S. Bee discussed "Social Attitudes in a New York Rural Community." "Land Values as an Ecological Index" was the theme of Calvin F. Schmid's discussion. Marvin R. Schafer presented a study of ecological patterning in Tacoma. Joseph Cohen discussed "Problems of Teaching Social Statistics."

All papers presented at the session will appear in the *Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society*, to be published by *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, at Pullman, in March, 1941.

Officers for 1941 are: president, Jesse F. Steiner, University of Washington; vice-presidents, northern division, William C. Smith, Linfield College; central division, Richard T. LaPiere, Stanford University; southern division, Erle F. Young, University of Southern California; secretary-treasurer, Paul H. Landis, State College of Washington; and editor, Carl E. Dent, State College of Washington.

*The Pan American Highway.* A very interesting map of the highway developments south of Mexico, with much pertinent information regarding the Highway and the Pan American Union has recently been issued. It may be obtained free from the Union, or the Educational Research Bureau, 1321 M Street N.W., Washington, D. C.

*Pi Gamma Mu*, national social science honor society, held a luncheon December 24, at Chicago, during the annual convention of the American Sociological Society. The address of the occasion was delivered by the distinguished teacher of law in Northwestern University, Walter Wheeler Cook, who spoke on "What's the Matter with College Teaching?" Brief addresses were given by Robert M. MacIver, president of the American Sociological Society, Edward A. Ross, honorary national president of Pi Gamma Mu; and Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah, former professor of political science in the University of Utah and this last year vice-president of the American Political Science Association. The toastmaster was S. Howard Patterson, University of Pennsylvania, who is national president of Pi Gamma Mu.

Pi Gamma Mu was founded by Leroy Alley of Southwestern College in 1924. It is a general social science honor society comparable in its scope to Phi Beta Kappa and to Sigma Xi. While it is a young organization, it has over 100 chapters, all active, and publishes a quarterly magazine, *Social Science*, whose object is the popularization of the scientific study of social science.

*Portuguese and Spanish, Institute for Intensive Training in.* The American Council of Learned Societies has been enabled by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to offer during the summer of 1941 two intensive language courses: one in Portuguese and the other in Spanish. The courses will be of nine weeks' duration and will be held on the campus of the University of Wyoming at Laramie from June 23 to August 22. Not more than thirty students

will be accepted in each language, and each student will be expected to devote his entire attention to the course he chooses. No previous training in Portuguese or Spanish is required.

The staff will include William Berrien, of the American Council of Learned Societies; Marion A. Zeitlin, of the University of California at Los Angeles; Francis Millet Rogers, of the Society of Fellows of Harvard University; Lic. Andres Iduarte, of Columbia University; a tutor for each language; and four native graduate assistants in conversation.

A limited number of study-aids will be available for assistance to qualified persons who cannot meet the full expense of attendance at the Institute. It is estimated that the over-all expenses for the nine weeks' session, exclusive of the costs of transportation, will range from \$160 to \$190.

For full information, write The Administrative Secretary, American Council of Learned Societies, 907 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.

*The Institute for Propaganda Analysis* is furnishing materials regularly to over 3000 high schools and colleges and 2500 adult study groups. There have been few periods in American history when the services of such an organization were more sorely needed than at present. The Institute is less than four years old but has already established itself as one of the leading educational enterprises in the country.

Subscriber-membership is \$2.00 a year. This brings twelve monthly bulletins plus (while they last) a choice of the *Fine Art of Propaganda: An Analysis of Father Coughlin's Speeches*, or *War Propaganda and the United States*, paperbound. These books clothbound sell in bookstores at \$1.50 and \$2.75.

The Institute has issued three volumes as background materials for studying the monthly bulletins and a *Group Leader's Guide*. These four volumes, a year's subscription (with book choice mentioned above) totalling \$9.50, may be had for \$5.00. This is an excellent opportunity for libraries, departments, and individuals to obtain a complete file of the Institute's publications. Student rates for five months' subscription to the *Bulletin* in bundles of 20 or more are only 25 cents each. Address Clyde Beals, 211 Fourth Avenue, New York.

The new officers for 1941 are: Kirtley Mather, of Harvard, president; F. Ernest Johnson of Columbia, vice-president; Clyde R. Miller, of Columbia, secretary; A. M. Lee, of New York University, treasurer; Clyde Beals, formerly editor of the *Guild Reporter*, administrative secretary; and Ralph Casey, of Minnesota, board of directors.—R.B.

*Public Affairs Committee* held a dinner meeting, December 29, 1941, and conference with a selected group representing the various social sciences that held their annual meetings at Chicago. The following persons were present: Luther Gulick, Institute for Public Administration, New York City, chairman; Brooks Emeny, Council of Foreign Relations, Cleveland, Ohio; Kenneth Colegrove, American Political Science Association, Northwestern University; James K. Pollock, Political Science, University of Michigan; Robert A. Polson, Rural Extension Division, Cornell University; Harry Shubart, Director of Press Relations, University of Chicago Press; Donald Buck, Mid-West Manager, Silver Burdett Company, Chicago, Illinois; Delbert C. Miller, Washington State College, Sociology; Frederick Ogg, President, American Political Science Association; M. P. Catherwood, Cornell University; and Marion Humble, Public Affairs Committee.

Twenty-four others (who shall be nameless here) were invited but were unable to attend. From experience, I assert that they not only missed an excellent dinner and good fellowship, but also an exciting and stimulating discussion of problems connected with what I believe is one of the most important educational agencies in the country, both in the schools (high schools and colleges) and in the field of adult education. You cannot laugh off the circulation of two and a half million pamphlets like those this Committee has prepared and sold. It does not give anything away. I think that is a sound principle in adult education. People will not read what they do not buy. The P.A.P.'s are not mental baby food, as the abbreviation might suggest, but they are both written and printed so that a person of average education can get a maximum of sound information and judicious interpretation with a minimum of time and effort.

That these pamphlets can be used profitably in the teaching of sociology at the college level was explained by Delbert C. Miller, of Washington State College. They have used 385 sets of 14 selected pamphlets during the current school year. Mr. Miller explained how they

were used. He stated that he and two other young instructors had used the pamphlets when they were students and so realized their importance for freshmen. The pamphlets present actual social problems and thus make the class work more concrete and profitable. Students like the pamphlets because in them they find what they hope for in sociology courses. He cited several titles as being especially useful in teaching geographical influences, social change, propaganda and crowd behavior, economics, education, and political science. He said the pamphlets are useful particularly in relating the traditional disciplines taught in college and high school to the actual problems of life.

Other matters of importance regarding pamphlets in preparation, fields as yet inadequately covered, extension to the grade school level, the use of sound and pictures, etc., were discussed. Mr. Gulick asked those present to consider themselves "Advisory Correspondents" on whom the Committee may count for suggestions, and I am sure the Committee will gladly receive suggestions from whomsoever will write.

The three most recent pamphlets are Number 51, *Read Your Labels*, by Helen Dallas and Maxine Enlow (do you know the Four Ways to Protect Yourself?); Number 52, *How Shall We Pay for Defense?* Maxwell S. Stewart (do you know How?); and Number 53, *What It Takes to Make Good In College*, by Samuel H. Hamilton, based on the recent study by Hugh Hartshorne and others, *From School to College*. Certainly it should be read by every parent who expects to send a child to college. I should think every university would put a copy in the hands of every entering freshman. It probably could be done for 5¢ or less per student if the colleges would order 300,000 copies—about the number who enter each year.

These pamphlets are all prepared from authoritative sources (as are all P.A.P.'s) and have bibliographies for further reading. The price is still 10 cents each with a substantial reduction for orders in quantity. Public Affairs Committee, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York.—R.B.

**The Russell Sage Foundation** announces the election to its Board of Trustees of two additional members, Robert M. MacIver and Dave H. Morris, Jr. Sociologists know fairly well who MacIver is. Mr. Morris is the son of the former United States Ambassador to Belgium, vice-president of the Bank of New York, president of Browning School, treasurer of Brierley School, and trustee and director of a number of financial institutions. He is a graduate of Harvard University.

**The Southern Sociological Society** held its sixth annual meeting on April 4th and 5th, at Atlanta, Georgia, with headquarters at the Miami Biltmore Hotel. The Society now has a membership of 250.

The program was organized under the following sections: Public Welfare and Social Work, Teaching of Sociology, Race and Culture, The Community, Population, and Social Research. In addition there was a general session on the evening of April 4th.

**Spanish and Portuguese, Institute for Intensive Training in.** See *Portuguese and Spanish*, above.

**The Commission on Teacher Education** is publishing *The Newsletter* which gives an up to date account of its own activities and publications and those of other agencies which are of interest to educators. *The Newsletter* may be had free by addressing The Commission on Teacher Education, 744 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington, D. C.

The General Education Board has appropriated \$125,000 to continue the work of the commission through the academic year 1942-43.

The Commission recently has issued (Jan. 1941) *A Functional Program of Teacher Education as Developed at Syracuse University*, 260 pages, paperbound, \$1.25.

**Twentieth Century Fund** has inaugurated a plan for distributing its publications at a 25 percent discount from the already low cost of its nonprofit printing and handling policy. Many libraries, organizations, and individuals are already taking advantage of it. One simply becomes a Standing Order Member. He receives each publication as it is issued; (he may also get older publications at the 25 percent discount); if he does not want it, he returns it; at the end of the year, he pays for what he has kept at the special discount rates. In addition, he receives certain supplementary materials free, such as the news releases (and these are fairly frequent and highly informative); occasional Public Affairs Pamphlets, Public Policy Bulletins,



and other materials. The average annual cost of all the Fund publications would be about ten dollars less discount, if one kept them all, but one is under no obligation to keep any particular publication. The great advantage is the lowered cost, greater convenience, and free materials. If the Fund can build up a large "backlog" of initial orders, the cost of manufacture will be reduced and these savings will be returned to the Standing Order Members in the form of lower average costs. There is no fee for joining and one may cancel at any time. Those interested should write the Twentieth Century Fund, 330 West 42d Street, New York.

Some current and forthcoming surveys deal with housing, labor and defense, government and the electric power industry, shortselling, and collective bargaining. In a preliminary report (News Release of Jan. 20, 1941, which Standing Order Members get free) of the Committee on Labor and Defense, which is making an extensive study under the direction of Lloyd G. Reynolds of Johns Hopkins, it is stated that compulsory arbitration is unworkable in a democracy, but that voluntary mediation is successful in more than 90 percent of the cases. In 1938-39, the U. S. Conciliation Service settled all but 146 of the 1678 cases in which it intervened; the New York Mediation Board settled all but 30 of the 310 it dealt with during 1939. The Committee states that industrial peace is more often found in unionized than in non-unionized industries and that the greater the experience with collective bargaining in such industries, the greater the industrial peace. It believes there will be more strikes in defense industries over union recognition than over hours, wages, or conditions. Unions can and do compromise on the latter, but they cannot compromise on the question of recognition. This seems simple enough. One would think employers could see it.—R.B.

**United States Department of State.** Eighty-five students, teachers and professional men and women from Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia attended the special six-weeks' winter session of the University of North Carolina, organized for South Americans. This is the first time that a United States' university has given courses of specific interest to persons from the other American republics. They came first to Washington, D. C., where they spent a day sight-seeing; they were welcomed to the United States by Sumner Welles on behalf of the State Department.

In the December issue, I stated that sociologists seemed to have been overlooked by the State Department in its Inter-American Cultural Relations program. W. Rex Crawford informs me I was in error, since he has been appointed to one of the exchange professorships. (His name was not in the State Department release I used, nor have I seen it in any subsequent bulletins.) He left for Chile on February 14 where he will give courses on Contemporary Social Theory. This (and the students who went to North Carolina where they are almost certain to get some sociological teaching) is something, but it is not enough. There should be at least one sociologist sent to every Latin American country every year for the next generation, and we should receive one in return from each of those countries. Perhaps sociology is best fitted of all the sciences to promote the kind of inter-cultural relations with which the State Department primarily should be concerned—the mutual understanding and appreciation of all aspects of life.

Of the eighteen students given travel grants as of November 1940, none were sociologists. Of the three professors who are coming this year, one, Sr. Fernando Romero, is alleged to be a sociologist, but the description of his work sounds like folklore and literature to me. He is primarily a naval officer. I wonder if our State Department knows what sociology is?—R.B.

#### NEWS FROM COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

**Colgate University.** Despite the bombings of London, Allen & Unwin issued on October 10, 1940, an English edition of Norman E. Himes' *Practical Birth Control Methods*, revised by Dr. Margaret Jackson, M.D. Allen and Unwin have also gone to press with an English edition of Himes' *Your Marriage*, published here last year by Farrar & Rinehart. The English revision is by Mrs. Lella Sargent Florence, author of *Birth Control on Trial*, and wife of Professor Sargent Florence, economist at the University of Birmingham.

**Cornell University.** For eight weeks during the summer of 1941 there will be offered under the sponsorship of the American Council of Learned Societies, intensive instruction in the Chinese and Japanese languages, as follows: (1) *Chinese* for beginners; (2) *Advanced Chinese*,



with particular emphasis on technical linguistic phenomena; and (3) *Japanese* for those with some knowledge of Chinese.

George A. Kennedy, of Yale University, will be in charge of the work in Chinese, and Edwin O. Reischauer, of Harvard University, of that in Japanese.

The total cost of attendance, including tuition, lodging, board, and registration fees, will be about \$150 for the eight weeks. Some scholarship assistance will be available.

For particulars, address Mortimer Graves, Administrative Secretary, American Council of Learned Societies, 907 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., or Knight Biggerstaff, M-211 Boardman Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

**Fisk University.** E. B. Reuter of the University of Iowa will represent the American Sociological Society at the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the founding of the University. These meetings will be held April 29-May 4, 1941. All friends of Fisk are invited to attend.

**Harvard University.** Charles P. Loomis, of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, is giving two courses, Social Organization, and Population Problems, during the second semester. During the summer session, James Ford, Sheldon Glueck, and Carle C. Zimmerman of this department, and Fred C. Frey, of Louisiana State University, will give courses.

P. A. Sorokin is delivering a course of eight lectures at the Lowell Institute in Boston on "Twilight of Sensate Culture, or Contemporary Social and Cultural Crisis." Mr. Sorokin's fourth volume of *Social and Cultural Dynamics* is in press and is expected to be out before May.

Carle C. Zimmerman's monograph, *Siam: Rural Economic Survey*, Bangkok, 1931, has been published in a Siamese translation by the Royal Siamese Department of Education for use as a social science text in Siamese colleges and universities.

**Hofstra College,** Hempstead, New York. The T. Y. Crowell Company announces the publication of *Introduction to Politics*, edited by R. V. Peel and Joseph S. Roucek. This text develops the thesis that politics is fundamentally the quest for power. The sociological, economic, political, legalistic, and educational aspects of this thesis are developed.

**University of Kansas City.** Under the auspices of the University, directed by Clarence Senior, an Institute on Inter-American Relations and the Midwest was held January 10-12, inclusive, 1941. Many well known North and South American scholars, officials, educators, and publicists participated. An exhibition of paintings, etchings, woodcuts and photographs by leading Latin American artists was held in connection with the Institute. A well selected bibliography was printed on the program, which probably can be obtained by addressing the Director, Clarence Senior. Mr. Senior has recently inaugurated a course in Contemporary Mexican Civilization, which was demanded by the increasing interest in Latin American relations. The Institute was a marked success and may become an annual event.

Those interested in Mexican culture and particularly in the development of cooperation, should read the item on the Laguna conference above.—R.B.

**Louisiana State University.** Warren S. Thompson, director of the Scripps Foundation for Research in Population, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, is teaching this semester as part of the General Education Board's program for training teachers and researchers in the field of population.

**Miami University, Scripps Foundation.** Field work will be started in Indianapolis shortly on a study of the social and psychological factors affecting fertility. It is planned to obtain detailed interviews from over 1200 native white Protestant couples married 10-12 years, with the idea of throwing light on the reasons why some have no children while others have four or more. In addition, an attempt will be made to ascertain how size of family would be affected by certain measures which might be included in a national population program. The study is being financed by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation to the Milbank Memorial Fund. Plans for the study have been prepared during the last two years. Preliminary forms of the schedules were tested last summer in Hamilton, Ohio, and Trenton, New Jersey.

Members of the Committee conducting the study are: Lowell J. Reed, Chairman, Daniel Katz, E. Lowell Kelly, Clyde V. Kiser, Frank Lorimer, Frank W. Notestein, Frederick Os-

born, S. A. Switzer, Warren S. Thompson, and P. K. Whelpton. The last mentioned has been appointed director of field work.

Mrs. Martha Sampson Herrick has been assisting in the preliminary field testing and organization for the above study. She is a candidate for the Ph.D. degree, majoring in clinical psychology at Purdue University and was an assistant instructor in psychology at Purdue prior to joining this study.

Warren S. Thompson, director of the Foundation, is at Louisiana State University this semester offering courses in population problems as part of the program arranged by the General Education Board for promoting the training of teachers and research workers in the field of population. Several fellowships for attending the University during this semester have been granted by the Board.

P. K. Whelpton has been appointed a member of an Advisory Committee for the Division of Vital Statistics, Bureau of the Census. The function of the Committee is to draw together for the Chief of the Division the views of medical men, research agencies, public health officers, and scientific societies.

**University of Minnesota.** Raymond F. Sletto is on a six-months' leave of absence to work in the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare under the direction of Carl C. Taylor.

**New York University** is offering again its annual Social Science Field Laboratory fellowships. The work of the laboratory will be conducted in northern California during the summer of 1941. Eight fellowships will be granted to graduate students and accredited seniors from any branch of the social sciences and from any university (nine points of credit). Provides an opportunity to receive practical experience and training in social research and to participate in a long-term research project. The results, which may be used as theses or dissertations, are to be published in a series. For further information see, "A Social Science Field Laboratory," *American Sociological Review*, February 1941.

Communications should be addressed to B. W. Aginsky, Director, Social Science Field Laboratory, New York University, New York City.

Alfred McClung Lee has been elected treasurer, a member of the board of directors, and chairman of the editorial committee of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Inc., 211 Fourth Avenue, New York. At New York University, Mr. Lee is offering a new course this year in public relations and propaganda techniques.

**Northwestern University.** A. J. Todd has recently completed the final volume, *Recommendations and Summary*, of the Chicago Recreation Survey, the five volumes of which, published by the Chicago Recreation Commission, have attracted wide attention as probably the most thorough analysis of the recreational facilities and activities of a metropolis.

The completion of the task under the supervision of Todd, Byron, and Vierow was signalized by a dinner attended by other participants in the survey, members of the Recreation Commission and many leading citizens of Chicago.

**Peabody College.** Marion B. Smith of Louisiana State University will be visiting professor of sociology during the summer quarter.

H. C. Brearley informs us that the reports of the Mass-Observation group on the first year of the war have been deposited in the British Library at Rockefeller Center, New York, and in the library of the University of Chicago. Mr. Tom Harrison, one of the organizers of Mass-Observation (which is briefly described in an article by Brearley in *Sociology and Social Research*, July-August 1940, 503-510) writes Brearley that these reports of war experiences, air raids, etc., were collected with the idea that "for the first time, historians and social scientists will have a detailed, authentic record of the effects of war on the population." Doubtless some scholars in and around Chicago and New York will want to examine these records, which may be valuable research materials.—R. B.

**University of Washington.** The *Newsletter Bulletin* for January 1941 contains a very interesting analysis of the income and expenditures of the university. This material is presented in the best pictographic style of Calvin F. Schmid. In the December, 1940, issue, Schmid shows

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that the University of Washington ranks sixth in enrollment among state universities (ninth among all universities) and ranks fourth in proportion of population enrolled in institutions of higher learning (Utah, California, and New York are the highest; New Jersey, Arkansas, and Delaware, the lowest).

This is a very interesting and informative "House Organ." I wonder how many colleges have them? They seem more sensible than the old gossip, name-printing, athletics-oriented alumni bulletins.—R. B.

**Western Reserve University.** Dean James E. Cutler, of the School of Applied Social Sciences, was recently awarded a Distinguished Service Certificate by the Community Fund of Cleveland for his development of "the highest type of graduate education for the profession of social service." Those who are familiar with the training in the various fields of social work which has been developed in the School of Applied Social Sciences at Western Reserve and his numerous personal friends join in felicitating Dean Cutler upon his reception of this award from one of the best organized and effective Community Funds in the country.—R. B.

**University of Wisconsin.** William Fuson has gone to the University of Mississippi, Oxford, Mississippi, for this semester as instructor.

William L. Kolb has received a similar semester appointment at Oklahoma A. & M. College, Stillwater, Oklahoma.

Melvin Brooks has been appointed assistant professor in the rural sociology department of Texas A. & M. College, College Station, Texas.

E. A. Ross has just completed his twenty-seventh book and has gone to Florida for a rest, stating that he will do "no more writing of any kind—for two or three months."

**University of Wyoming.** An Institute for Intensive Training in Spanish and Portuguese will be held here June 23 till August 22, 1941. For further information, see the item under *Portuguese and Spanish* in Announcements and Meetings above.

**Yale University.** The *Bulletin* of the Associates in the S. of S. for January 1941 contains some interesting remarks and questions occasioned by the preliminary releases of the 1940 Census. The writer is especially concerned with what may happen when there are more women than men as may well happen by 1945. He mentions many things, but not polygyny which would seem a logical solution and ought to be a not unfamiliar idea to all students of the anthroposociologico-science which is alleged by some still to flourish at Yale in Sumnerian splendor. (Perhaps Yale will admit women after 1945.)

There is a very nice little essay on "Why Study Sociology?" which all should read who are seriously concerned about the "practical" value of sociology. Sociology as a means of "making a good living" is pretty much a frost and, for 95 percent of the students who "take it," will always be so—I hope; it should be an invaluable aid to "living a good life," and I hope this highly "practical" aspect of it always will be the major emphasis in undergraduate work. (These are Binal remarks—not the conclusions of the Mr. Anonymous of the *Bulletin*—though his bias seems to be similar.)

During the fall semester, the Sociology Club heard two distinguished men. Frank H. Hankins spoke on "The Japanese Population Problem and Cultural Determinism." John Collier spoke on "The Indian and the Indian Affairs of the United States."—R. B.

## OBITUARY NOTICES

GEORGE E. VINCENT (1864-1941)

With the death of **George Edgar Vincent**<sup>1</sup> on February 2, there ended one of the most brilliant and influential careers in the sphere of education and philanthropy

<sup>1</sup> This notice was written by Mr. Lichtenberger in the wilds of Arizona where he had no access to data except the little I could send him. He hesitated to undertake the task under the circumstances, but knowing that there was a deadline, he met it with this very eloquent appreciation of the life and work of one of the earliest sociologists and one of the first men to become sociology's friend and advocate in high places. A volume could and should be written on the career of George E. Vincent, but this brief notice must serve to express the admiration and respect of all who knew his work and the deep sense of personal loss sustained by all who knew him personally.—R.B.

in the social history of America. It is given to but few men to have left such a record of achievement in so wide a range of social activities.

First of all was his contribution to the development of the then new science of sociology. He was a pioneer in this subject and throughout his life he never ceased to regard himself as belonging to this fraternity. He was a charter member of the Society and a constant member till his death. There was an interval, however, in which he devoted his energies to another service. Soon after graduating from Yale in 1885, he identified himself with the Chautauqua movement in which he was reared and of which his father, the late Bishop (Methodist) John Heyl Vincent, was the chief founder and promoter. Young Vincent became successively literary editor of the Chautauqua Press, vice principal, principal, and president of the Chautauqua Institution. Through programs, lectures, publications, and administrative leadership, he made Chautauqua one of the outstanding contributions to American culture.

Intellectually eager and able, he felt the need for more thorough academic training, so in the fall of 1892 he became a fellow in sociology at the University of Chicago, acquiring his doctorate in that subject in 1896. He remained on the staff and advanced through the ranks to a full professorship in 1904. It was under the inspiration and guidance of Albion W. Small, whom he always regarded as one of the greatest teachers in America, that he acquired his reputation as a scholar in this field. He published jointly with Small, while he was still a graduate student, *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, which, if it did not prove to be a classic in the light of later developments in the subject, nevertheless had the merit of being the first textbook in sociology in an American university, and set the pace for future achievements. In 1896, he published independently his own study *Social Mind and Education*, a pioneer work in this field. Perhaps it should be said that his greatest contribution to sociology was not so much in his writings as in his popularization of the sociological point of view both in the classroom and in public address, a service much needed at the time. From 1900 to 1907, he served as dean of the Junior College and of the faculties of Arts, Literature, and Science, an experience which proved valuable in his future career.

Upon the retirement of President Northrup, of the University of Minnesota in 1911, Vincent was called to succeed him. Here his executive and administrative abilities had wide scope and a period of expansion of the University's activities ensued, including the establishment of the Mayo Foundation of Medical Research. Probably the strong sociology department for which Minnesota is still noted is due, at least partially to the sociological interest of President Vincent.

In 1917, in the midst of the World War, Vincent resigned to become the executive head of the Rockefeller Foundation to which he devoted twelve years of the most vigorous and brilliant period of his career. This was the decade, during his tenure of office, of the greatest expansion of the Foundation in the work of medical research in this country and throughout the world. The great Union Medical College and Hospital in Peking is a good example of the assistance rendered to other countries abroad. During Vincent's administration, John D. Rockefeller enlarged the endowment of the Foundation with an additional gift of \$50,000,000 in order that Vincent still further might enlarge the scope of its worldwide medical activities in its battle against misery, pestilence, and disease. Large contributions were made by the Foundation to many universities for the expansion and improvement of their medical equipment and training. No one outside the medical profession, if indeed within it, has made a greater contribution to the development of the public health services in the United States than George E. Vincent through the wise expenditures of the Foundation's funds in this sphere. When the history of the Rockefeller

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Foundation is written, one of the most important chapters of it will read almost like a biography of this period of Vincent's life.

Dr. Vincent, son of Bishop John H. and Elizabeth D. Vincent was born in Rockford, Illinois, on March 21, 1864. Prior to his entering Yale, he attended the public schools in Plainfield and the Pingry Academy of Elizabeth, New Jersey, where he spent much of his youth. During his conspicuous career, he received many public honors, among which was the LL.D. degree from the universities of Chicago, Yale, Michigan, and Minnesota. He served on several public institutional boards and his advice and counsel was sought by many public service organizations. He was a past president of the American Sociological Society, the one learned society in which he maintained his active membership throughout his entire life.

Possessed of a brilliant intellect, a rapid and vivid flow of language, an affable and charming personality, a keen sense of humor, and a broad and sympathetic outlook on world affairs, he was sought after as a public speaker and lecturer through the entire country. By many, he was regarded as the most entertaining and fascinating after-dinner speaker in America.

J. P. LICHTENBERGER

*University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus.*

ULYSSES GRANT WEATHERLY (1865-1940)

*Ulysses Grant Weatherly*, whose death occurred in Cortland, New York, on July 18, 1940, was a contemporary of Small, Blackmar, Giddings, Ross, Cooley, and Thomas, although he did not get into the teaching of sociology until a few years after they did. He was born in West Newton, Indiana, April 2, 1865, and practically all of his professional career was pursued in Indiana. He received an A.B. degree from Colgate University in 1890 and, after some study in Heidelberg and Leipzig, received a Ph.D. degree from Cornell University in 1894. He taught for one year in Central High School, Philadelphia, and was then appointed assistant professor of history in Indiana University in 1895. He continued in that position, with promotion to the rank of associate professor, until 1899, when he was made head of the department of Economics and Social Science in Indiana University. In preparation for this work he spent a part of the year in study at Columbia University. He had been preceded from 1888 to 1899 by teachers of sociology in Indiana University all of whom became recognized as important sociologists or economists: Jeremiah W. Jenks, E. A. Ross, John R. Commons, Frank A. Fetter, and E. L. Bogart. In his early years, Weatherly taught courses in General Sociology, Anthropology, Criminology, Charities, and Race Relations. During those years, he formed contacts with the social agencies of Indiana and took an active part in the state conferences of social work. During several summers, he taught in the universities of Colorado, Illinois, Oregon, Cornell, and Columbia. He remained head of the department of Economics and Sociology until 1935, when he retired to Cortland, New York. There he spent much time reading in the library of Cornell University which was located not far away.

Weatherly was a charter member of the American Sociological Society when it was organized in 1905; he was a member of the executive committee from 1907 to 1910, vice-president from 1920 to 1923, and president in 1923-24. He was the author of *Social Progress* (Lippincott, 1926) and of many journal articles. He spent several months one year touring the West Indies with Robert E. Park, studying race relations, and wrote two journal articles on race relations in Hayti. He was kept occupied in teaching undergraduate students and made a significant success of this, for he was regarded by his students as a very stimulating and enlightening teacher.

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND

*Indiana University*

ROBERT EMMET CHADDOCK (1879-1940)

**Robert Emmet Chaddock**<sup>1</sup> devoted almost the entirety of his academic life to the service of Columbia University. He entered Columbia as a graduate student in 1905, and, except for two years in which he taught at the University of Pennsylvania, was constantly associated with Columbia until his death in 1940. Thousands of students and colleagues will always hold him in grateful memory for his fine critical intelligence, his broad interest in human welfare, and his ever considerate and kindly manner.

Many distinctions came to him in his long career. He was Secretary of the American Statistical Association from 1917 to 1924 and was President in 1925. He was a member of the Joint Advisory Committee to the Director of the Census from 1925 until his death; he was elected Chairman in 1937. He was a member of the International Statistical Institute. He was a delegate from the United States, representing the Social Science Research Council at an international conference for the scientific study of population problems. He was on the advisory council of the Milbank Memorial Fund and a member of the American Public Health Association. He was long a member of the American Sociological Society and was one of the founders of the Population Association of America. In 1922, he was made professor of sociology and statistics at Columbia, and in 1940, he was appointed chairman of his department. In 1929, his *Alma Mater*, Wooster College, Ohio, bestowed upon him an honorary LL.D.

His contributions to learning and his public services were many and varied. In his scientific work, he cultivated chiefly the field of population. He was the author of a text on statistics which is a model of simple and lucid exposition. He served as consultant to countless agencies and government authorities and was a member of many committees.

Robert Emmet Chaddock was born in Minerva, Ohio, on April 16, 1879. He died at his home in New York City on October 21, 1940.

WILLARD WALLER

#### *Columbia University*

<sup>1</sup> His principal publications were: *Principles and Methods of Statistics*, New York, 1925; *Safety Fund Banking in New York State*, Aldrich Monetary Report, 1909; *Statistical Sources for Demographic Studies of Greater New York*, 1920; (with others) in 1922; *Population of New York, 1890 to 1930* (with others) 1932; he also was a frequent contributor to the scholarly journals in his field and a participant on the programs of the learned societies of which he was a member.

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# BOOK REVIEWS

## BOOK REVIEW EDITORS

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University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin

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*Human Nature and the Social Order*. By E. L. THORNDIKE. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. Pp. xx+1019. \$4.00.

Professor Thorndike's new book is a very bulky one. It might be said to be the kind of book which is the privilege of an elder statesman of his subject to publish. It is not a research monograph, nor a textbook, nor even a system of theory. It contains rather his mature comments on the nature and general bearings of his field, and on a whole range of its possible application to social welfare. Not more than a third of it could be called in any

sense "psychology" as a technical discipline. The rest is comment on a whole series of subjects of social significance in which inferences from and applications of the psychological material are interwoven with common sense and a certain amount of material from the more strictly social sciences, of varying degrees of technicality and rigor. This includes long discussions of scientific ethics, of welfare and its conditions, of economic and political subjects, and of law.

Since the book is itself a kind of stock-taking of the more general fruits of a long and eminent career, it may be appropriate for the reviewer in a sociological journal to be concerned principally with the relation of the kind of psychology which Thorndike represents to the social sciences and sociology in particular. The present book is all the more suitable an occasion for this in that Thorndike is anything but the sectarian dogmatist of a "school." He is rather an eminently liberal and catholic-minded scholar.

In comparing the earlier and the later parts of the book the reader is struck by a certain looseness in their relations. This is by no means to say that the light Thorndike is able to throw on social problems from the results of psychological investigation that he summarizes is negligible—far from it. These results are, however, rather in the nature of quite general considerations which set limits of variation and define necessary conditions of social phenomena. Two contexts stand out as most important. One is the general consideration that responses followed by a satisfying result tend to be confirmed, even though this result is not biologically inherent but is deliberately or culturally associated with it. The other is the general application of our knowledge of genetics to the conditions of social phenomena, including especially our knowledge of the genetic basis of the differentiation of human abilities. Thorndike's discussion of these problems is admirably well-balanced, undogmatic, and convincing.

When we turn to the social side of his material a notable fact is the closeness with which he adheres to a kind of common-sense level. It is a refined and sophisticated common sense, but none the less tends on the whole to avoid the more technical aspects (such as they are) of especially economic, anthropological, and sociological work. Where authors from these fields are quoted it is generally in terms of their riper empirical wisdom as to the phenomena of their fields rather than their technical conceptual schemes—either that, or particular empirical points. When we put the two together we miss a close logical articulation of the psychological theory with sharply formulated generalized aspects of the social phenomena.

In his more definitely psychological discussions Thorndike tends to come as closely as possible to a biological level, although he is by no means the kind of behaviorist who spurns the assistance of "subjective categories" wherever they promise to be helpful for the purpose in hand. But in the chapter which should logically constitute the center of his more technical scheme, that on "Mental Dynamics," he clearly aims to reduce as much of psychology to neurology and physiology as possible. It is surely a matter of great regret to him that so little of his discussion is actually circumstantially physiological.



There is relatively little evidence in the book of awareness that on a rather different level the social sciences have been undergoing a technical development of considerable proportions. His attitude toward economics is perhaps symptomatic. In a general way he can be said to accept the main lines of the conceptual scheme of economic theory, but he uses it loosely and generally, not rigorously and technically. At many points he succeeds admirably in correcting numerous errors which too facile generalizers, on grounds of economic theory alone, have so often fallen into. Part of this constitutes a rather direct application of his psychology, but perhaps more of it is the good sense of a well-balanced and experienced man. There is practically no attempt to supplement the economic with a comparably rigorous and generalized scheme for statement and analysis of the data necessary for economic analysis. On a different level somewhat the same is true of anthropology. He quotes such writers as Boas, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead on occasion, but seems to have little awareness of the emergence of a distinctive way of approaching and analyzing human behavior in a social system from the anthropological work of about a generation ago. Somewhat the same is true of his use of sociological writers. To take two of the most notable theorists: Durkheim is not mentioned at all, and although there are four references to Pareto's work, they are all to particular empirical points; none refer to his systematic conceptual scheme.

Perhaps the most general statement of the difficulty I feel is that there is lacking the underlying conception, and above all the systematic use, of a "generalized social system." On a biological level Thorndike is, as would be expected, well schooled in a "functional" mode of thinking. He is continually referring his facts to the functional needs of the organism. But perhaps partly because he is so strongly oriented to a biological level, in the social context he does not carry out the same kind of analysis in a systematic manner. He tends to treat social action or behavior theoretically, simply as constituting some among the many possible sorts of biologically possible responses, to some of which we are particularly strongly conditioned simply as a matter of fact. The performance of socially significant functions are regarded simply as manifestations of some of the many heterogeneous abilities to which much attention is devoted.

The result is the failure to treat the "social order" in terms of any systematically articulated and generalized conceptual scheme. Social structure in even a mildly rigorous sense is a concept notable for its absence. This is true both in general and in detail. Thorndike pays attention to the relative "goodness for good people" of various kinds of social systems without any adequate analysis of the functional equilibrium by virtue of which its conditions are maintained. Thus he has nothing to say about the peculiarities of American kinship structure and its place in the more general institutional system; he seems grossly to underestimate the importance of religious orientation and its institutional forms as a factor in variation of social structure.

The way in which this ignoring of the structure of a functioning system, of the way in which this defines the situation of people's actions and emo-

tional reactions, in which it involves strains and instabilities, can lead to gross errors of empirical judgment, is illustrated by one example. On page 523, at the close of a discussion of the distribution of wealth in its bearing on welfare, Thorndike says: "As the people of a community become abler and better they will probably become less disparate in income, but if they do or not, no harm will be done. Philanthropy need spend no more effort on the disparity of people's incomes than on the disparity of their toenails." So far as the factors he considers are concerned this is probably correct. But it ignores certain fundamental considerations. Income is a fundamental symbol of social status, particularly in our society where it is associated with degrees of success in a competitive struggle. As such it is a focus of all the powerful sentiments associated with recognition, self-respect, and the like. It can be one of the most important foci for jealousy, and other aggressive reactions. Under certain conditions the strains to which these things subject a society can surely, apart from questions of social justice, seriously endanger the stability of a social system, thereby endangering the conditions of the processes by which the members of a community may become "abler and better" in Thorndike's sense. There is much evidence that just these factors are playing an important part in the revolutionary processes going on today, which are not merely the work of "bad men."

But someone may say that these strictures are out of place in reviewing the work of a psychologist except that in discussing the "social order" he ought perhaps to be better informed about current social science. There is, however, an important bearing on psychology itself in its relations to social science. The relative looseness of the connection between Thorndike's psychology and his observations on the social order has already been remarked upon. But suppose Thorndike had started by carefully analyzing the kind of conception of a functioning social system which many anthropologists and some sociologists are now using quite systematically. It is unquestionable that this scheme is a scheme for analyzing the behavior of human individuals in society. On that level its user necessarily thinks in terms of their motives, sentiments, "reactions," knowledge, and the like. In short, in some sense it necessarily involves a "psychology," a "theory of human nature." Would the systematic development of this analysis inevitably lead one to Thorndike's psychology? The answer is unquestionably "No." There is, however, not merely a logical place and a need for psychology in connection with such analysis. Quite considerable advances have already been made toward supplying this need. But these have come from other sources. So far as they have been psychological they have been largely "clinical" in origin. Undoubtedly the most highly developed conceptual scheme in this field has been that of psychoanalysis. In its earlier phases this was not well articulated with theory on the social level, but recent work has made great progress in developing fruitful interrelations, notably in the recent works of Karen Horney and Kardiner.

Many of Thorndike's facts and observations are of great empirical importance to many sociological problems. The difference is that they are not capable of being combined with theory of the social level for the building of a single closely integrated system of theory. Perhaps some day the total

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system will be extended to include both kinds, but for the present they are simply "things which have to be taken account of," and remain relatively isolated empirical things, whatever their practical importance may be.

One important difference between the two different systems of analysis of psychology and the social order which I am attempting to contrast may be put as follows: Thorndike's whole scheme is, in essentials, an extension of biology. In relation to human behavior he tends to be interested in those behavioral phenomena and mechanisms in man which are closest to the general patterns of the higher organisms. Social life is treated as an extension of the evolutionary process in these terms. He is interested in its more general conditions and its evolutionary "level." In the other scheme the psychology is not so much biological as clinical. It starts with the attempt to analyze concrete behavior problems in a social setting. Moreover, its perspective has been comparative in that it tries to understand why one human individual, usually a "pathological case," behaves differently from others, rather than "why we behave like human beings." The genesis on the social level has been similar. Theory has started more from an attempt to diagnose leading features of the concrete social situation—Durkheim's use of suicide as a symptomatic index of the state of an "individualistic" society is an excellent example. From immediate diagnosis in this sense, it has been extended to a comparative perspective. The questions, not of what conditions underlie societies in general, but of what constitutes the range of variation in societies, have the focus of attention. The development of social anthropology has made fundamental contributions to this phase. Again, such theory has been concerned with the understanding of particular processes of change in the structure of a social system—from the business cycle to the Nazi revolution. In this field a great deal of illuminating functional analysis has already been successfully carried out. The coalescence of the psychological and sociological phases of this movement is a phenomenon of the first importance, undoubtedly destined to have a profound influence.

He would be a rash and dogmatic person who would say that one of these two bodies of knowledge was "right" and the other "wrong." To a very large extent they are simply different, concerned with different problems and utilizing different fields of fact. At some important points they are closely interrelated. Where this is true, great care must be taken in drawing empirical conclusions not to ignore considerations relevant to either. Thorndike is guilty of ignoring crucially important considerations in his views about the unimportance of the distribution of incomes. But it is quite possible for a sociologist in the other tradition to be equally careless in ignoring the relevance of genetic factors in the differentiation of abilities.

The main criticism of Thorndike's book, then, is that it should be entitled something like "One Kind of Approach to the Scientific Study of Human Nature and the Social Order."<sup>1</sup> In general terms it is, in the opinion of the

<sup>1</sup> Editorial note: We have recently witnessed one flagrant case of title-cribbing in Hutchin's *The Higher Learning in America*—Veblen's work has the same name. Here is another bland ignoring of *suum cuique*; Cooley's *Human Nature and the Social Order* is appropriated by a man who does not even mention Cooley in the index. Perhaps the explanation lies in Dr. Johnson's famous remark made when he defined "pastern" as "the knee of a horse."



reviewer, by a good deal the less fruitful and promising of the two discussed here. This judgment is ventured on two main grounds: First, it touches a smaller range of the problems of most direct interest in social science and in understanding and if possible controlling events in the critical problems of the day. Second, it shows far less sign of the development of a systematic generalized conceptual scheme which is directly applicable to the immediate facts of social behavior. The role of generalized theory in this sense, in what we feel are the more advanced sciences, should not be ignored.

TALCOTT PARSONS

*Harvard University*

*Contemporary Social Theory.* Ed. by HARRY ELMER BARNES, HOWARD BECKER, and FRANCES BENNETT BECKER. New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1940. Pp. xx+947. \$5.00.

It may be said at once that this is a useful and discouraging volume. It is useful for those students who wish to be informed in a convenient and generally authoritative fashion of recent theoretical developments in sociology and cognate fields. It is discouraging to those who seek systematic accounts of integrated theoretical analysis involving clearly stated postulates, unambiguous concepts, fruitful and feasible hypotheses, authenticated theorems, and compelling bases for scientific prediction. In these respects, the various essays are clearly uneven. Yet this may be conceived not as a failing of the editors but rather as an indictment of so much that currently passes as "theory" in the social sciences. To some, theory signifies a medley of speculative judgments or *ad hoc* classifications couched in technical terms but entailing no logical interrelations. For others, hypothetical reconstructions of concrete historical and prehistorical events constitute an exercise in theory. Fortunately, some of the contributors recognize that theory, in sociology as in all scientific disciplines, involves a *system* of logically compendious propositions with empirical referents and not merely a collection of unrelated *post facto* hypotheses or a fractionated account of discrete researches. If several of the essays fail conspicuously to recognize the nature of scientific theory, it is none the less true that the symposium as a whole marks a notable advance over its thirteen-year old precursor, Ogburn and Goldenweiser's *The Social Sciences*. Periodic inventories of this sort serve a useful purpose. They provide a convenient gauge of the developments in sociological theory; they may even point the way for research along lines which are at the time most promising.

No one reviewer can claim competence to deal with this robust symposium of twenty-three chapters and a bibliographical appendix by nineteen authors (including two of the editors); a volume, moreover, which ranges through a score of diverse fields related to sociology. Unavoidably, critical appraisals must be restricted to a few essays and to the organization of the volume as a whole. Inasmuch as this is manifestly more than a textbook, it deserves evaluation in terms of rigorous standards.

The symposium is so organized as to have strategic pedagogical value. An



initial exposition of "the sociological frame of reference" is followed by an account of the relations between the natural and social sciences. The four succeeding sections deal with theories of "environmental," biological, psychological, and cultural elements in society. The last and longest section deals with "some applications of sociological theory to the social sciences and public problems."

No single conception of the nature and functions of sociology as a discipline informs this volume. Thus, hard upon Parsons' repudiation of the encyclopedic pretensions of some sociologists, we learn from Barnes that "Sociology is the only social science which views and analyzes the social processes in a comprehensive fashion, attempting to discover, describe and evaluate the significance of the many geographic, biological, psychological, economic, political and cultural factors which operate to produce the institutions and activities of human society" (p. 647). Here the symposium reflects the current confusion in sociological theory; it is clear that the conception of sociology as a synthesizing discipline has not been fully displaced by the view of sociology as a special social science. Sociology as the egregious queen of the social sciences remains at least a constitutional if precarious monarch. Simmel and Znaniecki have apparently not yet succeeded in their campaign against sociological imperialism.

There is also some variation in the contributors' interpretation of the term "contemporary" social theory. Some explicitly limit their discussion to the last two or three decades; others, such as Goldenweiser (on anthropology) devote as much as a third of their essays to theoretical developments prior to this century.

The absence of a chapter on the nature of scientific theory is regrettable. It might well have afforded a bench-mark for the various symposiasts. Perhaps Eubank's account of "the conceptual approach to sociology" was intended to satisfy this need. If so, it is not sufficient to the occasion, whatever else it may achieve. It would be interesting to know what "the conceptual approach" denotes, inasmuch as all cognition and scientific inquiry admittedly involve concepts. Eubank speaks of "verifying" concepts. Curiously enough, "the conceptual approach is held to be coordinate with such 'approaches' as the historical, the descriptive, the institutional. There is room for clarification here since it would be granted, no doubt, that these latter 'approaches' do not eschew concepts. Eubank's chapter may be considered a plea for recognition of the fact that a science without an explicit conceptual outfit is blind.

At least two essays provide independent contributions to their subjects as well as critical summaries of research. Both, it is interesting to note, are avowedly indebted to the work of Max Weber. The first of these, Becker's analysis of the procedures and logic involved in the use of the "constructed type" (ideal type), is one of the most lucid and suggestive treatments of the subject known to the reviewer. Its particular value lies in the demonstration of the analytical uses of typological constructions and in its clear discussion of the relations between idiographic and nomothetic procedures. It is thus as useful to the historian as to the sociologist. Becker's otherwise

unimpeachable statement of the nature of sociological prediction includes at one point what appears to be a confusion between empirical extrapolation and scientific prediction. He decries the use of "elaborate pseudo-scientific diagrams and charts of the social structure of a small town" because these are awkward, cumbersome and above all, because they do not have as much predictive value as "the local editor and a few of his 'sources' could give." This assertion—*sans* the adjective "pseudo-scientific"—is not consistent with the rest of Becker's discussion. For if sheer prediction, irrespective of its basis, is the touchstone of scientific knowledge, then the empiricist who "knows" on the basis of unanalyzed experience that certain herbs are curative is to be preferred to the scientist who, often through complicated analyses, seeks the basis of its curative effects. On this road lies raw empiricism. Since Becker is clearly aware of the fallacy of uncritical empiricism, it is more than likely that he would not subscribe to this implication of his position.

The second independent contribution is Talcott Parsons' essay on "sociological elements in economics," an exposition and analysis of the several directions in which orthodox economics has been compelled to enlarge its purview by redefining as problematical much which was previously taken as data. These modifications are classified and systematically analyzed. Notably absent in this chapter is the surface, disjointed, quality which inheres in a purely "historical" résumé of developments in a field of theory. The relationships between theories which Parsons establishes are not, to be sure, divorced from their historical context, but the emphasis is on the logical linkages between the various theoretical constructions. This essay, a distillate of the author's *Structure of Social Action*, is a most cogent statement of the logical relations between economic and sociological theory. It deserves the industrious study required to appreciate its implications fully.

Barnes contributes four chapters—"the development of sociology"; a historical summary of physical anthropology; "the new history, archeology, and cultural evolution"; "sociological contributions to political thought"—and collaborates with J. P. Shalloo on "modern theories of criminology and penology." His distinctive "scattergraphic" presentations submerge analytical theory in a series of brisk, brief memoranda on previous research. Thus, in place of a systematic account of the theory in question, he will write: "Examples of such sociological classifications [of types of state-organization] are Comte's theocracy and sociocracy; Spencer's military and industrial states; Oppenheimer's predatory state and freeman's citizenship; and the efforts of Ross, Tarde, and others to found a classification upon the fundamental psychological characteristics prevailing in any form of political society." Such a characteristic pageant of terms and labels, which should keep its place in a humble footnote, can hardly be expected to provide much understanding of theoretical analysis. Barnes writes once again on "the new history" which, to say the least, seems anything but new on this retelling. Such compression as he achieves here is truly remarkable; over a span of pages he allots little more than a sentence to a volume. Often a paragraph suffices to summarize from one to five weighty volumes. It need

scarcely be said that if Barnes intended to produce an annotated bibliography he has been eminently successful. The collaborative chapter on criminology bears some of the marks of this bibliographical technique, but is conspicuously more thorough in its treatment of the subject. It is, in fact, one of the more valuable summaries of a special field of sociological interest.

Goldenweiser contributed three chapters of uneven quality. His account of "some contributions of psychoanalysis to the interpretation of social facts" is disappointing and its title is partly misleading. A generally sympathetic summary of the work of Freud and Jung (with briefer sketches of Adler and Rank) is not as detailed as other available and equally brief discussions. In dealing with the sociological implications of psychoanalysis, he treats the admittedly unacceptable work of Freud in most detail but fails to mention the basic contributions of Fromm, Horney, and Kardiner. His chapter on anthropology, however, is far more successful. It inevitably reflects the tensions and disagreements between the warring bands of specialists in this field, but his choice and critical analysis of problems evidences his thorough theoretical orientation. Distinctly serviceable to the American student is his chapter on the methodological views of Dilthey and Rickert.

Among the other critical summaries, two are outstanding for their thorough-going critical treatment. Howells' brief but replete account of "the physical determination of race" is especially noteworthy for its masterly compression of the most recent findings on the relation of blood-groups to race. Kimball Young and Douglas W. Oberdorfer, in their sixty-page account of social psychology, show singularly good judgment in selecting for extended discussion those works which represent basic departures, while at the same time providing adequate bibliographical citations of the potboiling researches which develop the implications of these theoretical departures. The authors' own clearly defined conceptions—e.g., the distinction between social and cultural conditioning—supply a framework for effective appraisals. There are but few gaps, although their account of the sociologically important theory of "levels of aspiration" is uncritical and neglects the more recent researches. This essay indicates the preponderantly verbalistic character of much which passes for social psychology. Thus, the list of terms referring to predispositions to action continues to grow although theoretically significant distinctions between them are largely absent. "Instincts" are supplanted by "prepotent reflexes"; McDougall transforms the word "instinct" into "the good old word 'propensity'" (without at all modifying the referent); while drives, impulses, and wishes, join the assembly. These are all hypothetical constructs referring to relatively constant elements in human conduct which have an organic base, but their predictive and analytical value is slight. The Young-Oberdorfer account also brings to light a problem which appears in several of the other fields: a dilemma with one horn involving accuracy (and reliability) at the expense of securing theoretically relevant data, with the other horn involving significance (and validity) at the expense of uncertain and vague data. Those concerned with "measurement" of social attitudes largely choose the first alternative; proponents of case-history and field-study methods select the second. The

dilemma may well be specious but it persists as a practical predicament.

A chapter by H. O. Dahlke suggests that the sociology of knowledge has now come of age. This essay is useful for its summary of Scheler's work in this field, although its style bears traumatic marks of translations from the German. It neglects almost completely the many recent researches in the sociology of science.

Authoritative and full accounts of their subjects are provided by Lundberg (statistics), Franklin Thomas (anthropogeography), Quinn (human ecology), Hankins (human biology), Becker (historical sociology), Seagle (jurisprudence), Klein (theory of social work), Roucek (education), and Melvin J. Williams (religion and ethics). The editors have appended selected references to most chapters and these are rounded out by an excellent bibliographical appendix by C. Wright Mills. There is a full table of contents and elaborate indexes of names and subjects.

This review was predestined to inadequacy, if only because of the variegated nature of the book in hand. It remains to be said, however, that this symposium takes its place as the most comprehensive handbook of recent social theory now available. Becker provides, in another connection of course, the most fitting evaluation of this work when he decries "the familiar dodge of the timid reviewer" who weakly concludes that "in spite of its shortcomings, this is a good book." *Ipsa dixit.*

ROBERT K. MERTON

*Tulane University*

*Personality and Problems of Adjustment.* By KIMBALL YOUNG. New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1940. Pp. x+868. \$4.25.

It has been traditional for the social scientist who turns technician to direct his attention to the remodeling of the social order and to ignore the problem of fitting the individual to the existing order. With a few exceptions, such as sociological concern over the criminal, this problem has been relegated to the psychopathologist. He, however, has been interested only in the end products of social disorganization, the critical and the generally hopeless cases. The mild or incipient cases have been left to lay practitioner and charlatan. The former, whether he be priest or kindly friend, wise parent or sympathetic teacher, has, no doubt, much to commend him. But the latter, with his specious advice on how to win friends and live alone and like it, unquestionably causes more problems than he solves.

In *Personality and Problems of Adjustment* Young has broken with the tradition of the social scientist and has taken on the problem of fitting the individual to the existing social order. The result is a practical discussion of the social origins of personal maladjustment. The book does not pretend to be, and is not, a contribution to our scientific heritage; the social psychologist will find nothing new in it. But the college student who is baffled by his personal inadequacies will find it to be a mine of relevant information and a corrective for the superstitious belief that his troubles are inherent and hence irresolvable.

Young is not the first to attempt to bring to bear upon the problems of



individual maladjustment the findings of psychology, social psychology, sociology, and anthropology. But previous attempts have generally either led straight into stratospheric abstractions or have quickly degenerated into the compilation of moralistic homilies in the name of mental hygiene. Young avoids both tendencies, and the book succeeds in being at once earthy and amoral. It presents such relevant scientific evidences as are now available and leaves all application of them to the reader.

The first third of the book demonstrates the cultural origins of normative behavior and prepares the ground for a social interpretation of individual deviants therefrom. There are chapters on the psycho-biological bases of behavior, the learning process, and the culturally determined character of most learning situations. In a chapter on language behavior and two on the genesis of personality, Mead's concept of the self is heavily stressed. The first third of the book concludes with discussions of the study and measurement of personality.

The preliminary work done, Young settles to his task and for the next four hundred pages details the various ways in which our disorganized society either fails to prepare or else malprepares the individual for social membership. Although there is a constant tone and color to the discussion, no perceivable thread runs through it. The work has, as a result, somewhat the character of a handbook. There are chapters for the puzzled parent, the distressed adolescent, the prospective husband or wife, the person who is contemplating divorce, etc. Two chapters, "Pupil Adjustment to the Learning Process in School" and "Teacher-Pupil and Teacher-Community Relations," appear to be directed toward enlightening educators rather than toward assisting the maladjusted pupil or teacher. In some instances the author's preoccupation with detailed research data precludes adequate consideration of major issues. Thus the chapter on occupational adjustment devotes so much space to such matters as the role of fatigue and monotony in industry and problems of employer-employee relationship that the more vital aspects of occupational adjustment are obscured. Largely ignored, for example, is the subject of the induction of the individual into the special mores—the particular way of life—of the occupational group.

The last two chapters of the book are in somewhat speculative vein. The first discusses the adjustment values of religion, art, and the avocations. The second raises the question of whether a fixed (i.e., totalitarian) social system or a flexible (i.e., democratic) one is more capable of providing the individual with the adjustment patterns necessary to effective and frictionless collective life. In neither of these chapters is there the slightest tendency to dogmatize. But it is doubtful that they will further the purpose of the book—that of providing the reader with a factual basis for his trial-and-error fumbings toward a better adjustment to the world about him.

In addition to an imposing bibliography and excellent indexes of names and subjects, there is a carefully worked out and detailed guide for the writing of a case history.

RICHARD T. LAPIERE

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LIBRARIES

*Chart for Happiness.* By HORNELL HART. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. xi+198. \$2.00.

Rarely is a reviewer confronted with such a strange book, or more accurately, a mixture of *two* books. Professor Hart has undertaken to write both for troubled laymen and for professional men on the subject of happiness. As a sociologist the reviewer is somewhat more troubled than comforted by the shotgun marriage of science and sentimentality. Yet on reflection the volume acquires a certain significance as a document symbolic of the history of American sociology. From broad generalizations, social Christianity, hortatory humanitarianism, reformist fervor, and applied social psychology of the Dale Carnegie variety, the book marches on to Euphor units, standard deviations, and the supreme modernity of operational definitions.

There is danger, of course, of being unfair to both books, just as one might be unfair to both beefsteak and ice cream if they were stirred up together. The book for the layman is a vigorous, well-written, practical sociological pep-talk, doubtless helpful for those it can help. Many sensible things are said concerning adjustment to work, play, love, and home, with comments on health, success, social attitudes, and the thrilling potentialities of happy living thrown in for good measure. The argument is backed by scraps of evidence from a program of happiness measurement.

Certainly one must respect the boldness of Hart's attack in the more scientific book upon a significant, yet correspondingly difficult, scientific problem. Yet the Long-Run Euphorimeter seems over-simple for the measurement of hedonic subtleties. It consists merely of a rating scale dealing with energy, one concerning life change, and simple questions concerning worry, happiness, suicide, evenness of temperament, and guilt feelings.

The At-the-Moment Euphorimeter consists merely of synonyms and antonyms of the word happiness to be crossed out or underlined in order to express mood states. From a balance of happy and unhappy responses on this test a rational zero point for the Euphorimeter scale was derived. The adjective quotient scores (ratios of happy and unhappy responses) were converted into units on a happiness scale ranging from -400 to +400 by multiplying the happiness quotients by 400. The average score on this scale is about 100, thus showing the usual clustering of scores at the happiness end of a hedonic scale. Over 2,200 persons were given the Long-Run Euphorimeter tests as well as the adjective battery. The items on the former were so weighted that on the average zero points and scores of 100 coincided. The Long-Run Euphorimeter was thus calibrated against the adjective battery or At-the-Moment Euphorimeter. A Euphor-unit is defined as one-hundredth of the difference between the zero point and the average happiness score on the adjective battery. Happiness is "operationally" defined as the mental state associated with the statement "I am happy" and with that state of mind (way of life) which one seeks to maintain.

A reliability of .82 by the split half method is claimed for the adjective battery. Validity for the instruments is alleged by virtue of plausible group differences in scores. Certain unqualified interpretations seem a bit naïve, as for example, the discovery of relation between reports of energy and

Euphorimeter scores. On the Long-Run Euphorimeter tests one collects 200 Euphor units merely by asserting that he is "brimming over with vigor and vim."

The equipment of instruments is completed by a Diagnostic Euphorimeter which isolates scores on recreation, work, love-life, home, health, sense of success, mental harmony, economic status, and social attitudes. There is copious advice and exhortation for persons with low scores.

Many questions might be raised concerning the measurement process carried out by Hart and the validity of his instruments. One could wish that the publishers had offered Hart the same incentives to present details of statistical procedures that they offered to add to the long list of books on popular psychology. Perhaps a more detailed statement will be presented for scientific criticism.

The author has opened up an important line of research and has developed some ingenious devices. It is to be hoped that the genuine scientific contribution of the book will not be ignored by tough-minded readers who lack stomach for sentimentality.

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK

*University of Minnesota*

*The Integration of the Personality.* BY CARL G. JUNG. Translated from the German by Stanley M. Dell. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1939. Pp. 313. \$3.00.

This, the latest volume from the suggestive pen of Jung, sets the reader a laborious problem of deciding where poetic mysticism leaves off and empirical science sets in. It is primarily concerned with the psychological process of "individuation," the process whereby the two incongruous halves, the conscious and the unconscious, come to make up a whole, an individual. The deeper layers of the unconscious have an archetypal content, chief among which should be mentioned the *anima* and *animus*, the shadow and the "wise old man." The derivation of the first two concepts illustrates Jung's imaginative procedure. Since sex is determined by "a preponderance of male- or female-producing genes in the combined chromosomes," all men must have more or less latent female components, whereas the female of the species must incorporate male components. In this connection, we may note that elderly females acquire such masculine qualities as a mustache, "a rather acute and sometimes obstinate mind," and a deeper voice. After the necessary powers of observation have been developed, the enlightened and experienced observer will come to recognize the symptoms (which are often astonishing) of the "man in the woman" (the *animus*) and "the woman in the man" (the *anima*). The hypothesis of the *anima* has multiple uses; it enables us, for example, to understand how, through projection, the male may endow a real woman with all of the intriguing qualities which are actually part and parcel of the *anima*. Similarly, we may now account for the fact that no woman has ever presented an adequate literary portrayal of the *animus*, since the latter may actually write the woman's novels for her and thus slyly avoid its own picturization.

These strange creatures, the *anima* and *animus*, reside in the phylogenetic substructure of the mind, in the collective or racial unconscious. "The existence of these historical layers is presumably the source of the belief in reincarnation and in memories of past lives. As the body is a sort of museum of its phylogenetic history, so is the mind." Though unaware of this fact, a dreamer may encounter these unconscious collective representations. "One might indeed say, with reservations, that it is possible to write history from his unconscious contents just as well as from the texts that are objectively present."

The bulk of the book seeks to show "how the psyche behaves under the strain of the conflict" involved in the process of individuation, what is produced thereby in the individual, and its exemplification in the history of the human mind. The reader is warned that he may well be surprised by the large place assigned to alchemy and alchemical symbolism in the latter interpretation. Alchemy is an old hobby of Jung's and he was hard put to it to overcome the widespread prejudice against the "seeming absurdity of alchemy." The introduction of such considerations was unavoidable, however, since so many of Jung's cases involved distinct similarities to alchemical symbols. Thus, one of his patients experienced a recurrence of the number four, and before she could become a "whole individual" it was necessary that she perceive the significance of fourness. We should remember that four was sacred to the ancients (e.g., the Pythagorean tetractys and, the four directions of the weathervane); we must also note that four is the number of the basic directions of the basic psychological functions; that the quaternity in alchemy was expressed by four colors (and that these, with modern variations, were used in the patient's drawings); and we must not ignore the "curious *lusus naturae*" that carbon, with a valence of four, is the chief chemical component of an organic body. "The fact that spontaneous imagination makes such telling use of alchemistic symbolism is rather startling. . . ."

Full scope is afforded for this sort of interpretation in a lengthy chapter on the "dream symbols of the process of individuation" in which some sixty dreams, a sample of some four hundred dreamed by the same person within ten months, are analyzed.

Those interested in Jung's further evidence for that quasi-Lamarckian concept, the collective unconscious, the universal phylogenetic substructure of the mind which is the repository of archaic racial memories, must turn to this volume. It is scarcely *lese majesté*, however, to remain sceptical in the light of the evidence which the philosopher from Zurich presents in this collection of lectures.

ROBERT K. MERTON

*Tulane University*

*Homo Sum: Gedanken zu einer zusammenfassenden Anthropologie.* By LEOPOLD VON WIESE. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1940. Pp. ix + 148.

The point of the present crisis of the West which is in question is *man*, not mere political ideologies, economic institutions, and social creeds. An



ever-growing European literature on the question: What is man? starting some fifteen years ago, must be regarded both as a symptom and another evidence of it. Phenomenology and *Existentialphilosophie*, partly following in the footsteps of Søren Kierkegaard and his "dialectic theology," formed the spearhead of this movement, which includes not only theologians and philosophers, such as Haecker, Wust, Brunner, Heidegger, Ebner, Jaspers, etc., but also such noted sociologists as Groethuysen, Plessner, Scheler, and Sombart, now joined by Wiese in *Homo Sum*.

Unlike all other writers on the topic, Wiese does not want to present a philosophical anthropology, but rather a synthetic (*zusammenfassende*) theory of man—literally, a syn-opsis of the biological, philosophical, and sociological aspects of man. If man, he argues, is at the same time a physical, spiritual (rational), and social being, then an exclusively *geisteswissenschaftliche* anthropology will be just as unable to answer the question "What is man?" satisfactorily as biological or social anthropology. It is for the same reason that he regards this synthetic (but not encyclopedic) anthropology the summit rather than the basis of the individual sciences of man, forming the bridge from the exact sciences to metaphysics. Instead of presenting this anthropology systematically, Wiese contents himself with suggestions and questions regarding its scope, subject matter, and method of approach. Wherever he deals with systematics and methodology, he shows the same almost scrupulous caution which characterizes his sociological works. As soon, however, as he plunges into the midst of his topic, he becomes almost poetic and his writing stimulating and fascinating. But here, too, he prefers asking questions to answering them. All chapters on the "life and death of man," "body, soul, and spirit," "qualities and attitudes," "ideas, principles, and interests," "the philosophy of the personal pronouns," and "the search for God" are full of interrogation marks. Somehow the book seems to reflect the author's own struggle for light upon the final questions of man and life.

Here, as in his former works, Wiese refers frequently to American authors (Sumner, Sorokin, Becker-Barnes); Edgar Lee Masters' *Spoon River Anthology* inspired the second chapter of this courageous book.

FRANZ H. MUELLER

*College of St. Thomas*  
*St. Paul, Minn.*

*A Century of Social Thought*. A Duke University Centennial Publication. With a Preface by ROBERT S. RANKIN. Durham: Duke University Press, 1939. Pp. vi+172. \$2.00.

This book contains the series of lectures delivered at Duke University during 1938-1939 as a part of its centennial celebration, and is designed to review the cultural progress in selected fields of learning in the past one hundred years. Judd discusses the changing conceptions in educational theory and practice, and indicates the great potentialities opened up when the United States departed from the European pattern of a class education.

Harold G. Moulton traces the transformations that have occurred within the century both in economic conditions and economic thought. Henry Sloane Coffin reviews the field of religion and finds that "there is not enough conscience and goodwill to make proposed devices for economic and international fellowship succeed" (p. 87). John C. Merriam shows how science and belief may be made to work together in the shaping of views concerning the world and its purposes. Sorokin analyzes socio-cultural trends, and comes to the sad conclusion that a "physio-dirty" interpretation of man and culture "is rampant at the present time, in science, in philosophy, in art, ethics, everywhere" (p. 121). Mr. Robert Moses, the Park Commissioner for New York City, scrutinizes the concept of planning and the effects of planning on the growth of cities and states. And finally, Pound, in his review of American jurisprudence, gives his reasons for believing that "we are attaining a new measure of values, whether the jurists help in the process or not," and that nothing is gained by taking flight from this problem "in a doctrine of irreducible antinomies, or in skeptical realism, or in a relativist logicism . . . or in an analytical jurisprudence confined to the authoritative legal materials as they are" (p. 170).

The names of the distinguished lecturers attest sufficiently to the value of the book. It is unfortunate, however, that most of the papers read as if they were mere summaries of a larger work the lecturers had written or had in mind. Thus Sorokin's paper is a bare digest of his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. Pound's paper is a fortunate exception, and his "American Juristic Thinking in the Twentieth Century" is a model of its kind in succinct clarity.

J. RUMNEY

*University of Newark*

*The Development of Social Thought.* By EMORY S. BOGARDUS. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940. Pp. viii+564. \$3.50.

This is the third edition of this work, designed primarily for undergraduate college students. Although it has grown in precision with each new edition and has each time been brought up to date, it has never abandoned its simple, direct style, which brings it easily within the range of average college students. It combines the topical and the individual writer analysis methods very effectively. This last edition contains generous references to contemporary sociologists and their theories. Its scope is world-wide, beginning with primitive and oriental social thought and coming down to the immediate international present. The chief criticism is perhaps that so wide a range of treatment, within a medium-size book, does not leave adequate opportunity for the presentation of the social and philosophic backgrounds of the various theories expounded. This work is closer in content to Ellwood's *History of Social Philosophy* than to any other book, but it is less selective and brings the subject down later than the latter treatise.

L. L. BERNARD

*Washington University*

*Roots of Change.* By JOSEPH H. FICHTER, S.J. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939. Pp. xv+319. \$2.50.

In this collection of biographical and interpretative essays, Father Fichter attempts to trace to their roots some of the main ideas behind the vast social changes of the last three hundred years. Thus "the root of economic liberalism" is traced to Mandeville, the root of modern social work to Vincent de Paul and Antoine Frédéric Ozanam, the French Catholic lay leader. Other thinkers treated are Marx, Rousseau, Tolstoy, Thomas Paine, Robert Owen, Charles Kingsley, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Bishop Wilhelm von Ketteler, Pope Leo XIII, Cardinal Manning, and Carl Schurz. In each case the author uses his subject as a peg on which to hang (and this not only metaphorically) an idea, a philosophy, or a practice.

The basic frame of reference for the interpretation and criticism of these ideas is the Catholic religion, and it is argued that "the *via media* of social philosophy can be founded only on our Catholic philosophical concepts. All others lead us into the maze of sociological bastardy" (p. 311). Such an approach is not without a certain interest to the student of social ideas. The author's wide reading and evident fervor for his biographical subjects lend an appeal to this book which might repel some readers by its framework and assumptions. They would say that its catholicity has more to offer than its Catholicism.

J. RUMNEY

*University of Newark*

*Scholasticism and Politics.* By JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. viii+248. \$2.50.

If the voice of Maritain is the voice of one of God's prophets, then there are two causes for the present crisis of Western Civilization. One is the rejection of God; the other, the rejection of Thomas Aquinas. Both God and Aquinas are embodied in the mystical existence which is the Catholic Church. Thus for Maritain, the rejection (in short) of Catholicism by the majority of Western nations is the essential cause of the modern crisis.

Maritain tries to show that the ultimate consequences of this rejection are materialism and irrationalism, heresy and atheism, false democracy and dictatorship. In philosophy, for example, this rejection has produced the rationalistic materialism of communism and democratic individualism and the racial or *étatist* irrationalism of Nazism and Fascism. In theology, it has produced the heresy of Protestantism, which logically culminates in the monstrosity of atheism. In politics, it has set up the unreal and false body of Rousseauian or Proudhonian democracy which ultimately transforms itself into fascist and communist totalitarianism. In psychology, it has led to the reduction of the person to the individual, i.e., of the human being infused with the love and spirit of God to the human being existing as a material body with material wants. In ethics, it has exaggerated the life of action for the sake of action, minimized the life of reason, and ignored the life of mystical contemplation of God.

Maritain says the same thing that many intelligent people have said many times, but in different words and from other points of view. Many political scientists and sociologists have observed that man is not the purely economic man, that he has an intellect and a heart and a thirst for truth and justice. They, too, have observed that a society, a philosophy, a politics, and an ethics which fail to satisfy the basic needs and desires of men are ultimately repudiated. Many—needless to say—have also observed that no extant society today is adequate to fulfill its obligations and that a new social order is needed.

But Maritain can not remain content with the findings of experience. He must give these truisms a supernatural form. To him, man's nature is as it is because of God. The truth and justice sought by man is not relative to condition and circumstance, but is absolute because it is God's Truth and Justice. Man and society can be saved only if both infuse themselves with the mystic spirit of God.

To Maritain, there is only one mode of infusion: it must be with the theological hypodermic of Catholicism. All other modes, religious and secular, are insufficient, even unholy.

Maritain interprets the facts of church history or the facts of the history of religion to suit his theo-political bias. He therefore considers Catholicism not as the actuality it is, but as the vision of paradise which lights up his mind. As vision, Catholicism is the temporal and mystical organ of God intended by Him to guide man to his individual and social salvation.

Maritain's covert oscillation between actuality and vision is revealed in several important instances. As a visionary, he defends democracy against totalitarianism, freedom of thought against religious or state censorship. But as a Catholic philosopher, whose prime purpose is to defend the Church, he surreptitiously introduces actuality. As a realist, he insists that "The Christian [i.e., Catholic] religion is not enslaved to any temporal regime. It is compatible with all forms of legitimate government" (p. 85). With these words, he transforms the "vision" of democracy into the "actuality" of Catholic interest. He suddenly makes very clear that it is not political democracy which he is really defending, but any government in which the interests of the Church are preserved. Such a government is "legitimate."

As a visionary, he creates two spheres which interpenetrate without conflict in the life of man. One belongs sovereignly to the Church; the other, sovereignly to the State. One is the sphere of "Catholic Action," which seeks the transcendental, mystical good of all mankind; the other is that of "Civil Action" which concerns the temporal interests of men. But as a realist, Maritain admits that "Catholic Action" can "be contaminated . . . by political action" . . . "when it is a question of defending, on certain precise points . . . interests specifically moral and religious" (p. 211). What these "precise points" are, he fails to explain; but he sadly admits that Catholics, lay and clerical, have usually failed in practice to keep his two spheres distinct and separate.

As a visionary, Maritain visualizes the Church at its medicinal work of healing the spiritual and temporal sores of modern civilization. And lo! The



*Civitas Dei* shimmers golden in the light of the sun. But as a realist, he can not help but foresee dark doom for man unless the Church, here and now, purifies itself (p. 240).

Maritain, perhaps, may really be right. There are many, however, who, lacking his faith, will continue to doubt that the philosophy and religion of Thomas Aquinas can ever again become a world-civilizing force. At any rate, one thing seems certain. The proof, which will cancel many of our doubts, lies in the more or less immediate future.

RUBIN GOTESKY

New York, N. Y.

*The World's Need of Christ.* By CHARLES A. ELLWOOD. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1940. Pp. 237. \$2.

Professor Ellwood occupies a distinguished position in American sociology. He was the first sociologist to master technical psychology and introduce it into systematic sociological literature. He has been outstanding for his insistence that the chief function of sociology is ameliorative—that it is a philosophy of social betterment. Within this general framework he has contended in a number of able books that religion must be the dynamic agent in promoting social reform. Those who know Ellwood best realize that he is a noble and earnest character, rivalled in this respect only by the late Professors Small and Cooley. Hence, his arguments must command our respect if not our complete agreement.

Ellwood's latest book is more personal and more permeated by evangelical zeal than his earlier books on religion and Christianity. It shows that he takes the teachings of Christ to heart more vitally and literally than has heretofore been evident. His argument is essentially that Christianity, so far, has been but very slightly based upon the real teachings of Christ. He believes that the latter are adequate to work a fruitful social revolution in the twentieth century and he recommends their earnest cultivation in the present world crisis.

In his first chapter Ellwood presents what he believes to be the actual teachings of Christ. He then proceeds to tell us in successive chapters how Christ has been neglected in science, philosophy, the Christian religion and the Christian church, business and industry, and politics and international relations. He then suggests in cogent fashion how the teachings of Christ might well be applied to the solution of the problems of our own day. His argument is that we must first know Christ, then introduce him to the Christian church and, after so doing, use the church to install and spread the teachings of Christ. This is not a new position. It is in all respects in harmony with that of the more devout Deists of the eighteenth century.

With the criticisms of organized Christianity offered by Professor Ellwood and with his thesis that our Christian civilization is essentially Christless we can hardly quarrel. Whether the teachings of Christ are adequate to the problems of the twentieth century is quite another matter. The present reviewer has comprehensively marshalled the arguments which oppose Ellwood's position.

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Certainly the teachings of the Nazarene can only be adapted to the problems of our day through exegesis and reinterpretation so heroic as to tax even Ellwood's enthusiasm and ingenuity. Much of the book is obviously only Ellwood talking through the mask of Christ. At the most, we can only concede that the teachings of Jesus are valuable in our day if implemented by social science. But certainly the teachings of Christ are superior to those of most contemporary leaders. Therefore, we may wish Ellwood well in his crusade to revive and apply them.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Cooperstown, N. Y.

*Student Attitudes Toward Religion.* By ERLAND NELSON. *Genetic Psychology Monograph*, 1940, 22: 323-423. Provincetown, Mass.: The Journal Press.

This study will please a lot of people who are worried about the possible decline of religion and the "bad effects" of college on the rising generation. It also will disappoint a smaller number who think that college really "educates" people to deal more rationally with the world. Such conclusions doubtless will be drawn though I do not think the study warrants it.

In general, Nelson's work confirms previous studies though in some instances there is considerable discrepancy in the percentages shown by his and other investigations. These are probably due to differences in methods and to phrasal differences in statements intended to elicit "attitudes." These results are: state universities are less "religious" than denominational colleges; men, than women; seniors, than freshmen; northern students, than southern.

The data were collected by the administration of Thurstone's scales, *Attitudes toward Sunday Observance, the Church, Reality of God, and Influence of God on Conduct*, in 18 colleges and universities, 3749 responses being obtained. Four state, six Lutheran, three Friends, and one Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian, Adventist, and U. B. institutions were used, distributed in the South, Midwest, and East. It is not stated who administered the tests in the various institutions nor under what conditions they were given. I cannot see in what way the favorableness or unfavorableness of the students toward the colleges they were attending can be regarded as a "test of the test," as Nelson says it was. He seems to think this has some important bearing upon the seriousness and frankness with which the students responded. In order to compare these test performances with the subsequent activities of the subjects, he plans to restudy them at five year intervals. It is difficult to see how this will be possible since name signing was optional. Hence, only those who signed (and we do not know what proportion did) can be studied later. This may be an important selective factor, particularly in the denominational schools, where the very "religious" might sign to "prove" they are not "ashamed" of their religion. Militant antireligionists might also sign to "prove" they are not "afraid of their stand"—the kind of people who "defy God to strike them dead for blasphemy"—a very "religious" type (with reversed English) who try to "convert" people "away from religion."

The results for the state universities are certainly more representative of what is going on in the country than are those from denominational colleges. In all four tests, the state universities' scores were considerably lower than those of the other colleges. These students constituted only about 27 percent of the sample. Therefore, when Nelson lumps them all together and states "The mean score . . . , 8.08, indicates that these students . . . feel that their belief in God does influence their conduct" (page 401), he gives an erroneous impression, because the score of the state university students is only 7.4 ( $SD=2.08$ ), just two intervals above midpoint, whereas the Catholic score is 9.25 ( $SD=.94$ ). The dispersion measure used,  $SD$ , was generally much larger in the state than other schools. All the general conclusions are more or less biased in this way because over two thirds of the sample are from rather strict denominational schools whose students would be expected to be quite religious. Hence, the study is worth very little as a general statement of what college students believe, or say they believe, on these matters, with the exception of the data from the state universities, one of which is in the "religious" South and so biases even this sample.

The question of the scales themselves is important, as Merton has recently pointed out. They need better logic and semantic analysis than most of them have thus far received. The whole idea of equal appearing intervals is suspect and probably is little more than a statistical trick. Many of the statements are obviously loose—if not licentious—and would require fifteen theological counterparts of the Philadelphia lawyer to make any sense out of them. A near-midpoint statement on the God-and-Conduct scale is "The idea of God neither helps nor hinders my endeavor to lead a decent life." The lowest scale statement is "Only fools and hypocrites talk about God influencing them"; the highest, "I have completely surrendered my life to God." I don't know what such statements mean. The only "attitude" they evoke in me is confusion and exasperation. Many students probably feel the same.

This should not be taken as a condemnation of scales; it is rather a plea for better scales. For example, a scale based on statements about the actual behavior of people—church attendance, contributions, amount and regularity of Bible reading, praying, etc.,—might get us somewhere in defining and measuring religious "attitudes." A still better method would be to *observe the actual behavior* of people, to rely as little as possible upon what they say they "believe"—or even do. If one thinks it important to find out what people say they think or feel, then Leuba's method of 25 years ago seems vastly preferable to the one used by Nelson. Leuba defined rather accurately what he meant by Personal God and Immortality. His respondents knew pretty well what he meant. Intensive study, even case study, of even a small but representative sample would be better than potshotting at a large biased sample, no matter how elaborate the statistical analysis of such a collection of bad data may be.

So I conclude that this careful and laborious study does not add up to much. It deals with a very important subject in a way that is only apparently scientific, if by science we mean an accurate description of what *is* and

is happening in a given field. It is too bad the time and energy expended here could not have been applied toward getting a record of actual religious behavior, or at least statements about it, from a representative sample.

Of course, the data from each class of schools may be representative of these classes, though we are given no reasons for thinking this is so, and no certainty that the tests were administered uniformly in all of them by equally competent people. Some generalizations regarding the "attitudes" as measured by these scales in each type of school may be warranted, but certainly generalizations about the entire college population are not warranted. It is too bad that Nelson was not more critical of his own method and especially of his conclusions. He has furnished pseudo-scientific evidence of the kind that pseudo-scientific propagandists love—and we may be sure they'll use it—to Nelson's discredit and also to the discredit of quantitative social research.

READ BAIN

*Miami University*

*Toward Christian Democracy: A Profession Takes Its Bearings.* Edited by S. M. KEENY. New York: Association Press. 1939. Pp. xiv+212. \$2.00.

This interesting book is a collection of extracts from and summaries of talks given by H. A. Overstreet, Hedley S. Dimock, A. J. Stoddard, Paul Kellogg, R. E. G. Davis, Gregory Vlastos, J. Edward Sproul, A. R. Klemmer, and L. K. Hall, and reports of discussions at the U. S. and Canada Y.M.C.A. conference held at Toronto in 1939. This volume reflects a keen appreciation at this conference of the changing attitudes and needs of youth and a desire of some of the leaders in the Y.M.C.A. movement to adapt their programs and personnel to these changing needs and attitudes of youth.

Two chapters in this volume might well be read and pondered by all who have contact with youth—particularly youth as they try to find their place in democratic society as we know it today. Overstreet points out that youth must face situations that confront them. He argues that often our institutions designed to help youth do not help them. Speaking of formal education he says, "Most schools and colleges are not even a preparation for life; they are a contradiction of life. . . . We need a new man-and-woman-making kind of education." There is the implication that the Y.M.C.A. can and should help provide this kind of education.

Gregory Vlastos analyzes faith, the final test of which he says is social action. He points to accepted inconsistencies between faith and action. We prate of democracy, but we do not run our businesses democratically; we speak of equality, but we have the greatest inequalities of wealth in the world; we speak of brotherhood, but we discriminate against Negroes and Jews.

Three types of changes in and out of "the profession" seem to develop from this report. First, there are the changes in the work of the Y.M.C.A. program as it carries on with youth. These changes would focus on the changing needs of the youth with whom they are working. Second, there are the possible changes in attitudes and training of the paid workers within the



profession to conform to the changing program. There is frank recognition that this can take place only gradually. Third are the changes in society itself, changes in the direction of increased "cooperative effort" between individuals and groups as contrasted with what might be called "exploitive effort." This is pointed to as a type of change the democracies must take if they are to continue to function as democracies. This is pointed to as the "Christian Democracy."

A. F. WILEDEN

*University of Wisconsin*

*A Comparative Study of Religious Cult Behavior Among Negroes with Special Reference to Emotional Group Conditioning Factors.* By RAYMOND JULIUS JONES. (Howard University Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. II, Number 2) Washington: Howard University Graduate School, 1939. Pp. iv + 125.

Attention has been drawn frequently to the perennial outcropping of bizarre religious practices in certain communities and among certain strata in American life. This study, centered in Washington, D. C. with some reference to cults in New York City, is to be commended especially for the full, vivid reporting of some fourteen cult services. In selecting those features which clearly distinguish the religious cults from each other and from the closely related evangelistic churches, the author arrives, inadvertently perhaps, at a rudimentary typology of these groups which may lead to greater understanding of cult behavior than the formal analysis does.

Socio-economic and psychological reasons for participation of "lower class" Negroes are suggested as plausible explanations rather than demonstrated as significant factors. An interesting portion of the study is a comparison of personalities and techniques of contemporary cult leaders and those of their prototypes in primitive society—the shamans. The author does not, however, lead the reader through a series of easy analogies—nor does he suggest a direct cultural continuity connecting the primitive cult to its contemporary counterpart. The current cult patterns, he believes, stem from the 18th century Camp Meeting of the Southern Whites, while cult interest and cult behavior are regarded as products of economic, social, and psychological insecurity.

ALLAN W. EISTER

*Philadelphia, Pa.*

*Democracy and Social Change.* By HARRY F. WARD. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940. Pp. vi + 293. \$2.50.

This book, marking the culmination of the author's twenty years as head of the American Civil Liberties Union, and his retirement from the chair of ethics at the Union Theological Seminary, is not only a repository of the wisdom of an old and valient crusader for democracy, but a meritorious sociological contribution. It is concerned with a critical analysis of the problems, objectives, methods, and prospects of democracy under changing social conditions. Specifically, it grapples with such questions as economic

breakdown, the kind of change needed, the sort of democracy required by the changing order, the basic antagonism between capitalism and democracy, the nature of economic and political democracy, the fascist threat, the red bogey, class alignments, the task of intellectuals, religion's role, war and civil liberties, and the present outlook.

The main thesis of the book is that democracy can continue in a world increasingly dominated by forces hostile to it, only by continuous adaptation of our economic and social life to genuinely democratic ends. In support of this it is argued that the traditional democratic dogma which stresses liberty and government by the people reflects a mode of life long since replaced by conditions that require cooperation and equality. The democratic individualism to which we give lip service lags behind practical life. It has become a myth in the midst of new conditions that call for the democracy of collectivism. The problem is to harmonize dogma and conditions. By full exercise of the power inherent in the democratic method this can be accomplished. In fact the realization of democracy as mass power, not merely as method, is the crucial issue, for through this realization democracy will become sufficiently dynamic to achieve fulfillment.

Although the book is written for the general reader, and lacks index and documentation, the social scientist will find it valuable for its clear grasp and constructive criticism of social institutions. He will be impressed with the fact that the author speaks with the authority that comes from long contact with the practical aspects of democratic citizenship where they are being challenged and tested.

NEWELL L. SIMS

*Oberlin College*

*A Pioneer Merchant of St. Louis, 1810-1820.* By SISTER MARIETTA JENNINGS, C.S.J., Ph.D. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. Pp. 219. \$2.50.

*The Course of the South to Secession.* By ULRICH BONNELL PHILLIPS. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939. Pp. xi+176. \$2.50.

*Freedom of Thought in the Old South.* By CLEMENT EATON. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1940. Pp. xix+343. \$3.

*The Course of American Democratic Thought.* By RALPH H. GABRIEL. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1940. Pp. xi+452. \$4.

*Political Science in American Colleges and Universities, 1636-1900.* By ANNA HADDOW. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939. Pp. xiv+308. \$2.50.

These books constitute a sort of collection of essays in political sociology. They also illustrate admirably a trend toward the analysis and definition of American public life and idealism from 1800 to the present hour. Sister Jennings' account (a Ph.D. dissertation) portrays the practical economic interest and struggle in a pioneer Mississippi river town between 1810 and 1820. If the author had hated theory like sin she could not have had less interpretation in her day by day accounts of the humdrum of buying and sell-

ing and exploiting the Indians with "fire water" in return for their pelts and lead. If the author shows no imagination in her narrative, at least the reader may come out of the last page with a feeling that he has been all up and down the rivers between Pittsburgh, New Orleans and Dubuque and has seen American frontier life in its coonskin cap, buckskin leggings, and all the rest. He knows about the heavy death rate in St. Louis and the pettiness of the river towns, although the author says not a word about either.

If there is no theory in Sister Jennings' narrative, Professor Phillips has struggled hard to water his facts with interpretative thought. This book consists of seven public lectures edited by Professor Coulter of the University of Georgia as a sort of memorial to Professor Phillips, because they represent the clearest expression of his theory about slavery and secession. Being a modern historian, Phillips of course desired to arrive at his theory inductively, even at the expense of being commonplace. I think he has been commonplace for the most part, but he has done pretty well as a historical interpretationist. Last summer I sat through six weeks of public lectures on American Nationalism and Culture at a university in which Phillips once taught, arranged and partly executed by its history department. The impression I emerged with was, "How much better all this could have been done by the sociologists and how utterly oblivious the professional history men are of this fact." I know it is scandalous to say this, but who else will tell it to the history people? The fact is, the history professors are just beginning to discover political sociology and being buried under the dead weight of the past they are unaware that it has already been discovered and practiced. But let them write and speak. It is one of the best ways to learn. Phillips' account of Colonial liberalism, of the Virginia aristocracy, the struggle over slavery and the theory of race, and of the "fire eaters" who brought on secession, is worth reading. His purview is good and his critical powers were adequate, if not brilliant.

But a far better work, both in conception and in execution, covering almost the same theme, is Eaton's centennial prize essay. Eaton has a truly sociological conception of the period, viewing it as a conflict between frontier liberalism and a growing conservatism arising in defense of an outmoded economic and political institution—slavery. Through Eaton's eyes we get the best picture yet made of the eighteenth century liberals of the South, who were closer than the northern leaders to French and English liberalism. With a masterly control of a surprisingly rich body of data drawn from all manner of sources he traces the gradual transformation of opinion in the South until it becomes almost exclusively a defense of the "peculiar institution" and of the supporting "right" of secession. He shows clearly the partisanship of the poor whites in the lower South and the strong anti-slavery sentiment which survived through the era of intolerance, especially in the upper South. The intellectual leaders of the South as well as the "fire eaters" and the political prostitutes come vividly into view. This work might properly have been called an essay in the political sociology of the ante-bellum South.

What Eaton has done for the early South, Gabriel has achieved, with note-

worthy differences, for the country as a whole from the 1840's to the present. The differences are mainly in the nature of a greater generality and a more marked abstractness of treatment, due to the wider range of interests covered, and in the case method of illustration he employs as distinguished from the running narrative of Eaton. The result is that Gabriel achieves greater vividness of impression, but somewhat at the expense of continuity and smoothness of transitions. The total picture is perhaps as good, but the selection of his material is obvious. The ground covered is much the same as that in the Beards' *Rise of American Civilization*, but Gabriel's work lacks the even tenor and the fine logical consistency of the former survey. It is also more nearly limited to theory. Yet it is just as convincing. Gabriel's theme is the transition from an unquestioning frontier faith in the power of individualistic democracy to save man and mankind from the errors and wrongs of the past to a growing realization that it will do neither. In its place is developing a socialized concept of democracy which repudiates the old *laissez-faire* individualism and gospel of wealth but retains its missionary spirit, which goes windmill-chasing on such tottery Rosinantes as "To make the world safe for democracy," while the blubbing Sancho Panzas stand by and leave us holding the bag of their liberation. But it is not a propaganda book. On the other hand it is an interpretation of the halting and inconclusive evolution of American democratic theory thus far, displaying a wider and a more intensive grasp of American leaders of social thought than can be found in any other published work known to this reviewer. Yet, good as is this purview, there is much that is left out, whether because the book would not contain all of it or because the author's horizon was circumscribed I do not know. As it is, it is an interpretation which no social scientist can afford to ignore. Less able works have been awarded Pulitzer prizes.

Miss Haddow's study of political science in American Colleges is exactly the sort of thing Dr. Jessie Bernard and I have been working on for more than a decade with respect to sociology. It is gratifying to see that the political scientists have a series in which such books may be published. The value of this book lies in the fact that it is a history of political science in the United States in terms of the courses offered in colleges and universities. The trends to be noted here are most interesting and parallel closely those found in sociology.

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*Men on the Move.* By NELS ANDERSON. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. xiii+357. \$3.00.

*The Railroader.* By W. FRED COTTRELL. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1940. Pp. ix+145. \$2.00.

*Men on the Move* is intended as a convenient summary of recent studies on the estimated two million workers who cross state lines yearly in search of jobs. Its presentation lies between the technical and the popular.

The seasonal labor of the migratory casual worker was once valuable to agriculture, lumbering, and construction; but technological changes have greatly reduced his usefulness. Now these unattached migrants are being

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replaced on the highways by swarms of migrant families. Anderson reviews the findings on the characteristics of both unattached and family migrants. In both cases the dominant reasons for migration are economic. The reader should consider that such available sources of information as the records of Federal Transient Bureaus cannot give a representative picture of all migratory workers, much less of all migrants.

Other subjects treated are the hardships of migrants in finding work in an already overcrowded labor market, the types of jobs they do find, legal and extra-legal discriminations against them, and recent programs for assisting the less successful. There is also a discussion of such broad causes of migration as depletion of natural resources, relocation of industries, and technological change. The author points out that although the movements described have their social-pathological aspects and are in part wasted motion, they do serve as a balancer of economic opportunity among areas. Suppression of internal migration during the depression would have resulted in worse tensions than those that appeared, and with industrial revival we can expect more not less migration. Here, however, the interrelations of population trends, distribution of economic opportunity, and internal migration, are developed so sketchily that there is not sufficient integration of the subject with its larger social and economic setting.

There are many excellent photographs from the seemingly inexhaustible files of the Farm Security Administration. The tables are not so commendable. They need titles, and several of them disagree with the text (e.g., Tables 24, 25, and 43).

In *The Railroader* Cottrell writes as a sociologist about an industry in which he has a personal background. The central theme is the effects of occupation upon social participation. His generalizations rest mainly upon his own experience as checked by discussion with other observers. This little essay probably raises more questions about these effects than it settles, but suggests that intensive, controlled studies on specific occupational groups would yield valuable sociological conclusions.

The railroader's extreme mobility impedes family formation and marital adjustment and produces typically urban, secondary-group attitudes no matter where his actual residence. The vital nature of the time-element on the job interferes with the time-planning of outside matters. Consequently, the contacts of workers with their families are irregular, and all family members participate but slightly in community activities.

In the rather hit-or-miss recruiting of personnel, contacts with railroaders are given as the most important factor. Subsequently, seniority has a pervading place in the strongly unionized crafts of this declining industry. The author contrasts morale in the present lean years with that in the past. We learn which workers are accepted as "real railroaders" and which are in varying degrees peripheral as well as the hierarchies of jobs among and within the operating, mechanical, and maintenance of way departments. There is stress throughout on the importance of trade argot, particularly in defining in-group—out-group distinctions, and there is an interesting glossary of railroad terms.

HENRY S. SHRYOCK, JR.

*U. S. Bureau of the Census*

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*Management and the Worker: An Account of a Research Program Conducted by the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works, Chicago.* By F. J. ROETHLISBERGER and WILLIAM J. DICKSON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. 615+xxiv.

*Labour and Democracy in the United States.* By KENNETH WHITE. London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1939. Pp. xi+381.

*The State in Society.* By ROBERT WARREN, LEO WOLMAN, and HENRY CLAY. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1940. Pp. 140.

*The Path I Trod; The Autobiography of Terence V. Powderly.* Edited by HARRY J. CARMAN, HENRY DAVID, and PAUL N. GUTHRIE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. xiv+460. \$4.50.

*Capitalism the Creator; The Economic Foundations of Modern Industrial Society.* By CARL SNYDER. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. 473.

*The Wagner Act.* By JOHN H. MARIANO. New York: Hastings House, 1940. Pp. 229.

*The Busch Jewelry Stores Labor Injunction.* By JOHN H. MARIANO. Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1940. Pp. 238.

*A History of the Chicago Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.* By WILFRED CARSEL. Chicago: Normandie House, 1940. Pp. xxiv+323.

*One Thousand Strikes of Government Employees.* By DAVID ZISKIND. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. viii+279. \$3.00.

*Labor Relations in the Automobile Industry.* By WILLIAM HESTON MCPHERSON. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1940. Pp. xi+173. \$1.50.

*Shorter Hours—How? When?* By HENRY GAVENS. Washington: Ransdell, 1938. Pp. 128.

*Characters of Steel and Steel.* By GEORGE COGAN. Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1940. Pp. 230.

That Pareto's sociological theories are not inherently sterile is amply demonstrated by their application in the experimental researches conducted by Roethlisberger and Dickson. This is not to say that the authors found in *The Mind and Society* a complete set of formulae for their investigations. What they did find was a highly useful conceptual scheme through which they developed effective techniques of inquiry.

Beginning with a study of the relation between fatigue and output, the original experiments showed that fatigue is but one of many factors determining the productivity of the worker. By continuing the experiments in the direction suggested by each discovery of related factors, the investigation gradually evolved into a comprehensive socio-economic analysis of an industrial organization. The scope of the research was extended not only by the inclusion of more factors bearing upon production but also by an emergent recognition of the fact that production is not the sole aim of either management or workers. From this advanced point of view, new meaning was given the interdependence of wages, hours, conditions of work, the formal

and informal organization of workers, and other elements in the worker-management relationship. Moreover, the implications of this interdependence are made clear. The findings of these experiments provide a sound basis for the reconstruction of both theory and practice of labor relationships.

Mr. Kenneth White, a Commonwealth Fund Fellow, reports on six years' (1933-1939) developments in American industrial democracy. Although his views of the American scene are somewhat distorted by a tendency to generalize unrepresentative incidents, his interpretation of the A. F. L.—C.I.O. controversy, the rise of labor as a political power, and the labor legislation of the Roosevelt administration provide a considerable measure of insight. It is unfortunate that though the material seems to warrant a more profound discussion, the concluding chapter is limited to a consideration of the possibilities of a Labor Party.

*The State in Society*, a series of lectures intended "to recapture a sense of the eternal unity of the social problem," is in effect a searching critique of the democratic form of organization. Warren and Wolman emphasize the apparent remoteness of solutions for the problems they formulate. Clay stresses the value of individualism. These lectures should be read closely by all who tend to make facile generalizations about social organization.

Mystic, philosopher, moralist, politician, organizer, Terence V. Powderly was the focal point of varied American ideals and interests at the close of the century. In his autobiography, commendably edited, the reader will find not only a justification of the ideals of the Great Master Workman of the Knights of Labor but also an informative commentary on the culture which underlay the earlier struggles of organized labor. The letters documenting the text enhance the vividness of these memoirs.

Writing expressly for the layman, Carl Snyder provides the simple answers demanded by minds unaffected by the complexities of the "dismal science." He contends that social security for all can be gained and business depressions forever abolished by "the unbelievably simple methods of credit control." This thesis is wobblingly supported by (a) selected correlations between high prices, high profits, and high wages, (b) Pareto's law of universal inequality, and (c) 44 charts depicting various economic trends. A wide range of data is unconventionally interpreted in terms of several classic economic theories. Readers whose economic ideas are derived mainly from sentiment will find this treatise titillating, the more realistically minded will find it incredible.

John H. Mariano, a member of the New York bar, discusses in four essays the Wagner Act, labor injunctions, labor and the courts, and labor as a political force. Slightly tinged by an unconscious alignment with the conservative views inherent in the institutions of law, these essays present a clear statement of the law and the controversies it entails. Although the emphasis on the common purposes of labor, capital, and the courts is exhortative rather than sociological, this book is a useful contribution to the sociology of labor relations.

As the Referee of the Busch Injunction Case, Mr. Mariano gives an authentic description of the extensive litigation and intra-employee contro-

versy involved in this particular case. The author's conclusion that the case illustrates how not to conduct a labor dispute is applicable to the litigants, the courts, and other participants.

Writing primarily to promote the *esprit de corps* of the membership, Mr. Carsel has nonetheless produced a commendable case history of the Chicago Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. Here are discussed in painstaking detail all the events and personalities which attend the birth and growth of a labor organization. This book is valuable not only to the student of labor organization but also to the sociologist in search of dependable descriptive material relating the processes of cooperation and coordination.

Strikes in government service are comparatively rare, of short duration, and limited to the branch of service in which they originate. Mr. Ziskind, describing over a thousand strikes which have occurred during the past century, concludes that such strikes are justifiable and that labor rights now peculiar to workers in private enterprise should be granted to government workers. The interpretation of the data is considerably affected by an unwarranted stress on the similarities between government and private employment.

McPherson's brief study presents an accurate account of labor relations in the automobile industry during the years 1933-1940. Entirely on the descriptive level, it does not attempt to discuss any of the underlying economic and political issues. Only in the final chapter does the author intrude to declare his opinion that labor and management should recognize their interdependence.

In his preface, Gavens states that his "theoretical discussions are not carried so far into the realm of impractical hypotheses as an academician would carry them if he were writing for a group of his colleagues." Within these limits he has written a common-sense essay on the subject of shorter hours. A lengthy bibliography is appended.

*Characters of Steel and Steel* is a collection of short stories describing in most unrealistic terms the lives of steel workers.

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